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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM, THE LITERA TUBE, TH.E THEORETICAL BASC:S 1 
AND DEFINITION OF TERNS 
I • THE PROBLEM 
William Brigance in his Speegh, .ll.§. Techniques Jarul 
Disciplines 1n § ~ Sogiety reports the German psychologist 
Zillig 1 s experiment wherein ten pupils were apparently 
selected at random, placed in front of their classmates, and 
asked to follow simple instructions, i,e., "Raise your right 
hand. 11 The other members of the class were instructed to 
carefully judge each performing student on his ability to 
follow directions. In actuality, the selection of the ten 
students had been determined some weeks prior to the experi-
ment when a secret vote had been conducted among members of 
the class to identify the "most liked" and "least liked" 
students. The ten pupils who were "selected at random" were 
in reality two groups, the five "most liked" and five "least 
liked" as identified by the votes of their classmates, 
Shortly before the experiment the five "most liked" students 
were instructed to behave exactly opposite to the instructions 
given. Thus when ordered to lift their right hands the five 
most popular students elevated their left hands while the 
"least liked'' group followed the order correctly. A number 
of similar procedures followed and then the observing students 
rated the performers on their direction fol l owing ab i lity. 
Even though the five "most liked" students had been 100 per 
2 
cent wrong in their actual beha vior , "When class scores were 
totaled , it was found that the best liked students had been 
graded higher than the leas t liked." 1 
Brigance introduces the d i scussion of thi s experiment 
as an analogy to the personality dynamics of the persuasive 
speech situat ion. If for a moment the analogy is made con-
crete , the performing students imagined to be ten speakers 
divided into two teams supporting opposing si de s of an argu-
ment with the five nrnost liked" students using t ot ally irra-
tional proof in their a r gumentati on, t hen the results of 
Zill i g ' s experiment are easily expl ained in the t e rminology 
of rhetorical c r iticism. By virtue of their being the "most 
liked" students the ethos of the irrational team was so much 
greater than that of their opposition that , r egardles s of 
what the y said , the remarks of the winning tea m were more 
worthy of belief than were those of the f i ve "least liked" 
s tudents . 
Brigance conclude s his presenta tion of Zillig 1 s work 
wi th the pithy Qomment , "I f I like you , you are right. If I 
don ' t like you , you are wrong! 112 
1Wi lliam Norwood Brigance , Speech , 112 Techniques ~ 
Disciplines 1n ~ ~ Society (New York: Appleton-Century 
Crofts , Inc., 1952), p . 100. 
2.I.lilii. 
3 
The Importance Q( Ethos 
Though he possibly overstates for emphasis, Brigance 
has well illustrated one of the beliefs concerning the nature 
of persuasion which has remained almost constant since the 
beginnings of rhetorical scholarship, that one of the major 
factors contributing to the persuasiveness of any speaker is 
the ethos of that speaker. In fact, it would seem that when 
forced to select the most important of the three forms of 
rhetorical proof, logical (logos), emotional (pathos), and 
personal (ethos) rhetoricians are inclined to grant primacy 
to ethos. Perhaps the first to state this belief was 
Aristotle. 
The character (ethos) of the speaker is a cause of 
persuasion when the speech is eo uttered as to make him 
worthy of belief; ••• It is not true, as some writers 
on the art maintain, that the probity of the speaker 
contributes nothing to his persuasiveness; on the con-
trary, we might almost affirm that his character (ethos) 
is the most potent of all means to persuasion.3 
Aristotle is not alone in his estimate of the import 
of ethos. Though separated by nearly twenty-four centuries, 
Ewbank and Auer are very close to the Greek master in their 
estimate of the importance of the personal appeal of the 
speaker. 
3Aristotle, The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. Lane 
Cooper (second edition; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
Inc., 1932), pp. 8-9. 
We tend to accept ideas from those we like. The 
reverse of this statement is equally true: we tend 
to reject equally good ideas from those we dislike.4 
4 
Returning to a scholar of antiquity, it is interesting 
to note in Quintillian 1 s two-fold description of the perfect 
orator the first requisite has nothing directly to do with 
the speaker's use of logical or emotional proofs, but is 
rather a description of the character of the man who uses 
these proofs. The orator is first "a good man" who secondly 
is "speaking well. 11 Neither Quintillian 1 s description nor 
rhetorician's emphasis upon ethos should be viewed as bemean-
ing to speaking skill, logos, or pathos, for both judgments 
seem almost dictated by two factors of the speech situation. 
First, as Mudd and Sillars point out, the nature of rhetorical 
proof tends to emphasize ethos. 
However regrettable it may be, evidence and argument 
develop proof that is no more than probable, the fact 
cannot be avoided. It must be recognized, therefore, 
that much of the persuasion which a speaker ~ffects is 
the result of his own influence as a person.' 
Second, the speech situation involves human beings and 
all of their natural tendencies, and one of these inclinations 
4 Henry Lee Ewband and J. Jeffery Auer, Discussion~ 
Debate Tools of a Democracy (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, Inc., 1951l, p. 244. 
5charles s. Mudd and Malcolm o. Sillars, Speech Con-
~~ Communication (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing 
Company, 1962), p. 200. 
is " 1 ••• to accept as probably true statements made by 
persons whom they admire or respect ••• •6 to reason from 
the image of the speaker to his ideas or conclusions,"? 
In summary, rhetoricians have recognized that the 
circumstances of the speech situation tend to highlight the 
speaker as a person and thus the personal impact (ethos) of 
the speaker can greatly influence the effect of his remarks 
upon the audience, 
Purpose of ~ Study 
5 
Granting the importance of ethos, any study casting 
further light on this vital portion of rhetorical theory 
would be of value to the over-all knowledge of public address. 
The general purpose of the study to follow is to conduct such 
an investigation. More particularly the following pages will 
present an attempt to use the theory and method of contemporary 
personality research in an effort to more fully explain the 
nature and functioning of ethos in an actual speech situation. 
The remainder of this initial chapter will be given over to 
a review of rhetorical thought concerning ethos, an examina-
tion of five major contributions to the literature of per-
sonality theory (specifically that portion of personality 
6 Wayne C, Minnick, ~ ~ of Persuasion (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), p, 112, 
7Robert T, Oliver, H. P, Zelko, and P. D. Holtzman, 
Communicative Speech (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, 
1962). p. 311. 
6 
theory dealing with the "authoritarian personality"), and a 
synthesis of these two fields of thought which will lead to 
the formulation of a hypothesis concerning the nature of ethos 
and its relation to personality. 
Etho§, ~Definition~ Sources; ~ Difficulty of Location 
Before reviewing rhetorician's attempts to isolate and 
describe the nature and sources of ethos, it would seem neces-
sary to arrive at a general understanding of the term. For 
both the purposes of a review of rhetorical literature and 
the study to follow, ethos can best be seen as that portion 
of the speaker's character or personality which being revealed 
by the speaker and perceived by the audience both before and 
during the speaking situation effects the persuasiveness of 
that particular speaker. 
Though of great importance and ease of general defini-
tion, perhaps no other factor in public address is so elusive 
as ethos. Scholars can apply the rules of logical analysis 
to the rational appeals used by a given speaker and arrive at 
an accurate appraisal of his use of reasoning. Likewise, 
scholars can engage in counting, categorizing, and describing 
the number and types of emotional appeals employed by a speaker. 
But, systems like these break down when applied to ethos. 
Logic is ultimately reduced to the basic processes of induc-
tion and deduction. Emotional appeals, though more evasive 
of analysis, can be evaluated in terms of the basic inherent 
and learned vi tal needs of the audience. But, what are the 
ultimate sources of ethos? 
7 
As the definition above implies, one of these sources 
would be the character of the speaker. It is from this 
orientation that Aristotle begins his analysis of ethos. 
Ethos, in his view is determined by the speaker's revealed 
8 11 intelligence, character, and good will. • These three 
general features of the speaker's personality are felt by 
Aristotle to have their basis in the degree to which the 
speaker possesses nine virtues: justice, courage, magnificence, 
liberality, gentleness, temperance, magnanimity, wisdom, and 
prudence.• 9 This technique of describing the sources of 
ethical appeal by listing virtues and characteristics which 
if possessed by a speaker will tend to increase his ethos 
has been continued to the present day. To Aristotle's list, 
Cicero added "good nature • • • , piety • • ., and lack of 
avarice. 1110 Modern theorists have suggested further sources. 
Minnick imludes "physical energy and tonus, self discipline, 
8 Aristotle, QR. Qii., p. 92. 
9 ~ •• p. 47. 
10 Cicero, ~ Oratore Book II as quoted by Lester 
Thonnsen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Critici~m, ~ Develop-
~ Qi Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal New York: The 
Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 385. 
8 
confidence, poise, color, eccentricity and uniqueness ••• 1111 
while McBurney, O'Neill and Mills point to "preparation, 
intensity, flexibility, and directness." 12 
Beyond listing particular personal characteristics 
which contribute to a speaker's ethical appeal, rhetorical 
critics have also considered ethos as arising from proper 
audience adaptation. Plato, who was perhaps more concerned 
with the character of the orator than any other critic, made 
knowledge of how to cope with particular audiences central to 
his concept of the effective orator, admonishing his students 
that as a doctor's success is concomitant with his knowledge 
of men's bodies so, the orator's success hinges upon his 
knowledge of men's souls and the various types of speeches 
he should employ to lead the souls of various types of men.l3 
This principle has remained of fixed importance since Plato's 
time. Commenting upon Aristotle's restatement of Plato's 
concern for audience adaptation Thonnsen and Baird state, 
11
• • • this pronouncement has almost become a rhetorical 
11Minnick, QQ. cit., pp. 113-17. 
12James H. McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and Glen E. 
Mills, Argumentation~ Debate Techniaues of~ Free Society 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), pp. 210-13. 
13Plato, 11 Phaedrus," The Works of Plato, trans. Henry 
Cary (second edition; London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854), as quoted 
in Lester Thonnsen (ed.), Selected Readings 1n Rhetoric aTd 
Public Speaking (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1942 1 
pp. 30-31. 
9 
axiom , •• if he is to be effective the speaker must adjust 
both himself and his ideas to the audience .14 . . . 
An excellent example of two critics viewing ethos as 
established in part by audience adaptation is given by Thonnsen 
and Baird in a brief analysis of Daniel Webster's opening 
appeal in a murder case. 
Webster, it will be noted, attempts to reflect the 
spirit of his good intentions and his high moral 
principles by disavowing any relish for criminal 
prosecutions, • , • by answering the jury of his 
disinclination to hurry the orderly processes of 
justice; , • , by indicating his reluctance to take 
part in the proceedings; , •• in the main , , • 
(the purpose of this passage) is to convey to the 
jury a favorable impression of the speaker's good-
will and character,l5 
Yet, is it possible to speak with accuracy of a 
speaker's ethos as arising from a specific list of virtues 
which he may or may not possess, or to speak of ethos as 
being established by statements a speaker makes which are 
aimed at enhancing his character, sagacity, and goodwill in 
the eyes of a particular audience? These sources may repre-
sent part of the truth, but modern critics are inclined to 
view the source of ethos as a more general factor than either 
particular characteristics or audience adaptation, 
, , • the speaker's personality traits tend to be 
sensed by the audience through the arguments, the facts, 
the feelings exhibited by the speaker, through the 
14Thonnsen and Baird, QR. Qll., p. 360, 
15 l..!ll.d. J p. 389. 
propositions he defends • , • in fact, through every-
thing he does. Thus, the revelation of character is 
largely an unconscious process--something that the 
speaker cannot help doing--and, unless he is a con-
summate actor, the impression he transmits to the 
audience will reflect his character as it really is,l6 
10 
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills present an equally broad 
description of the determinates of ethos: 
The ethos of the speaker is ultimately determined by 
the choices he makes--by the propositions he elects to 
defend, by the matedals he uses, by his attitudes 
towards persons and things, by the emotions he displays, 
by the language he uses--indeed by all the factors which 
enter into the speech situation, all the cues or signs 
available to the listener for interpretation, The 
speaker is likely to succeed as an advocate to the 
degree that his listeners interpret these choices, 
cues, and signs to mean t~~t he is a man of intelligence, 
character, and good will, 
In addition to emphasizing the indefinite and broad 
nature of the sources of ethos as they are found in the speaker, 
the two passages above serve to introduce a new area in which 
ethos is rooted. Minnick writes of the "impression he the 
speaker transmits .t.Q ~audience." McBurney, O'Neill, and 
Mills speak of "all the cues or signs ayailable .t.Q ~ 
listener !.Q.r. interpretation." In other words, as it operates 
in the speech situation, ethos actually has two general 
sources, the speaker and the audience. This fact is made 
even more clear in the following analysis by Oliver, Zelko, 
and Holtzman: 
16 Minnick, QP. Qii., p, 121, 
17McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, QP. cit., p. 210. 
11 
Further he (the listener) is not really responding to 
the flesh-and-bl&od speaker before him, He is respond-
ing only to what he knows and learns about the speaker 
both prior to the speaking event and during l. t. Thus, 
the listener is responding to the speaker as ~ exists 
1n ~ neryous system Qf ~ listener or as he is per-
ceived by the listener,. He is responding to his own 
image of the speaker ,lo 
Granting that ethos is in part determined by audience 
members' perceptions of the speaker, the search for the 
sources of ethos should turn also to the discovery of the 
factors in the audience which contribute to a speaker's 
ethical appeal. Many such audience centered elements have 
been suggested, There are the obvious advantages given a 
speaker when the audience perceives that they share common 
goals, aspirations, and conditions with the speaker. There 
is the relationship which Ewbank and Auer consider when they 
speak of the audience "liking" the speaker (supra, p. 4), 
Another possibility is suggested by Oliver: 
••• any personality will prove most effectively 
persuasive when it most clearly adheres to the audience's 
pattern of expectation for leadership in that particular 
type of situation,l9 
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills offer another explanation 
in suggesting that the fashion in which the audience per-
ceives the speaker is effected by factors "which are rooted 
in basic attitudes and habits." 20 
18 
Oliver, Zelko, and Holtzman,~· Qii., p. 312. 
19
.Th.lll. , p. 369. 
20 McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills,~. Qii., pp, 208-09. 
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Whatever the cause(s) of all these conditions may be, 
it can be seen in summary that both classical and modern 
rhetoricians agree that a speaker 1 s ethos will be determined 
by the extent to which the audience views him as a man of 
character, intelligence, and good wil~ (It does not seem 
unfair to equate these qualities to the requisites for 
leadership), However, there has been much discussion over 
what factors determine whether or not the speaker will fill 
this description, In the last analysis, it would appear 
that a speaker 1 s succeeding or failing to meet these classic 
requirements will be determined by two factors: (1) the 
total range of choices he makes in projecting his image to 
the audience; and (2) the manner in which the audience member 
perceives the image projected by the speaker. Thus, the 
researcher searching for the sources of ethos as it operates 
in the speech situation should attempt to discover some ele-
ment which will explain both these phenomena. For, if some 
single thing can account in large part for both the choices 
made by the speaker and the fashion in which the audience 
member perceives the speaker, that factor must be viewed as 
a major determinate of ethos. 
As will be explained more fully later, it was the 
central hypothesis of the study to follow that personality 
structure is just such an element as is described in the 
previous paragraph. 
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II. THE THEORY AND LITERATURE OF AUTHORITARIANISM 
Thus far, one of the theoretical bases for this study 
has been examined, namely the rhetorical concept of ethos. 
The second major body of thought from which this investigation 
drew is a recent development in psychology, personality 
theory. Before dealing with this field and its relationship 
to ethos, it would seem necessary to arrive at an understand-
ir.g of the term "personality." Perhaps the most reasonable 
approach to this problem of definition would be that taken 
by Duns. "The writer will use 'personality' to indicate the 
'tone' of the study to follow rather than alittempt to be 
definitive about the term itself. 1121 This position is taken 
not in an effort to evade the responsibility of definition. 
It is an acknowledgment of the admitted ambiguity of the 
term. Duns establishes even at the time Cicero used the 
Latin root of our word personality, persona, it had at least 
four meanings. As further evidence of the vagueness of the 
term, Duns points out that one psychologist accumulated a 
list of fifty definitions of personality which are currently 
22 
used in psychological literature. 
The fifty definitions to which Duns refers indicate 
the breadth of current psychological considerations. 
21 Donald Duns, "A Study of the Relationship Between 
Dogmatism and Speech Behavior" (unpublished Doctoral disserta-
tion, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1961), p. 20. 
22Ibid. 
However, this study is based on the one particular portion 
of personality research which has centered on the concept 
of "authoritarian personality." One of the first major 
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works containing a definitive description of this personality 
type is A. H. Maslow's "The Authoritarian Character Struc-
ture.1123 
"~ Authoritarian Character Structure" 
After long experience in clinical psychology, Maslow 
concluded that there was a definite personality "type" which 
was characterized by a "syndrome" of personality traits. He 
identified this "syndrome" as the "authoritarian character 
structure" and in his article described twenty qualities which 
he felt were conspicuous in an authoritarian personality. The 
most important of these features as theyTelate to this study 
are presented here as summarized by Duns: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
A world view which portrays human beings as 
selfish, stupid, or evil and the world as 
generally threatening. 
A "tendency towards hierarchy, 11 or seeing others 
as either superior or inferior to oneself. 
The "Generalization of superiority and inferi-
ority," (in other words, the superior is 
superior in all things and the inferior is 
inferior in everything). 
That the authoritarian individual is hostile and 
possesses a single scale of values such as 
wealth, power, etc. 
That he identifies kindness with weakness. 
That he has a tendency to "use" people. 
He suffers from guilt feelings and complexes. 24 
23 A. H. Maslow, "The Authoritarian Character Structure," 
Journal Q£ Social Psychology (55:401-11), May, 1943. 
24 Duns,~.~., p. 23. 
Two other characteristics observed by Maslow which 
were not seen as salient to Duns' investigation but bear 
relation to this study are: (1) the desire for power; and 
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(2) a disposition to judge superiority by external standards. 25 
It will be noticed that this basic analysis by Maslow con-
tains characteristics of other works dealing with the con-
cept of authoritarianism. 
The Works Qf Erick Hoffer ~ Erich Fromm 
Following Maslow, two works contributed greatly to the 
literature of authoritarianism, Erich Fromm's Escape ~ 
Freedom26 and Erick Hoffer's ~True Belieyer. 27 Though 
written from differing orientations--as a psychoanalysist 
Fromm is more concerned with the causes and immediate personal 
vesults·of authoritarianism while Hoffer writing as a social 
philosopher is more concerned with its social manifestations, 
totalitarian marn movements--both works may be dealt witn 
together. 
In what seems a paradox, both Hoffer and Fromm believe 
freedom to be the cause of the authoritarian personality. 
25~. 
26Erich Fromm, Escape ~ Freedom (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Wilson, 1941). 
27Erick Hoffer, The True Belieyer (New York: The New 
American Library, 1961). 
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For in their view, freedom is a condition which involves 
unavoidable elements of insecurity, isolation, and anxiety. 
In the past, man was not free, but bound as he was to land, 
church, state, and an inflexible social order the individual's 
life was not an anxious one. The established institutions of 
the past gave every person a creed, social status, and perhaps 
poor but at least, stable position in his economic community. 
Modern society has changed all of this, Each man is no 
longer constrained by social, economic, political, and 
religious bondage. In a very real sense, he ,,feels he is 
"captain of his soul," in control of his social position, 
political allegiance, and economic fate. Seen in this light, 
freedom is a tremendous burden. Acourding to Hoffer and 
Fromm, when a person is faced by this "burden of freedom" and 
cannot bear it he begins to manifest a series of symptoms. 
An undefined anxiety begins to dominate his life and he views 
the world as threatening. He develops the "tendency to give 
up the independence of • • • his • • • own individual self 
and to fuse with somebody or something outside of • • • him-
self in order to acquire the strength which the individual 
self is lacking;" 28 a "striving for submission and dominance" 
becomes part of his motivational pattern and, he indulges in 
"the self torture of self accusation, compulsive behavior, 
28 Fromm, QR. Qii., p. 141. 
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self punishment, cruelty toward others, desire for power, and 
the desire to dominate and be dominated. 1129 Faced with this 
situation, which has arisen from the conditions of freedom, 
the individual can maintain his sanity only by escaping in 
some fashion from his freedom, According to Hoffer's and 
Fromm's thesis, he can accomplish this by becoming part of 
an autocratic political or religious movement for in submitting 
to the creed and total authority of this group a person, in 
effect, "escapes from his freedom" by becoming a •true believer" 
in some "holy" cause. He has, in Duns 1 words, gotten rid of 
"the burden of freedom by piling it onto the shoulders of 
someone else, stronger and wiser than himself ."30 
What is of particular importance to the theory of 
authoritarianism is that in two apparently independent 
studies, Hoffer and Fromm have described two "personality 
structures" which are both quite similar to each other and 
much like the •authoritarian character structure" described 
by Maslow. Beyond this general contribution to the investiga-
tion of authoritarianism, Hoffer makes two observations which 
are of particular importance to the study to follow. First, 
the •authori ty figures" selected by the 11 true believer" are 
individuals who, in personality, are quite similar to the 
29 Duns, QQ. Qlt., p. 34. 
30 Ibid., p. 29. 
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11 true believer" himself.3l Second , the movement to which 
the "true believer 11 surrenders his freedom is, in Hoffer's 
opinion, unimportant : the insecure man has a need to fill 
and the way it is filled is an accident of history. In 
other words, a fanatic is a fanatic by virtue of his per-
sonality: he is a fanatic communist by vittue of his Russian 
birth. This point, that the personality needs are primary 
and the creed which fills these needs secondary, was well 
illustrated by Hitler's remark 11 The petit bourgeois Soc ial 
Democrat and trade-union boss will never make a National 
Socialist , but the Communist always will." 32 
11~ Authoritarl.an Personality" 
It will be noticed that each of the three works above 
is de scriptive and somewhat spe culative in nature . The next 
landmark in the study of authoritarian1sm , 33 "The Authoritarian 
''. 34 Personality," goes beyond description. and speculation and 
enters the realm of measurement. Begun as an investigation 
of anti-semitism , the authors soon sensed that this particular 
31 Hoffer, QR. Q11., pp. 103-11. 
32Herman Rausching, Hitler Speaks (New York: G. P. 
Putnam' s Sons , 1940), p. 134. Quoted from Hoffer, QQ. Qlt., 
p. 25. 
33Duns, QQ. Q11., p. 24 . 
34T. W. Adorno~.~., The Authoritarian Personality 
(New York: Harper and Brothers , 1950). 
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prejudice is only a single element in an entire personality 
"syndrome," and as a result of this discovery, the final 
work covers a vast range of areas of social conflict with the 
central focus resting on the "potentially fascistic or authori-
tarian personality," The first part of the study is given 
over to transcripts of a pair of interviews conducted with 
individuals of known degrees of anti-semitism. It was from 
these and similar sessions that the authors, Adorno Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford, began to detect the general 
anti-minority, ingroup-outgroup "syndrome" which they identi-
fied as "ethnocentrism. 11 Working from the results of these 
interviews and the literature of prejudice the California 
investigators, as they were called, designed two question-
naires, the "A-S" (for anti-semitism) scale and the "E" (for 
ethnocentrism) scale. The first of these two measuring 
devices is devised to "tap" the specifically anti-semitic 
attitude of the responde.nts and consist of a series of state-
ments concerning Jews and Jewish "characteristics." The 
subjects indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree 
with each scale item. As the instrument is designed, the 
greater the subjects total agreement score the more he is 
considered anti-semitic. Two examples from the "A-S" scale 
are as follows: 
}. It would hurt the business of a large concern 
if it had too many Jewish employees, 
8. 
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The Jew's first lQ~alty is to Jewry rather than 
to his country.)) 
The second or "ethnocentrism scale" was designed to 
achieve two ends; first, to test the ingroup-outgroup 
prejudices of various minority group members and second, to 
attempt to measure the general ethnocentrism of which anti-
semitism seemed just a part. The following are three 
examples from this scale. Each example is drawn from one of 
the three "subsoales" (Negro, "minority," and "patriotism 11 )36 
which combine to form the total test: 
34. Most Negroes would become officious, overbearing, 
and disagreeable if not kept in their place. 
15. One main difficulty with allowing the entire 
population to participate fully in governmental 
affairs (voting, jobs, etc.) is that such a 
large percentage is innately deficient and 
incapable. 
?. There will always be superior and inferior 
nations in the world and, in the interests 
of all concerned, it is best that the superior 
be in control of world affairs.37 
It will be recalled that the California investigators 
suspected that anti-semitism was any one factor in a total 
ethnocentric "syndrome." High statistical correlations 
35 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
36These "subscales" represent three attitudes which 
seemed most common to interview subjects who were judged to 
be ethnocentric. For an extensive analysis of the entire 
ethnocentrism scale, see~ •• pp. 102-50. 
37 IQld., pp. 105-06, 108. 
between the results of the "A-S" and "E" scales tended to 
confirm this hypothesis. Thus, the next contribution by 
Adorno and his coTie8gues was the "F" (for fascism) scale. 
This measure was contrived to gauge the deeper personality 
factors which the authors believe to be the roots of anti-
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semitism, ethnocentrism and other "anti-democratic tendencies. 11 
The items for the "F" scale were drawn from analysis of results 
of the "A-S" and "E" scales, additional hypothesis are sup-
plied by further interviews and review of literature dealing 
with prejudice. In this fashion, the final version of the 
"F11 scale was composed of i terns intended to measure a group 
of variables which research indicated would be present in a 
"potentially fascistic" or "authoritarian personality." It 
is interesting to note how closely these variables described 
below compare to the features of the authoritarian personality 
as described by Maslow, Fromm, and Hoffer:38 
a. Conventionalism - rigid adherence to convention, 
middle-class values. 
b. Authoritarian Submission- submissive, uncritical 
attitude toward idealized moral authorities of 
the ingroup. 
c. Authoritarian Aggression - tendency to be on the 
lookout for and to condemn, reject, and punish 
people who violate conventional values. 
d. Anti-intraception- opposition to the subjective, 
the imaginative, the tender-minded. 
e. Superstition~ Stereotype - the belief in 
mystical determinants of the individual 1 s 
fate; the disposition to think in rigid 
categories. 
38 This similarity is to be expected as Adorno et. al. 
draw much of their theory from Maslow and Fromm. 
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f. Power §J:ld "Toughness" - preoccup::o.tion with 
dominance - submissive, strong - weak, leader -
follower dimension; identification with power 
figures ••• exaggerated assertion of strength 
and toughness. 
g. Destructiveness ~ Cynicism - generalized 
hostility, vilification of the human. 
h. Prolectivity - the disposition to believe that 
wild and dangerous things go on in the world; 
the projection outwards of unconscious emotional 
impulses. 
i. Sex - exaggerated concern with sexual 11 goings-on. u39 
As a measure of general authoritarianism, the "F" 
scale was only a partial success. The chief criticisms of 
the device will be presented later. However, the scale is a 
"reliable measure of facism, ethnocentrism, and other forms 
of prejudice,"40 and in over-all contribution to the study 
of authoritarianism, The Authoritarian Personality must rank 
as a landmark. If for no other reasons, it broadened the 
theoretical basis, provided a method of measurement for 
later studies in the field, and gave even further evidence 
of the existence of a specific and identifiable "type" of 
personality, which can best be described as "authoritarian." 
Two contentions presented by Adorno and his col-
41 laborators serve as the basis for two major criticisms of 
39 lliQ..' p. 228. 40 Duns, Q2. Qli., p. 3). 
41 There have been many criticisms of the Adorno work. 
The two included here were selected because they were con-
sidered most important to the Duns study which links the 
study of personality structure to the study of speech. for 
the most extensive analysis of the methods and findings of 
~Authoritarian Personality, the reader is referred to 
Richard Christe and Marie Jahoda (eds.), Stud~es 1n ~Limit 
and Scope .Qf. "The Authoritarian Personality 11 Glencoe, Ill-
inois: The Free Press, 1954). 
~ Authoritarian Personality, The first of these is the 
California investigators' belief that authoritarianism is 
evidenced by a "syndrome" of specific beliefs which can be 
generally classified as politically conservative. Edward 
Schils raises the objection that the "F" scale tends to 
classify all authoritarians as members of the political 
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"right" and tends to be insensitive to the authoritarianism 
of the far "left, 1142 • 43• and 44 
Second, Adorno ~. al, hold that ethnocentrism, anti-
semitism, political conservatism and other "anti-democratic" 
traits are all portions of a single personality syndrome, 
According to the criticism presented by Hyman and Sheatsley, 
this is not necessarily so. Their view is that the results 
obtained from correlations among the several "scales" may 
not point to a "syndrome" which includes all of the "anti-
democratic" traits, The argument and evidence presented by 
these critics indicates that the high correlations are really 
42 Edward A. Schils, "Authoritarianism 'Right' and 
'Left,'" in Christe and Jahoda, .Q.:Q • .Qi.t., pp. 34-39. 
43 In defense of ~ Authoritarian Personality, it 
should be noted that Adorno ~. ~. were most concerned with 
potential fascism rather than general authoritarianism, 
44
rt should be noticed that Schils 1 criticism would 
tend to confirm Hoffer's belief that as a personality trait, 
authoritarianism should exist independent of any specific 
idiology, 
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the result of a central authoritarianism which is "tapped" by 
the content and wording similarity of the questi onna ires. 45 
"The .Qrum gng Closed !il..rul" 
The discussion of the above two criticisms leads to 
the consideration of a final work dealing entirely with 
authoritarianism , Milton Rokeach'S The Open and Closed 
~.46 Though its methodology is similar (though not as 
diversified) to The Authoritarian Personality, Bokeach 1s 
study is theoretically more akin to those of Maslow, Hoffer, 
and Fromm. Unlike the Adorno studies, Rokeach attempts to 
present a general theory of personality which will account for 
all manifestations of belief, not only those of "ethnocentrism," 
"fascism," and "anti-semitism." ~ .Q.Q.rul and Clos~<ll:U.n9. can 
thus be viewed as a return to a search for a general authori-
tarianism. Stil l , there is a central difference between 
Rokeach 1 s woTk and all of the research reported above. 
Beginning with Maslow, these works concentrated their e fforts 
upon describing a factor, authoritarianism , which might or 
might not be present in varying degrees in any personality; 
Rokeach, on the other hand, attempts to isolate a factor 
45Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheats ley, "The Authori-
taria n Personality--A Methodological Critique, 11 in Christe 
and Jahoda, QQ. cit., pp . 50-1)2. 
46 Milton Rokeach , The ~ ~ Closed ~ (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc. , 1960). 
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central to every personality, something which determines 
personality not by its existence b~t by its degree or condi-
tion. 
Rokeach approaches the problem of authoritarianism in 
a fashion differing from those of the earlier mentioned 
authorities in that he attempts a systematic description of 
personality and explains authoritarianism, or to use his 
work "dogmatism" in terms of this general personality con-
struct. 
In Rokeach's view, each personality is characterized 
by a particular belief-disbelief system, a "psychological 
system" which contains everything believed or disbelieved by 
each personality. 
The belief system is conceived to represent all the 
beliefs, sets, expectancies, or hypotheses, conscious 
or unconscious that a person at a given time accepts as 
true of the world he lives in. The disbelief system is 
composed of a series of subsystems, rather than merely 
a single one and contains all the disbeliefs, sets, 
expectancies conscious or unconscious, that to one 
degree4Qr another, a person at a given time rejects as false. "I 
Of particular note here is the conception of the dis-
belief system as other than a mirror image of the belief 
system. The disbelief system contains a number of "sub-
systems" which can be viewed as a continuum ranging from 
disbeliefs of greatest similarity to the belief system to 
47
1"' "·' 33. """ "" " p • • 
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those which are very different from the things contained in 
the belief system. Hence, the belief system of a Communist 
accepts QD& group of political beliefs as true and good and 
rejects to varying degrees as false and bad ~ series of ~­
belief "subSYstems," Socialism, Democracy, Monarchy, and 
Fasci-sm. 
This division into beliefs and disbeliefs is char-
acteristic of the approach by which Rokeach explains per-
sonality, for he views the central feature of his personality 
"construct," the belief-disbelief system, as being comprised 
of three divisions or "dimensions," "belief-disbelief," 
"central peripheral," and "time perspective." 
Belief-disbelief dimension,_ One of the main features 
of the belief-disbelief dimension has been described above, 
the conception of a single system of beliefs and a series of 
disbelief subsystems. Taken collectively, these two systems 
comprise the total thought-set-expectancy content of any 
personality. Beyond this basic segmentation into beliefs and 
disbeliefs, Rokeach hypothesizes three other properties of 
the belief-disbelief dimension. These three, which are found 
to varying degrees in any system, are: {1) Isolation which 
refers to the extent to which an individual's beliefs form a 
logically consistent system; {2) Differentiation which refers 
to the articulation or richness of detail which characterizes 
a given system--how much an individual knows about the things 
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he believes and disbelieves; and (J) Comprehensiveness--nar-
rowness which refers to the range of the subsystems represented 
in a disbelief system--how much a person discriminates between 
those groups who disagree with him. 
Central peripheral dimension. The second major dimen-
sion of the belief-disbelief system is referred to as the 
central peripheral dimension, which is conceived as existing 
in three layers organized along a central-peripheral dimension. 
(1) The central region: As each person goes through 
life, his contacts with the outer world and his inner self 
create a group of beliefs which are unstated and rarely 
questioned but are of vital importance to his personality. 
These beliefs concern the essential nature of the world about 
him, the people who populate that world, and his own self. 
As such, they are central to the manner in which each person 
views and deals with the world which confronts him. 
It is obvious that beliefs concerning the essential 
nature of the world and the self will have an important 
impact upon personality and its central factor, the belief-
disbelief system, Rokeach holds that the entire belief-
disbelief structure emerges frcm certain central beliefs, 
namely, estimates of the "friendliness" of the world and the 
believer's potency or capability of dealing with the world 
he observes. The importance of these central beliefs to the 
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over-all system will be seen in an examination of the other 
two "layers" of the central-peripheral dimension. 
Arising from the content of the central region is the 
intermediate layer which contains beliefs concerning the 
nature and selection of authority. Since the vast majority 
of information used in everyday life is supplied by authority, 
the beliefs of the intermediate layer are of great importance. 
If the individual's central region is characterized by a 
belief in a threatening world and self inadequacy, he will 
exercise great care in the selection of authorities for many 
of those competing for his attention may themselves be part 
of or, at least, unwitting agents of this threat. In addi-
tion, since he is personally impotent, the authorities he 
selects will be his means of combating an unfriendly world. 
In these circumstances authorities will be few and absolute. 
Notice that in this layer, Rokeach is not describing which 
particular authorities an individual selects, he is concerned 
with attitudes which can apply to any authority. 
Rokeach includes another set of beliefs in the inter-
mediate region, beliefs about people in general. This con-
cept is of great importance to this study. 
We suspect that the world of people is generally 
evaluated according to the authorities and belief 
systems they line up with. In other words, we have 
beliefs about people-who-have-beliefs. When authority 
is seen to be absolute, for example, it also leads to 
extreme cognative distinctions between persons as 
faithful and unfaithful, orthodox and heretical, loyal 
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and subsersive, American and un-American, and friend 
and enemy ••• The connection just drawn is considered 
by us as important because it spotlights a possibly 
intimate connection between the way we accept people 
and reject people and the way ~e accept and reject 
ideas stemming from authority. 8 
Rokeach summarizes the three layers of the central-
peripheral dimension in the following terms: 
•• , It is necessary to conceive of three layers 
organized along a central-peripheral dimension: (1) 
A central region represents ••• the person 1s "primi-
tive" beliefs. These refer to all the beliefs a per-
son has acquired about the nature of the physical world 
he lives in, in the nature of the "self" and the 
"generalized other; 11 (2) an intermediate region repre-
sents the beliefs a person has in and about authority 
• • • on whom he depends to help him form a picture of 
the world he lives in; (3) a peripheral region repre-
sents the beliefs derived from authority4 such beliefs filling in the details of his world ffi?p, 9 
1bft ~ perspective dimension. This area is con-
cerned with how an individual views the past, present, and 
future and the relationship he draws between the three, 
Broadness and narrowness are the important variants of the 
time perspective dimension. A broad time perspective would 
be one in which past, present, and future are all represented 
in a balanced and related fashion. A person who "fixates" 
on either the past, present or future would possess a narrow 
time perspective. 
~peripheral dimension. The peripheral dimension 
contains all those specific beliefs which have their origin 
481.Q1.d.' p, 45. 49 l..J2.1..d, ' p. 46. 
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in authority. For example, affirmative or negative beliefs 
about such things as birth control, socialized medicine, and 
the theory of history would be considered peripheral beliefs 
as they are derivable from the formal content of one's 
beliefs about the Catholic Church, the A.M.A., and Marx. 
' 
However, it is not the content of the peripheral area that is 
important to the nature of the belief-disbelief system. The 
important factor is the relationship between these beliefs 
as they exist within a single system. If a person arrives 
at most of his peripheral beliefs by examining information 
from many sources then there is, very likely, "communica-
tion" between these beliefs--he is inclined to accept or 
reject a new idea because it corresponds or conflicts with 
pre-existing beliefs. He is also prepared to discard old 
beliefs when new ones make his old thoughts logically incon-
sistent with the truth as he now sees it. 
This, then, is a brief description of the belief-
disbelief system as it is seen through an examination of its 
three dimensions: Belief disbelief, central-peripheral, and 
time perspective. Many of the characteristics of the open 
and closed system have been suggested above. The following 
is an attempt to make these suggestions more explicit. The 
method employed will be to describe only the closed extreme 
with the understanding that the open mind will possess char-
acteristics opposite to those of the closed system. The 
.. 
' 
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reader should be able to imagine the infinity of degrees of 
openness or closedness which lie between the two poles. 
The belief-disbelief dimension of the closed mind will 
have a few strongly held beliefs and a few isolated, poorly 
differentiated, but strongly rejected disbelief subsystems. 
For example, the ardent member of the John Birch Society 
adheres strongly to a primitive version of Capitalism and 
Republicanism and rejects almost any other economic or 
political system as either Socialistic, Communistic or 
Democratic. 
same thing to 
(Even these three terms seem 
50 the John Birch member.) 
to represent the 
In the central-peripheral dimension, the closed mind 
is characterized by central beliefs which view the world as 
threatening and the individual as powerless. These beliefs, 
as explained earlier, lead to intermediate beliefs which 
hold a few authorities to be absolute and judge other people 
according to the way they react to the selected authorities 
or support "false" authority figures. The zealot almost 
always views the world as composed of a few "enlightened" 
fighting against the hordes of the heathen. The structure 
of the peripheral region of the closed mind finds peripheral 
beliefs in closer •communication" with authority than with 
each other. The resulting isolation can be seen in the 
50See Robert Welch, The ~ Book of ~ ~ Birch 
Society (Belmont, Massachusetts: The Blemont Press, 1959). 
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fashion in which some political thinkers claim they support 
both complete laissez faire and high protective tariffs. 
Finally, the closed mind is seen as having a rela-
tively narrow, future oriented time perspective. The obvious 
example here being the communist's demand for a present 
"dictatorship of the proletariate" in order to secure the 
far distant classless state. 
In addition to the view of personality as determined 
by the structure of the belief disbelief, Rokeach provides 
two additional contributions to the study of authoritarianism: 
(1) the "Dogmatism Scale"5l and (2) experimental, analytical 
and historical evidence that the organization of individual 
belief-disbelief systems strongly influences such diverse 
behavior as problem solving,52 prejudice,53 and selection of 
associates .54 
This latter connection is of special importance to the 
study to follow. After careful analysis of dogmatism scale 
results from various religious and political groups and study 
51The "Dogmatism Scale" will be discussed in detail in 
the next chapter. Briefly, it is a forty item questionnaire 
similar in form but not content to the "F Scale." 
52For a detailed account of the experiments which led 
to this conclusion, see Rokeach, 2Q. ~., pp. 171-242. This 
section offers evidence that the "open minded" individual is 
superior and faster in problem solving which involves the use 
of new systems of thought and action. 
53 54 ~., pp. 132-70. IQld., pp. 109-31 and 312-34. 
of movements of membership between these as s ociations , 
Rokeach reports : 
We generally seem to prefer , to one degree or 
another , those with bel~~f systems that are more 
congruent with our own. J) 
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The work of c . E. Izard serves to confirm this conten-
tion. Izard compared the personality scale scores of friends 
and pairs of individuals who wer e matched by chance . 
"Friends , 11 writes I zard , "were significantly more alike than 
non-friends .u 56 
Summary Q! ~ Literature Q( Authoritari anism 
The five studi es just discussed all tend to confirm 
the existence of a well defined authoritarian or dogmatic 
personality structure. In general , the authoritarian or 
dogmatist is observed to have a dim view of h i mself and 
others and to view the world as threatening . He tends to 
compulsive behavior characterized by rigidity and drives for 
dominance and submission , self accusation , masochism , and 
sadism. In his relations to other men , the authoritarian is 
inclined to project his own subconscious drives i nto the 
behavior of others . He accepts those who seem to be like 
himself without question and rejects all people who seem 
55 1J;U.,d. ) p . 391 . 
56 C. E. Izard , 11 Personali ty Structure and Friendship , 11 
American P§ychologist (14 :)66 ) , July , 1959. 
"different. 11 In this rejection, the authoritarian-dogmatist 
is prone to lump all rejected into one poorly discriminated 
group ignoring the great differences among them. One further 
social manifestation is observed in the authoritarian's 
proclivity for association with other authoritarians. 
Finally, the authoritarian is extremely dependent upon a 
small, highly select group of authority figures which he 
accepts as the final and absolute arbiters of his beliefs 
and actions. 
With the exception of Adorno et. al., the investi-
gators all feel that the authoritarian is not characterized 
by any particular idiology; as a general personality structure 
authoritarianism-dogmatism is more revealing of how an indi-
vidual believes the things he holds true and how he is 
inclined to behave in the world which surrounds him. 
Seen in this light, the theory of authoritarianism 
and its openminded opposite is not an attempt to describe a 
particular neurosis, it is an effort to explain the whole 
personality of any individual and as such provides a basis 
from which it should be possible to investigate all aspects 
of human behavior. 
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Authoritarianism and Speech Behayior; ~ ~ StudY 
Duns 1 "Study of the Relationship Between Dogmatism 
and Speech Behavior"5? can be considered as an attempt to 
partially validate the contention that personality structure 
is a major factor in the determination of human behavior. 
This investigation was conducted to evaluate the general 
hypothesis that if personality structure dictates general 
human behavior, it must affect speech behavior. 
To evaluate this hypothesis, the Rokeach "Dogmatism 
Scale" was administered to a group of prospective communi-
cators. From this population, speakers were selected on the 
basis of having scored in the two extreme quartiles of the 
population's test scores. These speakers then delivered 
extemporaneous oral communications to an audience which 
included a group of judges who had knowledge of the Rokeach 
personality theory. These judges, having no prior knowledge 
of the speakers• dogmatism scores, attempted to identiy each 
communicator in terms of dogmatism. Duns predicted that 
personality structure would effect speech behavior to an 
extent that the judges could correctly approximate the 
dogmatism of the performing speakers.58 After analysis of 
57 Donald Duns, "A Study of the Relationship Between 
Dogmatism and Speech Behavior" (unpublished Doctoral dis-
sertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 
1961). 
58 
.!.:tili!.. • I p • 3 • 
rating data from the judges observations of actual speeches 
and examination speech manuscripts, Duns concludes: 
With all the evidence taken together, there is ample 
proof that it is possible for judges familiar with the 
components of dogmatism to identify and classify speakers 
according to the score s they received on a dogmatism 
questionnaire.59 
Though Duns is careful to indicate certain limitations 
to the application of his findings, the resul ts of his study 
do indicate that speech behavior is determined by personality 
structure as it is measured by the "Dogmatism Scale. " 
Personality Theory ~Ethos Synthesized; Statement Q! Central 
Hypothesis 
It will be recalled that at the c l ose of the discussion 
of ethos (supra, pp. 2-18) , the argument was advanced that 
in the final analysis, two interacting elements determine the 
extent to which a speaker will be received as a man of char-
acter, intelligence, and good will: (1) the total range of 
choices made by the speaker ; and ( 2) what kind of man the 
individual audience member pe rceives the speaker to be. At 
the close of this analysis, the argument was presented that 
if a central factor could be discovered which would account 
for both the speake r's choices and the audience member 's 
manner of perceiving the speake r , this factor could be viewed 
59 Th1.Q.., p. 143. 
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as a major determinate and explanation of the character and 
operation of ethos. 
Two areas of evidence presented in the discussion of 
literature relating to authoritarianism indicate that person-
ality structure may be just such a central factor. (1) The 
confirmation of Duns' hypothesis tends to establish person-
ality structure as a major influence on speech behavior, and 
thus, on the choices made by the speaker. Hence, the speaker 
brings to any speech situation a personality structure which 
will determine the manner in which he will speak. (2) Each 
of the five works on authoritarianism considered above (supra, 
pp. 13-34) contains strong statements to the effect that the 
general manner in which an individual perceives others is 
determined by his personality structure (supra, pp. 17-18, 21-
22, 33, and 34), In other words, the audience member brings 
to the speech situation a personality structure which will 
govern his perception of the speaker. 
If these contentions are true, personality does deter-
mine the two interesting components of ethos, the speaker's 
choices and the audience member's perception of the speaker, 
However, the question yet remains, how does personality struc-
ture account for the degree to which the audience member 
judges the speaker to be a man of intelligence, character, and 
good will? 
The answer to this question is suggested by a further 
synthesis of the theories of ethos and the social manifesta-
tions of personality structure. Included in the discussion 
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of ethos was a section concerning the features which, if per-
ceived in the personality of the speaker, would tend to 
enhance his ethos, among these were: that the speaker is the 
type of person who is "liked" by the perceiver, that the 
speaker's personality corresponds to the basic habits and 
attitudes of the hearer, and that the speaker's personality 
conforms to the listener's "leadership expectations" (supra, 
pp, 10-ll). Thus, if personality structure could account for 
the interaction between individuals which results in the 
formation of friendships, the selection of leaders, and 
similarity of basic habits and attitudes, then in addition 
to determining the speaker's choices and the general fashion 
in which audience members will perceive the speaker, per-
sonality structure could account for the factors which tend 
to establish the degree of ethos possessed by a speaker, 
Indeed, the general observations of Fromm and Hoffer plus 
the statistical evidence upon which Rokeach and Izard base 
their conclusions indicate that people ~ friendships, 
associate ~particular groups, ~select leaders because 
of similarity Q[ basic habits ~attitudes; 1n other words, 
congruity of personality structure. (Supra, pp. 17-18, 21-22, 
33, and 34. 
Central hupothesis. If three of the main constituents 
of ethos are the degree of similarity of basic habits and 
attitudes between speaker and listener, the tendency for 
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audience members to "like" or "dislike " the speaker , and the 
extent to which the speaker meets the "lea dership expecta-
tions" of the listener ; and if congruity of personality 
structure ~ similarity of basic habits and attitudes and 
accounts for the formation of friendships and the selection 
of leaders; then the following relationship between per-
sonality structure and ethos may be presented as the central 
hypothes is of the study to follow. 
Ethos will increase 2nd decrease ~ ~ extent ~ 
~speaKer ' s ~audience member's personality structures 
are similar Qr dissimilar. 
Summary . Ethos has long been considered one of the 
major factors determining the persuasivene s s of any speaker. 
A review of the rhetorical theories of ethos suggest that the 
ultima te sources of the speaker ' s personal appeal lie in the 
choices made by the speaker and the fashion in which the 
audience perceives the speaker . A similar review of the 
literature dealing with the authoritarian-dogmatic personality 
s tructure indicates that both the choices made by the speaker 
and the manner in which audience members will perceive the 
speaker will be determined by personality structure . Further 
analysis of both the theory of ethos and that of personality 
structure leads to the hypothesis that in the final analysis , 
ethos may be accounted for by the degree to which the 
speaker ' s and listener ' s persona lity structures are congruent . 
CHAPTER II 
CON'l1ROLS AND MEASUREf1ENT 
I. EXPERIMENTAL HYPOTHESIS 
The methodology selected for test ing the central 
hypothesis of this in~estigation was almost dictated by the 
subject under investigation. To discover if ethos is 
determined in large part by the interaction of personality 
structure as described in the previous chapter , it is neces-
sary to create a quas i-experimental speech situation in 
which this theory can be evaluated. 
Once this general approach was outlined , the central 
hypothesis was restated in a form which was considered more 
suitable for experimental evaluation. 
In§! Q,ebate .1ll which .tM two competitors ~ egual 
1n all major variables excepting personality structure, 
audience members ~ tend ~ ~ persuaded ~ ~ 
speaker whose personality structure ~ ~ similar 
.:tQ their own. 
II. CRITERIA FOR STUDY 
Thus, the central methodological problem involved in 
appraising the influence of personality structure upon 
persuasion was the creation of a persuasive situa tion in 
which the major variable effe cting audience judgments would 
be the intera ction of speaker and audience me mber personali-
ties. In order to achieve this end , six criteria were 
established for the two debates which were to supply the 
data for this investigation, 
(1) An accurate measure should be obtained of the 
personality structures of all participating speakers and 
audience members. 
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(2) The debates should be between speakers of widely 
differing personality structures but equal speaking ability, 
(J) The question for debate should be of such a 
nature that no "topic bias" would color the judgments made 
by audience members, 
(4) The supporting materials available to the speakers 
should be of equal persuasive value, and represent a wide 
range of support types from which the debaters could draw to 
provide. the proof for their speeches, 
(5) In actual presentation, the speeches should be of 
equivalent persuasiveness, 
(6) An accurate measure of audience reactions to the 
speakers should be obtained, 
The remainder of this chapter shall be given over to 
a description of the methods used to achieve the controls 
called for by the above criteria, 
III. THE 'DOGMATISM SCAL~' 
The Rokeach "Dogmatism Scale" was selected as per-
sonality structure measure for use in this investigation, 
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The major consideration upon which led to this choice was 
1 that the results of the Duns study indica ted a strong rela-
tionship between personality structure as measured by the 
Rokeach scale and speech behavior . 
General description. The ·Dogma tism Scale is a 
Likert-type questionnaire. The i ns trument contains a se ries 
of statements and the r espondant 1 s score depends upon the 
degree to which he tends to agree or disagree with items of 
the scale . 
Rokeach gives this descript ion of the theory and 
methodology which produced the Dogmatism Scale: 
• • • Our procedure in constructing the Dogma tism Scale 
was essentially deductive . We scrutinized the various 
differ i ng characteristics of open and closed systems . 
We then a ttempted to construct s tatements des i gned to 
t ap these characteristics . Our assumption was that if 
a person s trongly agrees with such statements it would 
indicate that he possesses one extreme of that par-
ticular characteristic bei ng t apped , and if he s t~ongly 
disagrees that he possesses the opposite extreme . 
Working from this bas i s , Rokeach and h is co-worke r s 
cr eated eighty-six test items . The fi na l, or form 11 E" 
Dogma tis m Scal e consisted of the forty mos t "discriminating " 
1 
Donald Duns, "A Study of the Rel ation ship Be twee n 
Dogmatism and Speech Beha vior " (unpubli shed Doctoral di s -
sertation , Northwestern University, Evans ton , Illinois, 1961). 
2Milton Rokeach , The ~and Closed li1nd (New York: 
Bas ic Books , Inc., 1 960 ) , p . 72 . 
of the original eighty-six statements. It was this form 
which was used to measure the personality structures--belief-
disbelief systems--of the listeners and speakers involved in 
this study. 
Reliability ~ validity. Central to the consideration 
of any measuring instrument are questions of reliability and 
validity . Internal consistency and stability provide the 
prime measures of r eliabili ty in the Rol<:each investigations. 
Further evaluati on of reliability will be presented in the 
appropriate section of this report. 
No scale i s of any value unless it measures the property 
which it proports to measure. Rokeach supp orts the validity 
of the Dogmatism Scale by pointing to exper imental studies 
which indicate that his scale can be used to predict certain 
forms of behavior and distinguish between persons who achieve 
differing scores on a number of other measures . 
There is no need to go into great detail regarding 
the evidence bearing on the validity of the Dogmatism 
Scale as a measure of the open and closed mind. • • 
It will perhaps· suf f ice to say here that those who 
score extremely high on this scale are shown to dif-
fer consistently from those who scor e extremely low in 
the ability to form new belief systems , whether these 
systems are conceptual , perceptual, or aesthetic in 
nature . 3 
3 ~., p. 397. Indeed , the last two-thirds of~ 
~ ~ Closed tl1nd can be seen as a report of experimental, 
historic , a nd survey investigations aimed at establishing 
the validity of the scale . Some of the results of these 
studies are reviewed in Chapter I of this study (s upra, pp. 
30-33). 
44 
As Duns poi nts ou t , hi s study was , 11 in a sense , aimed 
at the validat i on of the scores obt ained on the question-
naire , using verba l performance as the cri terion. 114 Taken 
in this sense , the results obtained by Duns tend t o increase 
confidence in the validity of the Dogmatism Scale . In the 
same fashi on , thi s investigat ion is a further inquiry into 
scale validity using t endency of dogma tism congruity to f orm 
a bas i s for per s uasion as syst em of judgment. 
Respon§e ~. Like the Adorno scale s , the dogmatism 
questionna ire was comprised of i tems worded in a single 
direction--agreement always i s considered to indicate 
dogmatis m, disagree ment indicates openmindedness . The use 
of this type of quest ionnaire immediately raises the quest ion 
of "response set ," or the inclina t ion of some individua l s to 
respond to a ll items in ei ther the affirma tive or negat ive 
regardless of item content . Rokeach sugge s ts several purely 
"log ical" a r gument s whi ch he beli eves establ i sh t he Dogmatism 
Scal e as free of re sponse set. 5 
4 Duns , QP . ~., p . 55 . 
5 See Rokeach , ~. Qlt., pp. 405-06 . The a r gument s 
pr esented by Rokeach include the consistent differences 
between results obtained f r om the ~ogmatism 5cale and other 
measures and the wide variety of scor es obtained f r om the 
scale . 
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However, Rokeach offers no statistical proof that 
response set does not operate in hisooale. It was for this 
reason that Duns included in h~. s questionnaire a "Reve r se 
Dogmatism Scale" composed of items worded in the opposite 
direction of those contained in the Rokeach test. The 
rational for this method of checking 11 r esponse set 11 is; if 
true 11 response set" i s operating individuals will tend to 
answer both the original and "reversed" items in the same 
direction. Thus, if original and "reversed11 scales cor-
relate positively rather than negatively, it can be assumed 
that "response .set 11 is 11 color ing 11 results from the question-
naire. 
Though not absolutely conclusive, Duns' results 
indicate that 11 r esponse set " does not operate in the Dogmatism 
Scale . "The extreme high and l0\'1 (upper and lower quartile) 
sample also demonstrates significant differences between high 
6 
and low Total, Reverse, and Positive Dogmatism Scale scores ." 
However, at be st, this study was conducted on the 
assumption that Rokeach 1s logical and Duns' statistical 
evidence establish the Dogmatism Scale as relatively free of 
"response set," and thus, of sufficient validity to use in 
this study. Further investigation of this question is 
6 Duns, Qg. Qii., p. 110. 
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nece ssary before a pos itive state ment can be made one way or 
another . 7 
8 The measuring instrument . It will be recalled tha t 
the first cri teria established f or this study was an accurate · 
measure of the pe rsonal ities of audience and speakers . The 
use of the Rokeach Dogmatism Sca le was considered a satis-
f actory method of mee ting this requisite . The following "E" 
Form was employed in the study. 
l. The United States and Ru ssia have just about 
nothing in common. 
2 . The highes t form of government is a democracy and 
the highest form of democracy is a government 
run by those who are most intelligent. 
) . Even though freedom of speech for all groups i s a 
worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary 
to re s trict the freedom of certa i n pol itical 
groups. 
4 . It i s only natural that a person would have a much 
better acquaintance with ideas he believes in 
than with ideas he opposes. 
5. Man on his own i s a helpless and miserable creature . 
6. Fundamentally , the world we live in is a pretty 
lones ome place. 
7. Most peopl e just don 1 t give a "damn" for others. 
8. I 1d like it if I could find someone who would tell 
me how to solve my personal problems . 
9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fear-
ful of the fu~ure. 
10. There is so much to be done and so little time to 
do it in. 
7In one fashion , results from this study may provide 
another "log ical" argument agains t the consideration of 
"response set" as an important operating factor in the Dogma-
tism Scal e . It would be difficult to account for dogmatism 
scores in terms of r esponse set if the central hypothesi s of 
this study is correct. 
'
8The entire scale, the written instructions g i ven with 
the questionnaire and the information sheet which was attached 
to the test are included in Appendix A. 
11. 
12. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18 . 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I 
jus t can 1 t stop. 
In a discussion I often find it nece ssary to 
repeat myself several times to make sure I 
am being understood. 
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In a heated discussion I generally become so 
absorbed in what I am going to say that I 
forget to listen to wha t the others are saying. 
It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live 
coward. 
While I don 1 t like to admit this even to myself, 
my secret ambition is to become a great man, 
like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare. 
The main thing in life is for a person to want 
to do something important. 
If given the chance I would like to do something 
of great benefit to the world. 
In the history of mankind there have probably 
been just a handful of really great thinkers. 
There are a number of people I have come to hate 
because of the things they stand for. 
A man who does not believe in some great cause 
has not really lived. 
It is only when a person devotes himself to an 
ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful. 
Of all the different philosophies which exis t in 
this world there is probably only one which is 
correct. 
A person who gets enthusiastic about too many 
causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" 
sort of person. 
To compromise with our political opponents is 
dangerous because it usual ly leads to the 
betrayal of our own side. 
When it comes to differences of opinion in religion 
we mus t be careful not to compromise with those 
who believe differently from the way we do. 
In times like these, a person must be pretty 
selfish if he considers primarily his own 
happ iness. 
The worst crime a pe rson could commit is to 
attack publicly the people who believe in 
the same thing he does. 
In times like these it is often necessary to be 
more on g uard against ideas put out by people 
or g roups in one 1 s own camp than by those in 
the opposing camp. 
A group which tolerates too much diffe rences of 
opinion among its own members cannot exist for 
long. 
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30. There are two kinds of people in this world: 
those who are for the truth and those who are 
against the truth. 
31. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly 
refuses to admit he's wrong. 
32. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness 
is beneath contempt. 
33. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays 
aren't worth the paper they are printed on. 
34. In this complicated world of ours the only way 
we can know what's going on is to rely on 
leaders or experts who can be trusted. 
35. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about 
what ' s going on until one has had a chance to 
hear the opinions of those one respects. 
36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick 
friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs 
are the same as one ' s own. 
37. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. 
It is only the future that counts . 
38. If a man is to accomplish his miss ion in l ife it 
is sometimes necessary to gamble 11 all or 
nothing at all . 11 
39 . Unfortunately , a good many people with whom I 
have discussed important social and moral 
problems don't really understand what's going 
on. 
40. Most people jus t don't know what ' s good for them. 
IV . PRE-DEBATE CONTROLS 
Selection Qf speakers. Two main elements entered 
into the selection of speakers for the experimental situa-
tions , personality structure and speaking ability. In regard 
to personality s tructure , it was essential that the audience 
be presented with a choice be tween two definite personality 
11 types . 11 Thus, the first requirement established for the 
selection of experimental communicators was tha t each pair 
of debaters be composed of one speaker selected from each of 
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the extreme quartiles of the dogmatism scores attained total 
population of prospective communicators, 
Relative speaking ability was the second major con-
sideration in the selection of debate competitors. In order 
to prevent audience members from making debate decisions based 
on the speaking ability of the contestants, it was requisite 
that each experimental debate be between speakers of compar-
able speech skills. The method for achieving this control 
was the use of the University of the Pacific "Forensic Squad" 
as a "pool" of prospective communicators, This group was 
particularly well suited for this purpose by virtue of two 
facts. First, extensive records are kept of the performance 
of each squad member in inter-collegiate forensic competition, 
Second, due to a long series of practice debates conducted at 
the beginning of each semester, the "debate coach" is very 
familiar with the speaking ability of each squad member, 
These condtions made the selection of speakers a relatively 
simple matter. After all those prospective communicators 
with dogmatism scores in the extreme quartiles were identified, 
the writer selected four possible pairs of communicators and 
submitted their names to the Director of Forensics. From 
this list, he selected the two opponents for each experimental 
session. On the basis of forensic records and his personal 
judgment, he stated there was no significant difference in 
the speech skills of the competing speakers. 
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Thus , on the basis of pre-experimental controls, each 
pair of contestants were to be of equal speaking ability and 
to represent one extremely dogmatic and one extremely open-
minded individual. This method of selecting speakers was 
deemed appropriate to the second criteria for this investiga-
tion. 
Selection of ~debate question. One of the criteria 
established for the experimental situation was that the ques-
tion selected for the debates should be free of 11 topic bias. 11 
In other words, it was necessary to discover a debate proposi-
tion concerning which few of the audience members had opinions 
prior to the debates. After cons ideration of a number of 
possibilities , "Should the United States embark upon a crash 
program to develop the H. B. ?O?" was chosen as the experi-
mental topic. The basis for this choice was f ound in a poll 
taken by the writer among thirty sophomores, juniors, seniors , 
and graduate students which produced the following results: 
TABLE I 
RESULTS OF PILOT POLL OF H. B. 70 OPINION 
No knowl- No opinion For Against 
edge of concerning crash crash Total 
question question pro~ ram program 
23 5 1 1 30 
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It was assumed that if these results were indicative 
of knowledge concerning the R. B. 70 prevalent in the 
student body outside of the predominately freshman "Speech 
59" population, the audience for the debates would be char-
acterized by a similar ignorance. The chance that use of a 
questionnaire to check this assumption any time prior to the 
actual experimental speech s1tuation would stimulate thought 
and opinion formation among the experimental audience mitigated 
against the use of this type of validation until immediately 
prior to the experimental sessions. The results of this test 
will be considered at the appropriate time. However , on the 
basis of the pilot poll , the question selected was judged to 
be extremely free of topic bias . 
Preparation Qf speech mater1als . The fourth criterion 
established for the experimental debates was , "The supporting 
materials available to the speakers should be of equal 
persuasive value and represent a wide range of types of 
supports from which they might s elect the supports they 
would employ . 11 The necessity of this requirement is obvious . 
Should one speaker avail himself of supporting materials which 
were much more persuasive than those available to his opposi-
tion , audience decisions in his favor would be based upon 
superiority of evidence rather than personality structure . 
One of the methodological problems faced in this investigation 
became that of controlling the quantity and quality of 
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materials on each side of the question in order that neither 
position would have an advantage arising from superiority of 
s upporting materials. 
This difficulty was met by the creation of "informa-
tion packets 11 for each side of the debate and limiting the 
speakers to the use of only those materials included in the 
11 packets. 119 One of the advantages of the B. B. 70 issue was 
that its current nature made it possible to include a number 
of duplicated magazine articles in the materials supplied to 
10 
each speaker. The articles were selected for equal per-
suasive content and in order to provide the speakers with a 
wider choice of materials from which to choose, certain 
pieces of fictitious "congressional testimony" were fabricated 
by the writer. Diversification of "tone" i.e., emotional and 
logical evidence and variety of argument were the goals set 
for this "manufactured evidence. 1111 
Before supplying the speakers with these materials, 
the "information packets" were submitted to three expert 
9 The manufactured evidence plus a bibliography of all 
material used in the 11 information packets 11 is found in 
Appendix c. 
10 Due to a lack of suitable magazine materials the pro-
crash program included "B-70 'Valkyrie, 111 a pamphlet published 
by ~orth American Aviation Company, date of publication 
unknown. The pamphlet is no longer available to the general 
public. A copy is on file with the writer. 
11 This variety was required by the assumption that one 
of the choices which will be strongly influenced by personality 
structure is the decision to use or not to use a particular 
piece of evidence. 
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debate judges , members of the Department of Speech faculty, 
for purposes of evaluating the comparative persuasiveness of 
the "pro" and "anti " crash program materials. It was the 
unanimous opinion of these three authorities that the informa-
tion packets were of equal persuasiveness and variety of 
appeals. 
V. CONTROL AND MEASUREMENT OF DEBATE RESULTS 
Judgment Qf speech performances. Regardless of the 
precautions taken before the actual debates, it was evident 
that the pre-experimental controls might "break down. 11 For 
example , though of previously judged equal speaking ability , 
there was a possibility that lack of adequate preparation, 
poor health, physical appearance , or any one of a number of 
contingencies might ari se which woul d make one speaker less 
persuasive than his opposition. For this reason, four members 
of the speech department staff were present at each experi-
ment. They were asked to closely observe both speakers and 
at the close of the debate indicate their opinion of the 
comparative "general persuas iveness " of the two contestants . 
Of course , this procedure could not prevent the pre-experimental 
controls from failing, but should the judgment of this panel 
of expert s ·indicate that these measures had malfunctioned in 
either or both sessions it would be necessary to discard or 
treat differently the data ar i sing from the " renegade " ses-
sion (s). 
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Measuring audience judgments. The success of the 
entire procedure of this study necessarily rested upon con-
trols and the obtaining of data from audience judgments 
which would lend itself to analysis of the hypothesis under 
study. This data was supplied by a questionnaire used in the 
experimental sessions . The instrument consisted of two t asic 
sections, a pre-test and a post-test. The questions in each 
section will be presented here as both divisions are discussed.12 
The pre-test was aimed at arriving at an estimate of 
"topic bias" concerning the R. B. 70 and general knowledge of 
national defense and the Air Force in partlcular. 
] . 
2. 
4. 
12 
The present Secretary of Defense is: 
a . Chares E. Wilson 
b. E. L. Whittle 
c. Robert McNamara 
d . Christian Herter 
The present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
is: 
a. Curtiss LeMay 
b . Lionel Lemmnitzer 
c . Charles Radford 
d. Walter Reuther 
The plane which immediately preceded the B 47 and 
B 52 as the backbone of s. A. c. 
a. B 36 
b. B 29 
c . B 51 
d. B 50 
A long time champion of the U. s. Air Force in 
the u. s. Senate is: 
a. Senator Eastland 
b. Senator Capeheart 
c. Senator Claighorn 
d. Senator Symington 
The entire questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix F. 
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The next question concerns the question which you hear dis-
cussed today. Please mark the answer which comes nearest to 
your opinion. 
5. The best policy to follow in relation to the R. B. 
70 is: 
a. A crash program to ready the plane for produc-
tion 
b. Continue the present development program 
c. I am familiar with the issue but have no 
opinion 
d. I am not familiar with the issue 
Questions dealing with the Air Force and national 
defense were included to provide a "counter hypothesis." 
There was a possibility that even if question (5 ) d.id not 
reveal a specific "topic bias" the amount an individual knew 
about national defense might tend to form a general attitude 
which would incline him to vote one way or the other on the 
debate question regardless of the personalities involved. 13 
The second part of the experiment questionnaire was 
responded to immediately after the debate ended. It con-
sisted of 7 items. 
1. I cast my vote for: (Check one 
no ties allowed.) 
The first speaker 
The second speaker 
This was the "key question" of the experiment and 
provided the central data for t esting the central hypothesis 
of this study. 
13The results of this and all other measurement tools 
will be presented in the appropriate section of this report. 
The second question involved a familiar measure of 
proficiency. 
2 . Give a letter grade (A, B,C,D 
or F) to each speaker . 
The first speaker 
The second speaker 
Would personality types tend to judge speakers of 
similar belief systems to be better speakers, and opposite 
types as le s s talented? It was hoped that item 2 would 
answer that question. 
3. Briefly state the reason for 
your decision and the grade 
you gave the speakers. 
This "open ended" question was devised in hopes of 
providing subjective information which would indicate if 
different persor.ality types based their decisions on dif-
fering considerations. In part, item 3 can be considered a 
further investigation of the validity of the dogmatism scale. 
For if, as Rokeach indicates, differing degrees of dogmatism 
14 
result in diff ering perceptual and conceptual reactions, 
it stands to reason that differing degrees of dogmatism would 
result in differing reactions to speakers and their arguments. 
14 
4. Check the statement nearest your 
attitude 
Agree strongly with first speaker 
Rokeach, ~. Qll., p. 397. 
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Agree moderately with first speaker 
Agree mildly with first speaker 
Agree mildly with second speaker 
Agree moderately with second speaker 
Agree strongly with second speaker 
Item 4 represents an effort to discover if there 
would be differing degrees of persuasion effected by either 
speakers ' personality type among the various audience per-
sonality types. 
The last three items on the post-test i nvolved the 
use of the "Semantic Differential 11 15 in a venture to uncover 
any response patterns among the personality types of the 
audience to either of the speakers or the subject of their 
communications. 
THE R. Bo 70 
1 . Effective . . . . . . . . 
---- ---- ---- ------ ---- ----- ----
Ineffective 
2. Invulne.rable_: __ : __ : ____ : __ : __ : __ : Vulne r able 
3. Timely . . . . . . 
-----·----·----·-----·---·-----·---
Obsolete 
15For a detailed discussion of the "Semantic Dif-
ferential " the reader is directed to Charles E. Osgood, 
George J. Suci and Percy H. Tannenbaum , The Measurement QJ_ 
Meantng (Urbana , Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 
1958 • It should be noted that the different i als employed 
in this study are not as "sophisticated" as those described 
in The Measurement of Meaning and as a result -the methods of 
stati s tical evalua tion applied to r es ults from these instru-
ments are different from those developed by Osgood , Suci , 
and Tannenbaum . 
4 . 
5. 
Powerful 
Ha r d 
. . . . . . 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
. . . . . . 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
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Weak 
Sof t 
6. Aggr ess ive ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : De f en sive 
THE FI RST SPEAKER 
1 . Logi cal . . . . . . 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
2 . Believable ___ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ 
3 . 16 Unc onvinc ing_: ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : 
4. Factua l . . . . . . 
----·---- ·----·----·----·----·----
s. Lucid . . . . . . . . . . . . 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
I l logical 
Unbel i eva ble 
Convincing 
Emotiona l 
Obscure 
6. Aggr essive ___ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : Defens ive 
? . 
8. 
9. 
10 . 
1 . 
Strong 
Dogma tic 
Likable 
Like me 
(exclude 
sex ) 
Logi cal 
Wea k . . . . . . . . . . . . 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Open-Minded . . . . . . . . . . . . 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Repul sive . . . . . . . . . . . . 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Unl ike me . . . . . . 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
THE SECOND SPEAKER 
Illogical . . . . . . . . . . . . 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
2 . Believable ___ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : Unbel i evable 
3. Unconvinc ing_: ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : Convinci ng 
4 . Factua l . . . . . . 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
Emot i ona l 
16 The "a ffirma tive " and 11 negative " a lterna t i ves f or 
ite ms 3 and 8 were invert ed f r om the r egula r pat tern in an 
e f fort to 11 br eak11 any "response set 11 which might develop in 
r esponding t o t he "Sema ntic Diff erent i a l s . 11 The appl i cation 
of the "Semantic Diffe r ent i a l 11 in thi s wi l l be di scussed in 
gr eater detai l in Chapter IV . 
59 
5. Lucid . . . . . . 
- ·- ·- ·-·-·-·-
Obscure 
6. Aggressive ___ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : Defensive 
?. 
8. 
10 . 
Strong 
Dogmatic 
Likable 
Like me 
(exclude 
sex) 
. . . . . . 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
. . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
. . . . . . 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
. . . . . . 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
Weak 
Open-Minded 
Repulsive 
Unlike me 
The great virtue of t he "Semantic Differential " is 
that it is almost "open ended 11 in operation : within the 
limitations of the paired opposite words of each item the 
respondent is free to make his own judgment . If Rokeach is 
correct in maintaining that the extreme dogmatic and open 
minded individual perceive other individual s and objects in 
a differing fashion , it was felt the use of the "Semantic 
Differential 11 might cast some light on what these differences 
were . 
CHAPTER III 
DESCRIPTIONS OF POPULATION AND EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 
I. DESCRIPTION OF POPULATION 
The subjects, comprising the audiences for the two 
debates, were all students enrolled in the University of the 
Pacific's 11 Speech 59," 11 Rundament als of Spee ch" courses. 
At the time of administration of the Dogmatism Scale 
1 
the population totaled 16?. Experimental mortality reduced 
this number who actually listened to the two debates to 144. 
Attached to the dogmatism questionnaire was a form used 
to obtain personal information concerning each subject. This 
device was closely modeled on a form first employed by 
2 and 3 Duns. 
It ••• included, among other areas , questions con-
cerning the respondent 's age , sex, year in college 
••• relig iOus preference, fraternity or sorority 
affilia tion, and political preference. These were 
included for two reasons. First , name of the areas 
will be compared with the scores obtained on the 
questionnaire to determine if, for instance, there is 
a relationship between political preference , sex, age, 
l All information concerning composition of the popula-
tion will be based on this total unless otherwise indicated. 
2 With revision made to conform to conditions at the 
University of the Pacific, this was the same form as employed 
by Donald Duns in 11 A Study of the Relationship Between Dogma-
tism and Speech Behavior" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, 
Northwestern Uni versity, Evanston, Illinois , 1961). 
3see Appendix A. 
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etc., and manifestations of dogmatism as indicated by 
the scale •••• Second , knowi ng these areas wi ll per-
mit a thorough analys i s of the nature of the total sub-
ject population and the comparability of the various 
subgroups .4 
In addition to the data from the personal information form, 
the "Verbal Reasoning Score 11 and "Predicted Speech Grade " 
achieved by 132 of the sub jects on the Washington Gr ade 
Point Prediction Test were obtained f r om the Un iversity 
Dean of Students office . 
Class distrl9ytion. All four undergraduate classes 
were represented in the ori ginal 167 subjects . Of this 
total, over eighty per cent (141 ) wer e freshmen. There were 
16 s ophomores, 6 juniors, and 4 seniors . This type of dis-
tribution was to be e xpected as "Speech 59 11 is intended 
primari ly for freshmen students . 
~ ~ ~ leyels . As would be expected from the 
class distribution, t he age level of the subjects was con-
centrated in the 18 to 20 bracket. Few students fell be lo\'T 
this level . There were 9 seventeen year old s t udents and 
above the age of twenty, the oldest being thirty-four . 
Consistent with the general University pattern for 
lower division students , t here were more female (112) than 
male (5, subjects. 
4 Duns , QQ. Q11., pp . 75-?6. 
13 
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Fraternity ~ sorority affiliation. Accurate data 
on fraternal association was unobtainable. Fraternity and 
sorority "rush" occurred during the period of three weeks in 
which the Dogmatism Scale was administered to the various 
sections of "Speech 59. " As a result some students who 
indica ted no affiliation in the early stages of t esting may 
have become affiliated after completing the questionnaire. 
In addition, conditions on the Pacific campus were such that 
some fraternity and sorority members were reportedly refusing 
to state their membership on questionnaire and survey sheets. 
These two circumstances precluded the chance of easily obtain-
ing accurate information on this item. 
Religious affilia tion. One hundred and fifty students 
indicated some religious affiliati on. Students who did not 
claim membership in any particular denomina tion i dentified 
themselves as "Brotestants" or "Christians." The vast 
majority who specified religious connections were members of 
Protestant groups. There were 10 Lutherans, 16 Episcopalians , 
4J Methodists, 27 Presbyterians , ll "Protestants ," 12 Catholics, 
and 4 J ewish subjects . In addition, 17 s tudents were classified 
as "other ." These included individua ls stating a ffiliation 
with a denomina tion shared by three or fewer respondents. 
Political preferenge. The two party system was 
s trongly reflected in the subject popula tion. "Republica ns " 
accounted for 68 members of the population while "Democrats" 
comprised 28 . Only two subjects , one "Socialist" and one 
"Conservative" were members of splinter gr oups . There were 
69 subjects with no political preference. 
"Predicted speech grades." The 132 obtained predicted 
speech grades ranged from 18 , a high 11 D," to 37 , an "A." The 
5 
mean predicted gr ade was 27 .80. 
"Verbal reasoning scores." The range of verbal reason-
ing scores ran from a high of 107 to a low of 42 , with a mean 
score of 75.78. 
Academic majors. The population indicated academic 
majors which fell into eleven categories: The largest of 
these included sclence 8; pharmacy 14; psychology and 
sociology 13; education 22 ; business administration 12, 
English 14; fine arts 12; history ll; religious education 7; 
foreign l anguage 7; and undecided 11. 6 
Analysis of population. As the purpose of this study 
WlS to evaluate a general hypothesis concerning the nature of 
5These scores are equal to 1.8, 3.7, and 2 .78 on the 
4 point grade-point scale. 
6 There were other majors included but were indicated 
by too few students to be subject to valid statistical 
analysis . These included pre medicine 4; philosophy 3; 
home economics 4; math 3 ; engineering 4; economics 4; music 
and speech therapy 2 ; and speech 3. 
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ethos the data obtained from the information sheet is 
extremely important for it will indicate hov-r representative 
of the general population the s ubject population is and what 
restrictions must be placed upon general izations arising from 
this study. 
The exclusively collegiate nature of the a udruence is 
the first major restriction enforced by the population . 
This factor places t he subjects above the educational norm 
for the entire popula tion. Similarily , the brief age span 
included in the subject audi ence pl aces another limiting 
factor upon generalization as does the unequal distribution 
of political preference and sex. 
The variety of religious affil iation in the subject 
population provides an interesting basis from which to test 
the connection between dogmatism and relig ious beliefs . How-
ever , the small size of the various religious groups place 
restrictions on this analysis . 
The following generalizations seem called for concern-
ing the audi ence population . First , the sample is not typical 
of t~e general population in many respects , particularly age 
and educational level . Second , the population is homogenous 
in most features (1 . e ., age , educational status , and political 
preference ), thoug h there are some areas of difference namel y , 
academic major and religious preference . The homogeneity 
limits some comparisons , but the areas of difference provide 
6.5 
for interesting study. Due to t hese circumstances generaliza-
tions from this study must be limited in accordance to the 
observed differences between the subject population and the 
general populus . 
II. ADMINISTRATION OF DOGMATISM SCALE 
Testing methodol ogy . Differing conditions in the 
administration of questionnaires introduce extraneous condi-
tions which may tend to effect the scores of various groups 
of subjects . In light of this possibility , efforts were 
made to keep the conditions of scale presentation as con-
sistent as possible . In every case but one , the result of a 
time conflict , the writer administered the scale to the eight 
participating classes. Upon introduction to the class the 
writer would tell the students that they were about to 
participate in a survey being conducted by the "National 
Opinion Institute . 11 7 As the questionnaires were being dis-
tributed , oral instructions were delivered. Instructions 
included requests tha t the respondents read and answer all 
questions carefully ; that they complete the information sheet 
appended to the questionnaire; and that they raise their hand 
7 As many of the students were personally acquainted 
with the writer t his "white lie" seemed neces sary to prevent 
some testers from answering the questionnaire in such a 
fashion so as to meet their estimate of the writer ' s expecta-
tions . 
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when they had completed the test to allow for rapid collec-
tion. The subjects were also urged to write any comments 
concerning the scale in the space provided on the informa-
tion shee t . At the close of these oral directions , the writer 
asked the subjects to read with him the instructions on the 
cover sheet. 8 Once again the students were urged to answer 
all questions and record any personal reactions to the question-
naire. 
The presentation of the questionnaire took about five 
minutes. Most respondents used twenty to thirty minutes to 
complete the form , though some used as many as forty-five 
minutes. 
This format was followed in every te s ting situation. 
However , several factors served to keep the conditions from 
being identical. The scale was administered in eight dif-
ferent rooms at hours ranging from 8:00 in the morning to 
2:00 in the afternoon. 9 The writer was introduced in several 
fashions (i . e ., "a graduate student," "an instructor in the 
8 See Appendix A. These instructions were derived 
from T. w. Adorno , ~ al, The Authoritarian Personality 
(New York: Harper and Brothers , 1950) , pp. 2L~-25 . 
9The prospective communicators took the test at 8 : 00 
in the evening at a regular me e ting of the deba te squad. 
The same procedure for scale administra tion was employed at 
that time. 
department ," "Mr. Steve Collins , who has a test for you," 
10 
and "a master 1 s candidate doing research. 11 
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Student comments QD ~ Dogmatism §cale . Some of the 
most interesting data in this study was provided by the com-
ments made by 43 s ub jects . These remarks could be placed in 
three general g roups: 11affirrnative 11 - ... indicat1ng a liking for 
the questionnaire, 11 negative 11 --comments critizing spec ific 
items on the entire scale , and "inquiries 11 --students who 
de s ired to know the results of the test. There were only 
four · {4) affirmative comments . Typical of these was, "I 
liked the test, it made you think. 11 A very intere sting sug-
gestion wa s made by one of the two students who requested the 
test results , 11 It looks like somebody ' s been reading~ 
True B...e.lieyer ."11 The vast majority of comments (37) were 
negative in nature. These ranged from open hostility; 11 What 
I think about these things is nobody ' s damn business! I 
feel no obligation to sign ! 11 to mild disapproval ; 11 A lot of 
the questions are vague and abstract . 11 Or "I find some ques-
tions ambiguous ." The greatest number of nega tive comments 
10 In the last case a quick explanation was made 
attempting to divorce the questionnaire from any master ' s 
thesis work . This seemed necessary to prevent a biasing 
prejudice which is caused by some s tudents • resentment over 
being used as "g uinea pigs " for graduate students . The 
11 story 11 told this particular class was that the writer was 
fulfilling an assignment for a statistics class in conducting 
this research for the "National Opinion Institute . 11 
11 Duns , QQ. Ql!., p. 87 , records one comment reading, 
"This s ounds like Escape From Freedom." 
were of this latter variety. The words 11 vague" and 
"ambiguous" appeared repeatedly. 
Several students wrote their reactions directly in 
the question portion of the Dogmatism Scale rather than on 
the information sheet. Item 15 ("While I don ' t like to 
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admit this even to myself , my secret ambition is to become 
a great man like Eins tein, Beethoven , or Shakespeare•• ) drew 
three comments . Two students stated that they wanted to be 
"great" and would admit it to any one . 12 One other comment 
consisted of an art major's addition of "Degas " to the 
question ' s list of great men. 
Duns included a Manifest Anxiety Scale with his ques-
tionnaire and obtained results which indicated, 11 A trend 
points to a hostile rea ction to the scale as a r e sult of 
dogmatism with low anxiety."l3 He also states , "'rhe critical 
group (15), with five exceptions was decj_dedly on the 
dogmatic side."14 This study contained no check on anxiety, 
however , the general dogmatism of negative comment writers 
was not on the dogmatic side . The mean dogmatism score of 
the entire population was 149.52, while the mean score of 
critical respondents was 149.89. A possible source of the 
difference between these results and those reported by Duns 
12 IQld., Duns records a similar comment. 
l3.Th1Q..' p . 91 . 
14.lli.Q.. 
lies in the fact that all groups of subjects in this study 
were urged to write comments whereas Duns encouraged some 
groups and did not encourage others. 
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At any rate , the findings reported both here and by 
Duns indicate a possibility that individuals of differing 
degrees of dogmatism may respond to testing situations in a 
different fashion. This possibility warrants further 
investigation, for if true , it would cast serious doubt on 
the validity of the questionnaire method, and indeed , all 
systems of paper and pencil testing . 
III . GENERAL PROCEDURES 
Creation Qf audiences . One week prior to conducting 
the two experimental debates the regular Tuesday morning 
"Speech 59" Mass lecture class , was told that a "special 
event" would occur the next week which would require one-half 
of the lecture class , sections to attend on Tuesday morning 
while the other half sections would come on Thursday. This 
procedure created an audience of 82 for the first session and 
77 for session two. However, only 76 and 68 in the respective 
audiences had completed the Dogmatism Scale, creating a "sub-
ject mortality" which reduced the population from the 
orig inal 167 to 144. 
Description of~ audiences. Table II presents the 
composition of the audience for Debate I as class ified by 
dogmatism score quartiles . 
Quartile 
1 
2 and 3 
4 
TABLE II 
AUDIENCE FOR DEBATE I AS CLASSIFIED 
BY DOGMATISM SC ORE QUARTILES 
Number of 
subjects 
19 
35 
22 
Total 76 
70 
Percentage 
of audience 
25.0 
46.1 
28.9 
Table III provides a similar description of the 
audience for Debate II. 
Quartile 
1 
. 2 and 3 
4 
TABLE III 
AUDIENCE FOR DEBATE II AS CLASSIFIED 
BY DOGMATISM SCORE QUARTILES 
Number of 
sublects 
23 
JO 
.15 
Total 68 
Percentage 
of audience 
33.82 
44.12 
22.06 
Preparation of speakers. The four speakers were con-
tacted in a period ranging from one to two weeks before the 
debates and asked if they would like to participate in a 
11 model 11 two man debate before the "Speech 59" lecture session. 
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All four agreed to participate. None of the speakers learned 
of the debate topic until the Friday before the Tuesday on 
which Debate I was conducted. At this time all four were 
given the "information packets." In an attempt to stimulate 
prepara tion, the speakers were told a reward of a free steak 
dinner was to be made to the winning debater from each con-
test. The time limit of 7 minutes was stressed as was the 
requirement that they use no materials from sources other than 
the "information packets." At no time were the speakers told 
that they were participating in an experiment or that their 
selection had any connection with the "General Information 
and Opinion Questionnaire 11 which they had completed some 
eighteen days previously. 
Debate procedure. On the mornings of the two debates15 
the pre- and post-debate questionnaires were distributed as 
soon as the audience was seated. An instructor, other than 
the writer, asked the class to please complete the first 
page of the questionnaire, assuring them that their answers 
on this "information sheet 11 were in no way connected with the 
grades they would receive in 11 Speech 59 . 11 When indications 
were that the students had completed the information test the 
same instructor informed the listeners that they were about 
15 Complete transcripts of all speeches can be found 
in Appendix D. 
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to hear a debate on the question: "Should the United States 
Embark Upon a Crash Program to Develop the R. B. ?O?", and 
that the questions they had just answered were designed to 
test their general knowledge of national defense and to 
obtain their opinion on the question before they heard the 
debate. He then gave a brief description of the historical 
background of the R. B. 70 and introduced the first speaker. 
At the end of the first address the second speaker, who had 
been waiting outside of the room, was introduced. At the 
close of his remarks the listeners were told to complete the 
second and third pages of the questionnaire and to conside r 
themselves excused when finished. 
There were only two differences in the procedures of 
Sessions I and II. At the end of the first session audience 
members were asked to refrain from mentioning the topic of 
the debate to any of those students who would hear the second 
conte s t on Thursday. The second change involved a rotation 
of speaking order. In Debate l the degmatic speaker opposed 
the "crash program11 and s poke first while the .Q.I2..e..n-m1nded 
speaker advocated the "crash program" and spoke second. In 
the second session, the ~-min4ed speaker opposed the 
"crash program 11 and spoke first, the h1&h dogmatic sp~aH;er 
advocated the 11 crash program" and was second speaker. This 
rotation was affected to provide a check on any "primacy" or 
"recency" effect which might operate in regard to dogmatism. 
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IV. EVALUATION OF EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 
Debate I 
Descript i on of speakers. Both speakers for the first 
debate were first year debaters for the University of the 
Pacific . The teams of which the speakers were members had 
achieved identical records in previous debate tournaments , 
making elimination rounds on two occasions but failing to 
place in both cases. Neither speaker had been successful in 
individual events . 
The breakdown Q! control. At one time in the planning 
of this study serious consideration had been given to having 
the speakers rehearse their speeches before a panel of expert 
judges . The purpose of this rehearsal wa s to allow the panel 
to suggest any changes in the content and delivery of the 
communications which it felt nece ssary to assure the equality 
of persuasiveness required to successfully fulfill this 
important criterion for the experimental sessions. The 
rehearsal control was finally rejected. It seemed that 
choices made by the speakers should be based entirely on 
their own personal j udgments . In taking suggestions from a 
panel of experts a speaker would , in effect , be changing his 
speech from a product of hi s own personal i ty to a product of 
his judgment combined with that of the panel . This decision 
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increased the risk that the performances of one or both pairs 
of communicators would be unequal which would result in either 
major alteration in the treatment of data arising from the 
session(s ) involving the breakdown(s ) or a total discarding 
of these results. However , the risk of creat ing misleading 
results from the use of the panel was deemed greater than 
that of failing to evaluate the hypothesis because of a 
breakdown i n :controls. 
If fea rs involving the effect of influence from the 
panel 0f experts were unfounded , the events of Debate I were 
unfortunate. The controls aimed at assuring speaker equality 
failed. All four speech instructors evaluating the compara-
tive general persuasiveness of the two debaters were of the 
opinion that the second speaker was much more effective than 
the first . All of the evaluating judges agreed that data 
from Debate I should be used only as subsidiary information 
in evaluating the influence of personality structure upon 
persuasion. Thus, the results of Debate I shall be considered 
as corollary to the results of the more successful Debate II . 
Debate II 
Description Qf speakers . The two speakers in Debate 
II were experienced upper division debaters for the Univers ity 
of the Pacific . The low dogmatic (dogmatism score = 119.) 
speaker was assigned the first speaking posit ion and opposed 
7.5 
the "crash program" to develop the R. B. 70. The high 
dogmatic (Dogmatism score= 192.) speaker was given the 
second position and advocated the "crash program." Of the 
two the first speaker had been the most successful in 
forensic competition. This difference, in the opinion of 
the debate coach , arose from the first speaker's greater 
ambi tion a nd more "academic manner" rather than from a 
greater degree of general speech skills. Intimate kno\'lledge 
of the speaking styles of both debaters led the debate coach 
to believe that in speaking before an audience of college 
students rather than before a debate judge, neither speaker 
would enjoy a significant advantage. 
In addition to the more extensive speech experience of 
the speakers , one other circumstance differentiated the 
speakers of Debate II from those of Debate I . This was 
consideration of speaker prestige. Both speakers involved 
in the second competition were well known campus figures. 
The first speaker was the then current student body president 
and had received extensive publicity both for his debate 
victories and academic record. (For example, speaker #1 had 
been a wa rded a Woodrow Wilson Fellowship. ) The second 
speaker benefited from a similar , though somewhat less 
notable record . He had been a consistent debate winner , was 
at the time of the experiment a candidate for student body 
president , and had achieved notoriety for hi s academic 
76 
acc omplishments by virtue of his selection as "captain" of 
the team which represented University of the Pacific on the 
nationally televised "General Electric College Bowl ." 
All things considered, it was the opinion of the debate 
coach and other observing judges that he first speaker 
probably possessed an advantage of slightly higher prestige . 
Success of controls . At the close of the second 
debate the unanimous opinion of the observing judges was 
that, though the low dogmatic speaker 's performance was 
s lightly superior , the two debaters were of sufficiently 
equal general persuasiveness to employ data from Debate II 
in the evaluation of the central hypothesis advanced in this 
study . 
Summary 
The speech situa tion is obviously an extremely complex 
social phenomena involving an infinity of variables. Complete 
experimental control is, therefore, almost a total impos-
sibility . The best an investigator applying the experimental 
method to speech can hope for is sufficient control to allow 
him to observe indications, clues, and trends in the variable 
he is studying. It was felt , that at least in the case of 
Debate II, the controls employed in this study were successful 
enough to warrant examina tion of data from this study in an 
attempt to assess the influence of pe rsonality structure upon 
persuasion. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
The results of this study will be reported in three 
basic divisions. First , there will be a description of the 
population in terms of the relationship between dogmatism 
and various factors obtained through the use of the informa-
tion questionnaire and other sources and a description of 
quartile distribution of subject dogmatism sources. Second , 
there will be a presentation of the results obtained from 
the debates designed to test the central hypothesis. The 
third division will consist of a brief discussion of the 
results obtained through the "Semantic Differentials" 
included in the post-debate questionnaires . 
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND SELECTED FACTORS 
Comparison of "Speech 5.2. 11 Sections 
The audience popula tion for this inve s tigation was 
comprised of the combined popula tions of nine class sections 
of "Speech 59 . 11 Before these groups could be combined it was 
essential to determine that , in r e lation to dogmatism, the 
groups were homogeneous. To evaluate the comparative dogma-
tism of the nine secti ons a null hypothesis concerning the 
mean dogmatism scores of thes e groups was evaluated. 
There should ~ nQ significant differences between 
~ ~ dogmSttism scores fQI:. ~ ~ "Speech .53." 
sections (I , II , III , I V, V, VI , VIII, .and X). 
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Application of an Analysis of Variance "F" Test 
demonstrated there was no significant difference between all 
1 
of the groups taken as a whole . Application of "t'' tests 
revealed , however , that differences at the . 05 level of 
confidence existed between Section X and Sections I , IV , V, 
and VI . The null hypothesis was, therefore , rejected . 
The re jection of this particular null hypothesis con-
cerning the homogeneity of the population forced an examina-
tion of the groups which demonstrated a significant difference. 
A study of the dogmatism scores of subjects in Sections X, I, 
IV , and VI showed the cause of the differences to be the 
relatively low mean scores of the last four gro ups and the 
1 The analysis of variance (" F" ) used in this comparison 
was the "Groups Within Treatments : 11 The formula for "F11 is 
s2 r(rt )2 cJ_") ~ 1 or l: r x 
s2 N N 2 
... - 'l 
N W' ( N ~ ~ x2. - 2 I l( ) 
N 
N-f" 
The 11 t 11 Test for significance between individual groups is 
derived from the Within Means Square of the F source table . 
The formula is as follows: 
,, . ,. 
"t" ~ .01 \ 
Significance levels of both "F" and "t" are two-tailed. 
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rather high meah score of Section X. As "t" test revealed 
no s i gnificant differences between the low scoring sections 
and a ny other g r oup with the exception of X, it was determi ned 
that the cause of the difficulty lay in some element of the 
latter population. Examination of Secti on X r evealed a n 
absence of low scores , a large percentage of middle r a nge 
and high scores , a nd the s i ngle highes t dogmatism score in 
the entire population (211 }.2 When this high s ubject was 
removed f rom Section X, the significant dif fe r ence between 
this g roup a nd every section , with the exception of IV, dis-
appeared. Since much of the difference among groups could be 
acc ount ed for by one s ubject, it can be assumed the popula-
ti on generally re sponded to the Dogmatism Scale uniformly and , 
thus , no e rrors were introduced in data collection throug h 
lack of subject-group homogeneity. 
Analys i s of ".tl1gh" $illQ. "Low" Subjects 
Fol l owing the procedure of Duns , the t otal population 
of 167 was divided fo r analytical purposes into quartiles . 
The first (highes t} a nd fourth (l owest ) we r e selected for · 
intensive s tudy in the evaluation of the centr a l hypothes i s . 
2 It i s inter es ting to note that thi s score was made by 
an African e xc ha nge student who i s a member of one of the 
highly nationa lis tic political parties of Wes t Africa. The 
relationship between extreme dogmat i s m a nd political extremi sm 
is borne out in this one case. 
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Table IV presents the distribution of the population 
by quartiles . 3 
TABLE IV 
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY QUARTILES 
Quartiles Number of Quartile scores Mean dogmatism 
s ub jects score 
~ 4 43 Above 167.24 184 . 21 
Q 2 & 3 '78 
------
147 . 49 
Q 1 46 Below 132 . 88 120.35 
It was expected that the differences between the high (4 ) 
and low (1 ) quartiles would be significant . To evaluate this 
assumption the following hypothesis was tested : 
There will be §:. slgnificant difference betrween ~ 
~ dogm~tism scores .Q.f. .tll§. 11 .h.igh11 an.Q.. 11 .l.m'L11 e uartiles 
Q( ~ population selected Qn the basis Q! dogmatism 
scores . 
When subjected to a 11 t 11 test for significance , the 
difference between the mean dogma tism scores of the 11 high 11 
and 11 low" quartiles proved to be significant beyond the .01 
level of confidence . The hypothesis was accepted. 
3Quartiles were obtained through 
formula Qi :: Yi + (. lS i N - X; ) C 
f I 
application of the 
This formula is used to determine the upper boundaries of Q 1 
and lowest score of Q 4. Thus , the 3 above refers to the 
highest score in the third quartile of subjects. 
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~ Relationship Between Dogmat i sm ~ Selected Factors 
Grade point prediction ~ verbal reasoni~ scores . 
11 Verbal reasoning" and 11 predicted speech grade point" scores 
taken from results of the "Washington Grade Point Prediction 
Test 11 were obtained from the Dean of Students • Office for 132 
of the subjects. Table V illustrates mean "verbal reasoning" 
and " speech grade point prediction" scores of the extreme 
dogmatism score quartiles. 
TABLE V 
COMPARISON OF MEAN VERBAL REASONING AND SPEECH GRADE 
PREDICTION SCORES BY HIGH AND LOW QUARTILE GROUPING 
OF D0Gf1ATISM SCORES 
Group Mean "Verbal Mean "Predicted lie ..ru:t.~ .. ~e Speech Grade Point" 
Ql (N = 37) fl:5o62 28.59 
Q2 (N = 35 ) 69o91 2?o68 
Total (N = ?2) 72 . 85 28. 1.5 
No significant difference be tween either verbal reason-
ing or predicted speech grades was discovered through applica-
tion of " t " test to the mean scores of the two extreme 
4 quartiles. However, Rokeach 1 s experimental evidence of 
low-dogmatic superiority in problem-solution reasoning 
indicates the difference in verbal reasoning scores to be 
in an expected direction. 5 Further investigation of the 
bearing of dogmatism upon reasoning ability would serve to 
6 
clarify this relationship. 
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Religious aff111~tion and dogmatism. Included on the 
general information questionnaire was an item requesting the 
subject to identify his religious affiliation. Table VI 
indicates the mean dogmatism scores of the larger denomina-
tional g roups represented in the subject population. 
4 A "t" test designed for use in comparison of unmatched 
groups was employed in this study. 
[~)( ~ 
. 1 
Results are two-tailed unless specified. 
5Milton Rokeach, ~ ~ and Closeq H1Dd (New York: 
Basic Books , Inc ., 1960), pp. 182-214. 
6 Refer to Appendix B for correlational data concerning 
verbal reasoning , predicted speech grades , and dogmatism. 
TABLE VI 
COMPARISON OF MEAN DOGMATISM SCORES 
BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION 
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Category Number of Mean Dogmatism Sublects Score 
Catholic 12 146.66 
Jewish 4 134.25 
Presbyterian 27 148.63 
Methodist 43 153.77 
Episcopalian 16 161.13 
Lutheran 10 154.80 
Protestant* 11 147.82 
Other** 17 144 . 75 
No preference 27 143 . 77 
* Consists of subjects who did not specify denomina-
tion. 
** 
Consists of all subjects listing affilitations held 
by three or fewer subjects . 
When considering religious affiliation, Rokeach 
treated only four groups : Catholics, Protestants, Jews , and 
nonbelievers. The results reported in Table VI generally 
follow Rokeach 1 s findings. 7 Duns considered se~eral denomina-
tions . There are some interesting contrasts between Duns • 
findings and those reported here. Episcopalians represented 
7 Rokeach , QQ. Qlt., p. 112. 
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8 the lowes t scoring group of Duns • subjects ; the exact 
reverse is true of this study. Duns reported Ca tholics to be 
the highest scoring group ; 9 while in this study they occupy 
a medial position. This observer is hard pressed to explain 
these differences . They may arise from chance operations in 
small samples , or they may be accounted for by other factors . 
Perhaps there is some cultural difference between the Episcopal 
Church in the Midwest and that on the Pacific Coast. Pos-
sibly Duns ' sample of Catholics is atypical of the general 
population, for the mean dogmatism of his Catholic group is 
considerably higher than that reported by Rokeach and this 
10 investigation. Confirmatory to both Duns ' and Rokeach 1 s 
findings , there were no signi ficant differences between the 
11 
various religious groups . 
Breakdown ~ ~. The mean dogmatism score of the 
male and female subjects comprising the original subject popula-
tion are presented in Table VII . 
8 Donald Duns , 11 A Study of the Relationsh ip Between 
Dogmatism" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation , Northwestern 
University , Evanston , Illinois , 1960 ), p . 135 . 
9 ll?J..d. 
10It is difficult to report exact comparisons between 
the Duns ' study and other investigations employing the Dogma-
tism Scale . Duns reports his findings in terms of "Total 
Dogmatism , " or the combined scores of the -Dogmatism Scale and 
the Reverse Dogmatism Scale , whereas other research is reported 
in terms of the results of the Dogmatism Scale only . 
11The difference between Jews and Episcopalians 
approaches the .JO level of confidence . The difference 
between Episcopalians and Protestants is at the . 50 level. 
8.5 
TABLE VII 
COMPARISON OF MEAN DOGMATISM SCORES BY SEX 
Sex Number of Subjects 
Mean Dogmatism 
Score 
Male 
.55 
Female 112 
Rokeach neglects to consider sex differences in his 
book. Attempting to fill this gap , Duns analyzed the dif-
ference in the mean dogmatism scores of the male and female 
segments of his population, and discovered a highly signifi-
cant (.01) difference in these scores . Though the results 
found in Table VII are similar to Duns in that the mean 
female score is below that of the male, the difference 
reported here does not begin to approach any meaningful 
level of confidence. 
Mean scores , hov1ever, do not reveal a very interesting 
aspect of the relationship between dogmatism and sex within 
the subject population. Table VIII presents the distribution 
of sexes within the quartiles of dogmatism scores and the 
res ults of a "Chi Square" analysis of this distribution. 12 
12The general 2 formula for X used here is : 2. [ ( r. ~.f•)2 J 
Results are one tailed. 
86 
TABLE VIII 
DISTRIBUTION OF SEXES BY DOGMATISM SCCHE QUARTILES 
Quartile Number of Number x2 p of Men of Women 
1 29 
2 & 3 19 58 ).69 .10<...05 
4 18 25 
The "Chi Square", a measure of "goodness of fit" 
between observed and expected distributions, here indicates 
that there is an almost significant variation between the 
observed and expected distribution of sexes among the dogma-
tism score quartiles. This difference apparently arises out 
of a tendenc y ·of male subjects to be "skewed .. to the outer 
quartiles while the female subjects ma intain a relatively 
norma l distribution. 
The conflict be tween these findings and Duns, plus 
the results of "Chi Square" analysis of the di s tribution of 
sexes, strongly suggest tha t more resea rch aimed at clarify-
ing the relatio~ship between sex and dogmatism is in order. 
Breakdown bY classes. Table IX indicates the mean 
dogmatism scores of the four undergraduate classes. 
TABLE IX 
COMPARISON OF MEAN DOGMATISM SCORES 
BY UNDERGRADUATE CLASS 
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Class Number of Mean Dogmatism Subjects Score 
Freshman 138 149.38 
Sophomore 16 1.52. LJ-4 
Junior 7 138.14 
Senior 6 1.56. 66 
Although the re are some r a ther large differences in class 
means , none of the se approachs significance. The largest 
difference, 18 • .52, be tween juniors and seniors , r epresents 
a . 40 < . 30 level of confidence. These finding s echo those 
of Duns . 13 The data indica te that the extent of under-
graduate college educa tion has no a ppr eciable effect on 
individual dogmatism scores. 
Breakdown~ political preference. Table X con-
tains mean dogma ti s m scores for subj ects indciating 
11 Democra tic , " "Republican, 11 or "no preference 11 in r e sponse 
to the gener a l informa tion questionnaire ite m concerning 
political preference . 
13 Duns , .Ql2. ·~. , pp. 132 - 33 . 
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TABLE X 
COMPARISON OF MEAN DOGMATISM SCORES 
BY POLITICAL PREFERENCE 
Number Mean 
Preference of Dogmatism ll tll p 
Sub1ects Score 
1. Democrat 28 153 . 50 
2 . Republican 69 151.93 
3- Democrat & 97 152.38 Republican 
4. No preference 69 145. 04 1 . 82 . 10 < .os 
These results present a contrast ~o thos e reported by 
Rokeach and Duns . Both of these investigators found very 
small differences between the mean dogmatism scores of 
various political preferences. Like the groups studied by 
Duns and Rokeach this subject population demonstrated a very 
small difference between the mean scores of Democrats and 
Republicans. But , there are more apparent differences 
between those who stated a political preference and those 
who had none. When the mean scores of Democrats and Republ1-
cans are .compared separately to the "no preference" group, 
the differences do not a ttain a high level of significance 
( 11 P11 is . 40 <. 30 and . 20 < .10 respectively.) When the two 
groups with a political preference are combined and compared 
to subjects with no political choice , the difference 
approaches the .05 level of confidence. This r esult was 
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unexpected and is contrary to both Duns • findings and Rokeach 1 s 
contention that the 11 Dogmatism Scale 11 measures across lines 
of political ideology. Further investigation seems called 
for with respect to dogmatism and political preference , or 
in this case, dogmatism and the lack of political preference. 
Breakdown Qy ~majors. Table XI presents the 
mean dogmatism scores of various academic major groups in 
the subject population. 
TABLE XI 
COMPARISON OF MEAN DOGMATISM 
SCORES BY ACADEMIC MAJORS 
Major Number of Sub.1ects 
Science 8 
Pharmacy 14 
Psychology-Sociology 13 
Education 22 
Busines s Administration 12 
English 14 
Fine Arts 12 
History 11 
Religious Education 7 
Foreign Language 7 
Undecided* 11 
Mean Dogmatism 
Score 
144.12 
161.93 
136 • .54 
1.50.68 
161.7.5 
137. 42 
149.~·2 
1.51.4.5 
142.14 
1.56.14 
1.52.00 
* Only majors indicated by at least four subjects were 
considered. 
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These results correspond to data presented by Duns who found 
an almost significant difference between mean dogmation scores 
of students enrolled in the Schools of Liberal Arts and Busi-
ness Administration of Northwestern University . 14 Likewise , 
they support Rokeach 1 s findings that 11 ••• the closed sub-
jects more frequently entered military and commercial careers 
15 
of an administrative na ture... Thus , the high scores of the 
business administration and pharmacy majors were to be 
expected, as were the low scores of the psychology-sociology 
and religious-education groups. (Rokeach reports , "For the 
open group religious and social interest rank first and 
16 ' 
second in importance • 11 ) However , the differences 
between foreign language majors and the low scoring groups , 
though~not highly significant , were unexpected. 
The data reported in Tables X and XI support earlier 
findings pointing to a definite relationsh ip between per-
sonality s tructure and interests . This area certainly should 
provide fertile ground for further investigation. 
14 
Duns , QQ . ~., pp . 131-32 . Duns 1 fai lure to dis-
cover a s ignificant difference between students of the 
Liberal Ar ts and Business Administration Schools may lie in 
the wide range of dogmatism scores which Table XI indicates 
~arious majors within the College of Liberal Arts might 
exhibit . 
15 Rokeach , QQ. Qii. , p . 346. 
16 Ibid ., p . 339 . 
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II. RESULTS OF EXPERIMENTAL DEBATES 
Debate ll 
Restated for purposes of experimental evaluation the 
central hypothesis of this study was: 
In a @bate .1.n which .tM. .tN.Q. comp~:tit·ons ~ equal 
.1.n all major variables excepting personality structure, 
audience members will ~ ~ ~ persuaded ~ ~ 
speaker whose personality structure ~ mQa1 similar 
.:t.Q their own. 
As only the second of the two debates held to evaluate this 
hypothesis satisfied the criteria for this study,17 it was 
selected for extensive analysis. Data from Debate I will be 
treated separately at the close of this chapter and in 
Appendix E. 
Results presented herein have been categorized through 
the use of "Quartile .... Voting Groups. 11 As the name implies, 
the "Quartile-Voting Group 11 identifies the speaker for whom 
the group members voted and the quartile placement of the 
dogmatism scores of the s ubj ects within each segment. In 
textual discussion "Quartile-Voting Groups 11 will generally 
be referred to in the foll owing fashion: "Quartile 4 voting 
for the 1 high 1 speaker 11 will serve to identify the subjects 
from the fourth quartile of the dogmatism score population 
who voted for the speaker from the fourth quartile of the 
11 speaker pool 11 dogmatism scores. In tabular presentation the 
17see pp. 73 ~ ~. 
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same g roup identification will be further abbreviated to 
"Q 4 v . f. (for voting forl 'high. '" This method of data 
cl assification seemed well suited to direct anal ys is of the 
central hypothesi s and , in the interest of clarity and 
consistency , was employed throughout the presentation. 
Pre-debate Questionnnaire Results 
"General defense knowledge. " Previous to each debate 
the subjects responded to a questionnaire designed to measure 
their knowledge of the general area of nati onal defense and 
18 their attitude toward the R. B. 70. In order to determine 
if "general de fense knovtledge " or specific attitudes toward 
the R. B. 70 had operated as pre judicing factors in the 
debate decisions made by the s ubjects, the r e sults of the 
pre-debate questionnaire were tabulated in terms of quartile-
voting groups . Table XII presents the results of the 
"general defense knowledge ': portion of the pre-debate 
measure . 
18 The complete pre-debat e questionnaire is duplicated 
in Chapter II (supra , pp . 54-59 ) and in Appendix F. 
TABLE XII 
RESULTS OF PRE-DEBATE 
"GENERAL DEFENSE KNOWLEDGE" ITEMS 
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Quartile-Voting Group Number of Mean 11 Gener al Defe~se Knowled~e 1' Score Subjects 
Q 1 v. f . 11 high11 7 2 .57 
Q 2 & 3 v. f. "high" 14 1.79 
Q 4 v. f. 11 high" 10 1.80 
~ groups v. f. "high" 3l("ehtal) 1.94 
Q 1 v. f. "low" 16 1.75 
Q 2 & 3 v . f . "low 11 16 1.63 
Q 4 v. f. "low11 5 3 .00 
X groups v. f . 11 low" 37 (total ) 1.86 
* Total pos s ible "General Defense Kno\17ledge 11 score is 
5.00 
Application of an "F" test to the mean 11 Defense Information 
Scores" reported in Table XIII revealed a significant dif-
ference among all of the groups taken together. The mean 
"Defense Information Scores " of the various groups were sub-
mitted to analysis by "t" tests. The results of the 11 t 11 tests 
are presented in Table XIV. 
-. 
Q 1 
v . f. 
11 high 11 
Q 1 
v. f . 
"low" 
Q 2 & 3 
v. f. 
11 high 11 
Q 2 & 3 
v. f. 
11 low 11 
Q 4 
v. f. 
11 high 11 
Q 4 
v. f. 
11 low 11 
TABLE XIII 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEAN DEFENSE INFORMATI ON 
SCORES BY DOGMATISM SCORE QUARTILES 
Q 1 
v. f. 
"High" 
* 
• 82 
* 
.78 
* 
* 
.77 
.43 
Q 1 
v. f . 
''Low" 
.04 
.12 
*** 
2.25 
Q 2 & 3 
v. f. 
11 High 11 
.16 
.01 
*** 
1.37 
Q 2 & 3 
v. f 0 
11 Low" 
.17 
*** 
1.21 
Q 4 
v. f. 
"Hi"h" 
2 . 20 
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Q 4 
v. f . 
11 Low 11 
Q = Qua rtile v. f. = voting for 
·*** = significant at .01 l eve l 
•• = significant a t .05 level 
* = ap~r.o~ehes .05 l e vel 
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If the central hypothesis of this study is true, 
Table XIII presents some very interes ting data. Assuming the 
correctness of the hypothesis, it would be expected that the 
larges t number of high dogmatic audience numbers would vote 
for the "high" speaker , likewise the "low" subjects would 
vote for the 11 lOt-1 11 speaker. A glance at Table XIII will 
establish that thts was the case. But, what of the audience 
members who did not vote for the speaker whose personality 
structure was most like their own? Table XIII indicates that 
the 11 h igh 11 s ubjects voting for the "low 11 speaker and the 11 low" 
subjects voting for the 11 high" speaker had significantly or 
almost significantly higher information scores than the other 
groups . 
One conclusion which might be drawn from these data is 
that the more a n audience member knows concerning the topic 
under debate, the less likely he is to be influenced by the 
personality structures of the competing speakers. To the 
extent tha t this is true, "General Defense Knol'Tledge 11 may 
have influenced the votes of some audience members. 
It should be noted before turning to the next considera-
tion that the high 11 Defense Informa ti on" scores of the quartile 
4 g roups corresponds to Rokeach 1 s finding tha t high dogma tism 
sub j ects were more likely to enter careers relating to the 
military. 
~-debate opinion. In order to ascertain whether 
opinions formed prior to the debate influenced the decisions 
made by the subjects, all members of the audience answered 
a question concerning their attitude toward the R. B. 70 . 
Table XIV presents the pre-debate opinion for Debate II 
expressed in terms of subsequent votes cast by the subjects. 
Q 1 v. 
Q 1 v . 
Q 2 & 
Q 2 & 
Q 4 v. 
Q 4 v. 
TABLE XIV 
PRE-DEBATE OPINION DEBATE II 
Know For Against Issue But Group Crash Crash Have No Program Program Opinion 
f. 11 low 11 3 2 
f. 11 high11 1 1 
3 v . f . "low11 5 1 
J .v. f. 11 high 11 1 1 
f. 11 low" 1 
f . "high" 3 
Totals 2 12 5 
Unfa-
miliar 
With 
Issue 
10 
5 
11 
12 
4 
7 
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Table XV reveals that there was some pre-existing 
opinion concerning the R. B. 70 and that the majority of this 
opinion favored the "low" speaker who opposed the crash 
program . Results from this study must be qualified by this 
knowledge. Particularly important is the fact that three 
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"low" subjects who eventually voted for the "low• speaker 
stated that they agreed with the position favored by the "low" 
speaker even before the debate, 
There is some reason to doubt, however, that these three 
votes actually expressed opinions held prior to the debate, 
Examination of the "General Defense Information" scores of 
the three subjects revealed that none of them answered more 
than two of the five questions correctly. Especially telling 
was the fact that not one of the three correctly identified 
the present Secretary of Defense. It seems somewhat unlikely 
that an individual should know so little about national defense 
and have an opinion concerning a specific defense matter such 
as the future status of the R, B, 70. 
Another group which is of interest are the four sub-
jects who changed their opinion in the course of the debate. 
Three of these opinion changes were by "high" dogmatism sub-
jects who prior to the debate had opposed the "crash program." 
After hearing a low dogmatism speaker support this belief and 
a high dogmatism speaker angue for the "crash program," all 
three changed their opinion and voted for a "crash program." 
On the other hand, of the five "low" subjects two had 
opinions prior to the debate only one changed his mind and 
this was a change from an "anti-crash Program" opinion to one 
favorable to the rapid development of the bomber, the posi-
tion advocated by the "high" speaker. The numbers involved 
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in these patt erns of belief change do not warrant strong 
inferences . Yet, it should be noted t hat t hey are contrary 
to findings pr esented by Rokeach wh ich indicate that indi-
viduals scoring high on the "Dogmatism Scale 11 are l east 
likely to change beliefs. 19 Perhaps further investigation 
will reveal that the trend r eport ed by Rokeach is reversed 
when a 11 high 11 dogmatic indiv idua l advocates a change in the 
beliefs of a "high 11 dogmatic a uditor . 
~-Debate Questi onnaire Results 
Degree of persuasiQn. Included in the post-debate 
quest i onnaire was an item which requested each subject to 
express the ext ent to which he was persuaded by the speaker 
who won hi s vote . The re were three pos s i ble choices in the 
i t em: "agr ee strongly , 11 "agree moderately , " a nd "agr ee 
mildly." These alternatives were assigned respective 
numerical values of 3 , 2, and 1 . The mean scores of the s i x 
"Quartile-Voting Groups " computed on this basis are presented 
in Table XV. 
19 
Rokeach , QQ. ~., p . 21 3 . 
--< 
' 
Q 1 v. 
Q 1 v. 
Q 2 & 3 
Q 2 & 3 
Q 4 v. 
Q 4 v. 
TABLE XV 
COMPARISON OF DEGREES OF PERSUASION 
BY QUARTILE VOTING GROUPS 
Group Number of Mean Degree SubJects Persuasion 
f. "high" 7 2.43 
f. "low" 16 2.25 
v. f. "high" 14 2.14 
v. f. "low" 16 2.36 
f. "high" 10 2.50 
f. "low" 5 1.60 
* 
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of P* 
,01 
.05 
.20 <..10 
.01 
.01 
p scores indicate the level of confidence for the 
significance of the difference between the adjacent "Degree 
of Persuasion" score and that of "Q 4 v. f. 'low,'" 
"F" test analysis of the mean "Degrees of Persuasion" 
presented in Table XVI revealed a difference among the groups 
taken as a whole which approached the .05 level of confidence 
(F = 2.31, ,05 = 2.37). "t" tests between the various 
groups established that the mean score of quartile 4 voting 
for the "low" speaker was, with two exception, below all 
others at the .01 level of significance. There were no 
significant differences between the other groups. If 
further investigation proves this to be a regular phenomenon 
it would seem that when listeners evidencing "high" dogma-
tism are persuaded by speakers of "low" dogmatism they are 
persuaded less strongly than are "high" dogmatism listeners 
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when persuaded by speakers of similar personality structure. 
If the theory of ethos advanced in Chapter I is correct, the 
explanation offered above would appear to be sound. It would 
seem that some factor caused the "high" audience members 
expressing a preference for the contentions of the "low" 
speaker to vote for him 1n spite Q[ conflicting personality 
structures. In terms of the central hypothesis of this 
study this lack of personality congruity would be presumed 
to reduce the 11 low" speaker 1 s ethos as perceived by "high" 
audience members. Thus, when "high" subjects voted across 
personality lines they could be expected to be less persuaded 
than when voting for a speaker with the "built-in" advantage 
of similar personality structure. 
Reasons~ subJect decisions. Item #3 on the post-
debate questionnaire requested the subject to, "Briefly state 
the reason for your decision and the grade you gave the 
speakers." In response to this item most subjects gave more 
th 20 an one reason. The writer examined each of the responses 
attempting to discover the most prominent justifications and 
found six distinct categories. These categories with an 
example of each are presented below: 
(l) Delivery. "The first speaker spoke directly to 
me. I like that kind of speaker." 
20 In cases of more than one 11 reason" the first was 
selected unless the subject indicated another was more 
important. 
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( 2 ) Evidence - log ic . "The second speaker had more 
facts and made a log i cal argument from them ." 
_() ) Organization. 11 It was so easy to follow the 
second speaker. You knew exactly where he was 
going . " 
(4 ) Adopts argument . " I agree with the second 
speaker . It is es sential tha t we have the R. B. 
70 for limited wars . 
(5) Cr i tical of other . "The second speaker just 
didn ' t present any a rguments that held water . " 
{16 ) Uncertain . " I just like d the s econd speaker 
more . Cant (s ic) say exactly why . " 
Table XVI . presents the f requency of each of these 
responses a s employed by the extreme "Quartile-Voting Groups ." 
TABLE XVI 
FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF EACH OF SIX REASONS 
FOR DECISIONS BY EXTREME "QUARTILE VOTING GROUPS " 
Group 
Q 1 V • f • 11 1 OW II 
Q 1 V • f • II high II 
Q 4 v . f . 11 1 ow" 
Q 4 V • f • II high II 
Reasons Given For Decision 
Organ~ -Adopts Criti-
Deliv-Evidence- 1za- Argu- cam of 
ery Logic tion ment Others 
3 7 
2 2 
3 2 
2 
1 3 
4 
1 
1 
Uncer-
tain 
5 
1 
Table XVI includes some data that coincide tdth 
observations made by Rokeach . The f act that only "low" su~­
jects admit the y are uncertain of their reasons for pre-
ferring one speaker would seem to support Rokeach ' s findings 
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that, 11 open-minded individuals are more likely to admit 
21 
ambivalence than are closed minded persons." In like 
fashion the exlcusive use by quartile 4 of the "adopts argu-
ment" and "critical of other" justifications fits well with 
Rokeach ' s belief that more dogmatic individuals are more 
inclined to judge other individuals on the basis of whether 
or not the individua l being judged agrees with the beliefs 
22 
adhered to by the person passing judgment. 
Beyond these two instances ·.Cable XVI contains little 
or no information which would indicate striking differences 
between the "reasons for decision" reported by the various 
"Quartile-Voting Groups. 11 
Speaker grades . Table XVII contains a breakdown of 
the grades given the debaters by the members of the extreme 
11 Quartile Voting Groups o 11 
TABLE XVII 
SPEAKER GRADES ASSIGNED BY EXTREME "QUARTILE VOTING GROUPS " 
Q 1 
Q 1 
Q 4 
Q4 
Group 
v . f. " low" 
v . f. 11 high 11 
v . f . " low" 
v . f. 11 high 11 
Assigned Same 
Grade to Both 
7 
2 
4 
Assigned Higher Grade to 
Speaker Receiving Vote 
9 
5 
5 
5 
21 
See Rokeach, QQ. Qii., pp. 357-59. 221.lll.9.. , p. 56 . 
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The subjects were rather generous to the speakers. 
Only one audience member graded a speaker as low as "B-. 11 
The average grade given by each group ranged from 3.5 to 3.71 
on a four point scale. The one obvious difference between 
"Quartile-Voting Groups" reported in Table XVII.f.lies in the 
failure of any member of quartile 4 voting for the "low" 
speaker to assign the same grade to both speakers. This is 
yet another instance in which this group has shown a marked 
difference from the other segments of the population. (As 
has been shown earlier, ·~uartile 4 voting for '+ow 1 " had 
the highest of all 11 general defense knowledge" scores 1 
reported the lowest "degree of persuasion," and contained 
three of the four subjects who changed a pre-debate opinion 
in the direction advocated by a speaker from the opposite 
extreme quartile.l 23 This interesting behavior may be the 
product of the specific debate situation created for this 
study. On the other hand, these may be the results of some 
factor within the closed belief-disbelief system which is 
affected when the individual scoring high on the dogmatism 
scale is persuaded by a low scoring speaker. At any rate, 
the behavior of this group presents another possibility for 
future research. 
23 See supra, pp. 93, 96, and 99. 
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Analysis Q[ Central Hypothesis 
Breakdown~~ dogmatism scores. If, as is 
maintained in the central hypothesis of this study, individuals 
will tend to be persuaded by speakers whose personality 
structure is most similar to that of the listener, it would 
be expected that the mean dogmatism score of subjects voting 
for the "high" speaker would be higher than that of subjects 
voting for the "low" speaker. To test this supposition a 
hypothesis concerning the mean dogmatism scores of subjects 
voting for each speaker was constructed. 
~ ~ dogmatism score Q[ subJects yoting for the 
"h.lgh" speaker !i1ll ~ significantly higher .than ~ 
mean dogmatism score of subJects yoting for J<b.e. 11 .l..mt£11 
speaker. 
Table XVIII presents the mean dogmatism scores of the 
subjects voting for each of the speakers of Debate II and the 
results of the 11 t" test employed to evaluate the hypothesis 
concerning these scores. 
"High" 
"Low" 
TABLE XVIII 
COMPARISON OF MEAN DOGMATISM SCORES OF SUBJECTS 
VOTING FOR THE "HIGH" AND 11 LOW 11 SPEAKER 
N:O·~. ofl Mean Dogma- Differ-
"t" Snhject.s t1sm Score ence 
Speaker 3l 154.74 
15.09 2,66 
Speaker 3'7 139.65 
* Results are o:fflo.tailed. 
P* 
,005 
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The "t" test of the 15.09 point difference between the mean 
scores of the two voting groups revealed that a variance this 
large and in the hypothesized direction would arise by chance 
only one out of two hundred times. The hypothesis was 
accepted. The data of Table XIX indicate that audience sub-
jects in Debate II tended to vote for the speaker whose 
personality structure was most similar to their own. The 
data are thus considered confirmatory to the e~perimental 
hypothesis of this study. 
Distribution Q! yoti~ ~ dogmatism score guartiles. 
Table XIX presents the vote for the speakers as it was dis-
tributed among the dogmatism score quartiles. 
TABLE XIX 
DISTRIBUTION OF DEBATE VOTES BY D0Gr1ATISM SCORE QUARTILES 
No, of Sl!];]jects From 
Voting For Quartile Quartiles Quartile Totals 
1 2 & 4 
"Low" Speaker 16 (121.38) * 16 (146.75) 5 (175.40) 37 
"High" Speaker 7 (125.29) 14 (147.28) 10 (183.70) 31 
* Numbers in parenthesis indicate mean dogmatism score 
of cell group. 
The important features of Table XIX are found in the 
distribution of votes from the low quartile, 1, and the high 
quartile, 4. More than twice as many subjects from quartile 
1 voted for the "low" speaker while exactly twice as many of 
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the quartile 4 subjects voted for the "high" speaker. Again, 
the indications are that subjects tended to vote in the direc-
tion predicted by the central hypothesis . 24 
Another interesting finding presented in Table XIX is 
that within each quartile the mean dogmatism score of subjects 
voting for the 11 low" speaker is lower than that of subjects 
voting f or the "high" speaker. Though none of these differ-
ences is significant , all are in the predicted direction. 
".Qhl Square " analysis of voting distribution • . In 
Debate II 33 . 82 per cent of the audience had dogmatism 
scores in the first quartile while 44.12 and 22.06 per cent 
of the subjects represented the two combined medial quartiles 
and the fourth quartile respectively . If the distribution of 
votes from each of these groups would ~ave occurred on a 
random basis each speaker would have received one-half of 
the votes from each quartile . However , Table XIX25 indicates 
that subjects from the two extreme quartiles showed a strong 
tendency to vote for the speaker with a corresponding personal-
ity structure . As the central hypothesis predicts that subjects 
24 As the central hypothesis of this study predicts that 
subjects will vote for the speaker with the most similar per-
sonality structure the phrase "voting in the predicted direc-
tion" will be employed throughout the remainder of this report 
to indicate votes cast for speakers with dogmatism scores most 
like those of the voters, i.e. , votes cast by quartile 1 sub-
~ects for the "low" speaker. The p}lrase "unpredicted direc-
tion" will indicate votes cast for speakers from the opposite 
quartile , i.e., quartile 4 voting for the "low 11 speaker. 
25
supra, p. 105. 
-· 
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will tend to vote for the speaker whose personality structure 
is most similar to their own, the following null hypothesis 
was formulated to test the significance of the difference 
between the recorded voting distribution and that which would 
have occurred by chance. 
The distribution Qf yotes frQm ~ subject do~m@tism 
score quartiles between ~ .!iliQ. speakers Jiill nQ.t. ~ 
significantly different ~ that distribution which 
would ~ occurred ~ chance. 
As the "Chi Square" test of "goodness of fit" is a 
device specifically designed to measure the significance of 
difference between observed and expected distributions, it 
was applied to the data presented in Table XX in order to 
test the above null hypothesis. When corrected by the Yates 
correction for continuity, the resulting x2 score of 4.90 
was significant between the .10 and .05 levels of confidence. 
Though these results do not justify the rejection of the 
null hypothesis, they do indicate that the tendency for sub-
jects in the first and fourth quartiles to vote for speakers 
of similar personality structure resulted in a distribution 
of votes which could be expected to arise only five to ten 
times out of 100 random voting distributions. 
Summary of analysis of central hypothesis. By and 
large, the data presented in the analysis of the central 
hypothesis tend to confirm the prediction that individuals 
witnessing a debate in which the competing speakers are 
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equal in all major va~iables excepting personality structure 
will tend to vote for the speaker whose personality structure 
most closely resembles their own. 
The specj_fic conclusions and implications which can be 
drawn from this data will be discussed in detail in the 
final chapter. 
Results From D~bate l 
As indicated in Chapter III , the performance of one 
speaker in the first debate was greatly superior to that of 
his opposition. Thus, results from this debate could not be 
considered in the direct analysis of this study ' s centra l 
hypothesis . Some information derived from Debate I is inter-
esting , however , and is presented below. 
"Quartile-Voting Groups , 11 Debate 1. Table XX presents 
the dis tributi on of votes cast in Debate I as classified by 
the "Quartile-Voting Group" method. 
TABLE XX 
QUARTILE-VOTING DISTRI BUTION OF DEBATE I 
Qua rtile Voting 
Gr oup 
Q 1 v . f . "low" 
Q 1 v . f . "high 11 
Q 2 & 3 v . f . "low" 
Q 2 & 3 v . f . 11 hig h 11 
Q 4 v.f. 11 1 0\'111 
Q 4 y . f . 11 bi~h" 
Number of Percentage of Mean Dogmatism 
Subjects Quart i l e Scor e 
19 
29 
5 
18 
4 
100 . 00 
85 . 29 
14.71 
81. 82 
18 .18 
122 . 87 
144 . 29 
155 .00 
183 . 22 
189. 50 
A glance at Table XXI discloses that even in the 
unevenly matched Debate I (The total vote was 66 to 9 in 
favor of the "low" speaker,) the patterns developed which 
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were quite similar to trends described in the discussion of 
the second debate, First, the percentage of subjects from 
each quartile who voted for the "high" speaker increases as 
the degree of dogmatism increases. This would indicate that 
the possibility that a subject would vote for the losing 
"high" speaker increased as dogmatism scores rose, Partie-
ularly impressing is the finding that while no audience 
member from the lowest quartile voted for the "high" speaker, 
18.18 per cent (N = 4) of the highest quartile decided in 
his favor, Of course, the opposite of this trend is also 
true; the probability that a subject voted for the "low" 
speaker increases as subject dogmatism decreases, 
The second similarity between voting-dogmatism pat-
terns in the first and second debates is found in the mean 
dogmatism scores of the voting groups within each quartile, 
As was the case with Debate II, there is a small difference 
between the mean scores of each quartile's two voting 
groups, and in every case the mean score of the subjects 
voting for the "high" speaker is higher than that of sub-
jects vet ing for the "low" communicator, 26 
26 There is the obvious exception here--the first 
quartile in Debate I which voted unanimously for the "low" 
speaker, 
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Perhaps even more important than the similarity of 
trends discovered above are the results contained in Table 
XXI . 
TABLE XXI 
COMPARISON OF MEAN DOGMATISM SCORES OF SUBJECTS VOTING FOR 
THE "HIGH " AND 11 LOW 11 SPEAKERS , DEBATE I 
Subjects Number of Mean Dogma-
Voting For Subjects tism Score Difference 
"High" Speaker 9 167 .11 
"Low11 Speaker 57 145 . 52 
21.59 
No 11 ~ 11 test was performed on the diff erence between 
these means. Previous comparisons indicate , however , that a 
difference as large as 27 . 59 would probably prove significant. 
Summar~ Qf r esult§ ~ Debate I . Although the 
imbalance of speech performances between the t wo.-: speakers 
prevented the use of results from Deba te I in the direct 
analysis of the central hypothesis , the data from the first 
debate correla t es highly with that of Debate II . Even when 
marked superiority characterized one speaker there are strong 
indi~ations that congruity and contrast of personality 
strucrture may well have played a significant role in 
determining voting behavior . 
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III. RESULTS OF "SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIALS" 
The "Semantic Differentials" employed in this study 
were designed to serve a triple purpose. First, it was hoped 
they would provide a check upon the contention of Maslow, 
Fromm, Hoffer, Adorno, and Rokeach27 that personality structure 
strongly influences an individual's perceptions of people and 
objects. Second, if this contention is true, the "Semantic 
Differentials" might offer some clue as to how the "high" 
and "low" subjects of the population differed in their per-
ceptions of the speakers to which they were exposed. Third, 
the "Semantic Differentials" offer another method of evalua-
ting the central hypothesis. 
28 Design of lllll. "Differentials." Two semantic dif-
ferentials were designed for use in this study. One measure 
was conceived to tap subject responses to each of the speakers. 
The other was constructed to gauge reactions to the R. B. 70. 29 
Both devices were contrived in the same general pattern. The 
27 See supra, pp. 37-38. 
28 The complete differentials employed in this study are 
duplicated in Appendix F. 
29To avoid confusion between the "subjects" who corn-
prise the population and the speakers and R. B. 70 which are 
the "subjects" in the grammatical sense--of audience responses 
recorded in the "Semantic Differentials" the subject of each 
differential will be referred to as the "stimulus." Through-
out the following discussion the differential for which the 
speakers serve as stimuli will be identified as the "Speaker 
Differential." The scale for which the R. B. 70 serves as 
stimulus will be called the "R. B. 70 Differential." 
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paired terms of each item within the two scales were comprised 
of one "affirmative" and one "negative" term. Hence the first 
i tern in the "R. B. 70 Differential" is: 
"1. Effective . . __ : __ : ineffective." 
while the first item in the "Speaker Differential" is: 
"1. Logical __ • __ _: _: __ : __ : illogical." 
For purposes of statistical presentation, each of the seven 
spaces between the paired terms of the items was assigned a 
numerical value. Seven (?) was assigned to the space nearest 
the "affirmative" term and from this point the values run down 
in single unit steps until one (1) which was assigned to the 
space adjacent to the "negative" term. Using this method 
four (4) was assumed to be a neutral response with three 
degrees of "negative" or "affirmative" opinion on either 
side. Although responses above and below the midpoint (4) 
indicate general "affirmative" or "negative" reactions to 
the particular stimulus, they also serve to locate the 
stimulus in terms of the continuum of meaning established 
by the two alternatives. Thus, when a subject marked the 
sixth space of item #1 of the "Speaker Differential" it 
would indicate the respondent considered the stimulus speaker 
rather logical. If, on the other hand, the second space was 
marked, the subject would have perceived the speaker as 
rather illogical. 
Results of the various di fferentia.ls are reported in 
terms of the voting groups from the two extreme quartiles. 
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The mean score for each item in the "Semantic Differentials" 
are included in the tables to follow; however, must discus-
sions will deal with the average of each "Quartile-Voting 
Group 1 s" responses to all of the items of the particular 
scale being considered. This average shall be referred to 
as the "Mean Semantic Differential Score." In the tables 
to follow the "Mean Semantic Differential" will be indicated 
- 30 by the standard symbol for mean, X. 
Hypothesis concerning "Semantic Differential Results." 
The theories outlined in the opening chapter of this 
investigation plus those of Duns and Rokeach combined to 
provide the basis for three hypotheses which serve as a 
framework for the analysis of the "Semantic Differentials." 
These hypotheses along with their theoretical bases are as 
follows: 
1.) If the "Semantic Differentials" designed for this 
study are accurate measures, it follows that preference for 
one speaker over another will be reflected in the "Mean 
Semantic Differential Scores.• 
30 
The great difference between the speakers of Debate 
I made the results of "Semantic Differentials" from that 
session inapplicable to the purposes for which they were 
designed. Thus semantic differential results from Debate II 
only will be considered here. Summaries of the results from 
Debate I are presented in Appendix F. 
The. 11~ Semantic Differential Score " .Q.f. .:t.k:ui 
spe<aker receiving ~ votes of ~ 11 Qua rtile-Voting 
Group 11 kL.lJJ.. ~ high er .:tllilli ~ "~ Semantic Dif-
ferential Score 11 given to .:t!:llt speaker 11b.Q failed to 
receive ~ votes of ~ same groupo 
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2.) If, as was indica ted by the analysis of the 
centra l hypothesis of this study, congruity of personality 
structure predisposes audience member s to vote for a par-
ticula r speaker , it would s eem that subjects who faile d to 
vote in the predicted direction would experience some c on -
flict in that they voted against a speaker who shared with 
them a bond of similar belief-disbelief systems. To test 
this assumption the fol l owing hypothesis was f ormulated. 
"Qua rtile- Voting Groups " voting 1..n ,tM unpredicted 
directions will grant lower "Mean Semantic Differential 
Scores 11 .:t.Q ~ speakers receiving their yotes ..:t.lJ.rul are 
granted 1Q speakers receiving the yotes of subjects 
yoting 1n the predic ted directions . 
J .) Rokeach indicates tha t one of the characteristics 
of the 11 open mind " i s its greater ability to discrimina te, 
while the 11 closed mind 11 i s not so sensitive to di f ferences . 3l 
Would this contras t result in 11 open minded" members of a 
debate audience perceiving greater diffe r ences between 
speakers than are detected by 11 cl ose minded11 a uditors? It 
was hoped tha t a partial answer to this question would be 
prov i ded by analysis of the fol lowing hypothesis : 
31 Rokeach , QQ . Qli. , pp . 37-39 . 
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~ "Mean Semantic Differential Scores" of yoting 
groups from quartile l. nil ~ characterized ~ 
greater yariation :!t.llill:J. .t.I:J& variation of "~Semantic 
Differential Scores 11 of voting groups from quartile !J:., 
These hypotheses were tested by comparison of the 
results of the "Speaker Differentials" from Debate II. These 
results may be found in Table XXII, 
Analysis Qf. "Speaker Differential" results, Data pre-
sented in Table XXII indicate that on face value all three 
hypotheses concerning the results of subject responses to 
the "Speaker Differentials" were confirmed. In regard to 
the first hypothesis all "Quartile-Voting Groups" granted 
higher "Mean Semantic Differential Scores" to the speaker 
who received their votes than they granted to the speaker 
who failed to gain their decision. Table XXIII presents 
the comparison of these scores, 
TABLE XXII 
RESULTS OF nsPEAKER SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIALS," DEBATE II 
Low S_ILeaker Ht,;rh Sneaker 
Q 1 Q4 Q 1 Q 4 Q 1 Q 4 Q 1 
Item Voting Voting Voting Voting Voting Voting Voting 
for for for' for for for for 
"Low" "Low 11 . "Hii2'h • "Hi>rh" "Low" "Low0 "Hi>rh" 
1. Logical- ' 5.40 6.14 Ilio,;rlcal 6.40 5.80 5.28 5.67 4. 80 
2. Believable- 6. 53 5.40 5.57 5.89 5.07 5.40 6.00 UnbAl~evable 
3. Convincing 
Unconvinci= 5. 80 5.80 .,4.43 5.44 4.20 3.80 6.14 
4. Factual- 6.07 4.40 5.86 6.22 3.86 4.60 5.28 Emotional 
5. Lucid- 6.07 5.00 4.50 5.56 4. 93 4.60 4.71 Ob_acure 
6. Aggressive- 5.20 4.40 5.29 4.78 3.60 3.60 4.00 Defensive 
7. Strong- 5-73 5.80 5.29 5.00 4.60 4.40 4.17 Weak 
8. Open-Minded 4.52 4.80 3.57 3.78 3.53 4.40 4.57 Doo-m"',.; c 
9. Likable- 6.27 5.60 5.29 6.Lf4 5.47 5.60 6.00 RePulsive 
11 LO. Like Me- 4.20 4.00 3.14 4.33 3.60 3.80 5.00 Unlike Me 
X 5.68 5.10 4. 82 5.31 4.36 4. 56 5.20 
.... ..l 
Q 4 
Voting 
for 
"Hi>rh" 
6.22 
6.55 
6.33 
4.46 
5.89 
5.88 
6.33 
3.55 
6.78 
4.89 
5.69 
1-' 
1-' 
a.. 
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TABLE XXIII 
C0~1PARISON OF "MEAN SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCORES " 
OF SPEAKERS RECEIVING AND FAILING TO RECEIVE 
THE DEBATE DECISIONS OF EACH " QUARTILE-VOTING GROUP " 
Q l *S,H(. Q 1 Q4 Q 4 
Mean Score For v . f . v . f . v . f . v . f . 
11 Low 11 "Hi gh11 ''Low" "High" 
Speaker :f\eceiv-
ing vote 
Speaker fai l ing 
to receive vote 
5 . 68 
4. 36 
5.20 5 . 10 
4 . 82 
**-!~S ignificant at . 01 from a l l other groups . 
5.69 
5.31 
The second hypothesis predicted that s ub jects v oting 
in the unpredicted directions would grant lower 11 Mean 
Semantic Differential Scores 11 to the speakers receiving their 
decisions than would be granted by sub jects voting in the 
predicted direction . Table XXIV presents the scores relating 
. to · this hypothesis . 
TABLE XXIV 
COI'1PARISON OF "MEAN SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL 
SCORES" OF SPEAKERS RECEIVING THE VOTES 
OF PREDICTED AND UNPREDICTED VOTING GROUPS 
Direction 
of Vote 
Predicted X * 
Unpredicted X 
* 
Vote For 
"Low 11 Speaker "High" Speaker 
5 . 68 
5 . 10 
5. 69 
5. 20 
"Mean Semantic Differential Score " 
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In both cases the unpredicted mean scores were in the direc-
tion predicted by the hypothesis. Neither of the differences 
is significant at the .05 level; however, this is not unexpected 
as all of the scores in Table XXIV were for speakers favored 
by the voters. The evidence in Table XXIV indicates that 
subjects voting in the unpredicted direction tended to favor 
the speaker receiving their vote less than did subjects vot-
ing as predicted. A glance at Table XXII will show subjects 
voting in the unpredicted direction also tended to favor 
losing speaker more than did subjects voting for the debater 
whose personality structure was most similar to their own. 
Taken together these two trends would imply that, even when 
voting in the unpredicted directions, subjects indicated 
favorable inclinations toward speakers of similar belief-
disbelief systems by reacting less favorably to the speaker 
receiving their vote and more favorably to the speaker fail-
ing to receive their vote than did subjects voting in the pre-
dicted directions. 
Taking its cue from Rokeach 1 s contention that "open-
minded" individuals are more aware of differences than are 
"closed-minded" persons, the third hypothesis predicted that 
the "Mean Semantic Differential Scores" of voting groups 
from quartile 1 would show greater variation than those of 
voting groups from quartile 4. To test this hypothesis a 
standard deviation was computed for the average of the "Mean 
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Semantic Differential Scores" from each quartile. Table XXV 
presents the results of these computations. 
Quartile 
1 
4 
TABLE XXV 
COMPARISON OF AVERAGE "MEAN SEI1ANTIC 
DIFFERENTIAL SCORES" BETWEEN 
QUARTILE l AND QUARTILE 4 
Average of Mean 
S D S 
1,019 
,418 
As a measure of deviation around a mean the differ-
ence between the standard deviations of the average "Mean 
Semantic Differential Scores" indicates subjects from the low 
quartile reported greater differences between speakers than 
did subjects from the high quartile, 32 To the extent that 
subjects 1 reactions recorded in the "Semantic Differentials" 
actually correspond to perceived differences the date of 
Table XXV support Rokeach 1 s belief that "open minded" indi-
viduals discriminate more than "closed minded" persons, In 
32 This result must be viewed with considerable cau-
tion for the average "Mean Semantic Differential Scores" are 
several steps removed from the raw data, In fact they are 
averages of the average scores of four groups which are in 
turn averages of the ten average item scores of each group 
which are the averages of the several individual group 
members• scores on that particular item. 
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particular Table XXV provides evidence that the general 
s uperiori ty of low dogmatics • discrimina tory powers is 
reflected in the differences they perceived between a high 
dogmatic and low dogma tic speaker . 
Results Qf. 11 R. ~. 1Q Differential§.. 11 The r esults of 
subject reaction recorded in the 11 R. B. 70 Differential" are 
reported in Table XXVI . 
TABLE XXVI 
RESULTS OF R. B. 70 DIFFERENTIAL , DEBATE I I 
Item 
1 . Effective vs . 
ineffective 
2 . Invulnerable vs . 
vulnerable 
3. Timely vs . 
obsolete 
4 . Powerful vs . 
weak 
5. Hard vs . 
soft 
6. Aggress ive vs . 
defensive 
X 
Tb.~ R. 
Q 1 
v . f . 
"Low11 
3o46 
1. 86 
2 .84 
4.38 
4 . 46 
2. 79 
3.44 
B. zo as R~1212onQ.eQ. 
Q 1 Q 4 
v . f . v . f . 
t~Hi:lid}" "Low" 
5. 57 4. 20 
3. 14 3. 60 
5. 28 3.60 
3. 60 
5;.42 4 . 60 
3 . 80 4 . 40 
4 . 88 4 . 0Q 
tQ :b;'£ 
Q 4 
v . f. 
11H1¢ 
5. 67 
3 . 33 
5. 22 
6. 44 
5.00 
4.44 
5. 27 
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Recal:j.ing that the "low" speaker in Debate II opposed 
the "crash program" to develop the R. B. 70 while the "high" 
speaker argued for such a program, there are indications in 
Table XXVI33 that even when subjects responded to a "Semantic 
Differential" for which an airplane served as stimulus, the 
relationship between audience member and speaker personality 
structure were reflected. For example, even when their 
impressions of the R. B. 70 were gained from listening to the 
same speeches, subjects from quartile one who voted against 
the crash program (for the "low" speaker) were negatively 
impressed by the weapon (M. s. D. = 3.44) while subjects 
from quartile four voting in the same direction responded 
entrally (M. s. D. = 4.00). In a similar fashion subjects from 
quartile four who voted in favor of the crash program were 
more favorable disposed to the R. B. 70 (M. s. D. = 5.27) 
than were subjects from quartile one who voted in the same 
direction (M. s. D. = 4.88). Though significance of differ-
ence 
feet 
ratings were not computed for these scores, their per-
34 
reflection of results reported in Table XXIV; and 
the discussion which followed lend strong credence to the 
33 A matrix of the significance of difference between 
the "Mean Semantic Differential Scores'' recorded on the 
"Speaker Differentials" from Debate II is included in 
Appendix E. 
34see supra, p. 117. 
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possibility that congruity or conflict between audience and 
speaker personality structures were at the root of the 
response patterns just discussed. 
The specific implications and conclusions which can be 
drawn from the results of both Speaker and R. B. 70 Semantic 
Differentials will be discussed in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As originally stated, the general aim of this study 
was to" ••• more fully explain the nature and functioning 
of ethos in an actual speech situation."1 Basic to the 
method employed herein was the close connection which seemed 
to exist between the ancient rhetorical concept of ethos and 
the contemporary psychological concepts of personality 
structure and its social manifestations. Rhetoricians 
explained that ethos was that portion of the speaker 1 s 
personal nature which inclined the audience to accept or 
reject him as a man of character, sagacity, and good will. 
Personality theory, particularly that portion dealing with 
authoritarianism, appeared to offer a possible explanation 
of the psychological factors resulting in the acceptance or 
rejection of the speaker as a man worthy of belief. 
The synthesis of rhetorical thought concerning ethos 
and psychological literature dealing with authoritarianism 
led to the formulation of a theory in which ethos was seen 
as a product of the interaction personality structures of 
speaker and audience members. Stated in the form of a 
hypothesis, this theory became: 
1 Supra, p. 5. 
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Ethos will increase and decrease 12 ~ extent ~ 
~ speaker's ~audience member's personality 
structures ~ similar ~ dissimilar. 
In order to evaluate this theory two experimental 
debates were conducted. In these debates the personality 
structures of speakers and audience members who were to 
judge the debates were measured through the use of the 
Rokeach Dogmatism Scale. Controls were employed in an 
attempt to assure that debate decisions made by the audience 
subjects would be based primarily upon the comparative ethos 
of the speakers to which they were exposed. 
In light of the theory of ethos summarized above it 
was hypothesized that subjects in the audience of each 
debate would tend to be persuaded by the speaker whose 
personality structure was most similar to their own •• 
The following are the specific conclusions drawn from 
the results of these debates as reported in Chapter IV. 
I. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS 
2 Analysis Q( sentral hypothesis. The mean dogmatism 
score of subjects of Debate II who had voted for the 11 high 11 
and 11 low 11 speaker were tested for significance of difference. 
The results of this analysis revealed that the mean score of 
subjects voting for the 11 high 11 speaker was very significantly 
2 Unless otherwise indicated all discussion in this 
chapter will relate to results obtained from Debate II. 
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higher than the mean score of subjects voting for the "low" 
speaker (P = ,05), 
"Chi Square" analysis of the distribution of votes for 
the two speakers from the dogmatism score quartiles demon-
strated that the tendency for subjects from the high (fourth) 
quartile to vote for the 11 high" speaker and for subjects from 
the low (first) quartile to vote for the "low" speaker 
resulted in a voting distribution which approached significant 
deviation from that which would be expected by chance. 
(P = .lo<.o5l. 
Even in the first debate, in which controls broke 
down and the "low" speaker was greatly superior to his "high" 
opposition, analogous results were produced, The mean dogma-
tism score of subjects voting for the "high" speaker (N = 9) 
was 21.59 higher than that of subjects voting for the "low" 
speaker (N = 5?). When the votes for each speaker were 
classified in terms of the dogmatism score quartile placement 
of the subjects casting the votes it was discovered that an 
increasing percentage of subjects voted for the "high" 
speaker as subject dogmatism rose. (Q 1 = O%, Q 2 and 3 = 
14.71%, Q 4 = 18.18%.) Though the small number of subjects 
who voted for the "high" speaker (N = 9) prevented statistical 
treatment of these results, data from Debate I reflected the 
trends found significant in the second experimental session. 
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All things considered, there is sufficient evidence to 
establish th~t, within the limited context of this study,3 
that subjects tended to be persuaded by speakers whose per-
sonality structure was most similar to their own. To the 
extent that controls succeeded in making comparative ethos 
the primary basis for subject debate decisions it can be 
concluded that ethos was the result of the interaction of 
speaker and audience member personality structures, and 
that ethos increased or decreased to the extent that speaker 
and audience member personality structures were similar or 
dissimilar. 
Further evidence concerning the central hypothesis of 
this study will be considered from time to time in the 
remainder of Chapter v. 
Pre-debate questionnaire. The significant difference 
between the high "General Defense Knowledge• score of sub-
jects from quartile 4 who voted for the "low" speaker and 
groups voting in the predicted directions, plus the similar 
but not quite significant, difference between quartile 1 
subjects who voted in the unpredicted direction and the pre-
dicted groups seem to indicate that subjects with more knowl-
edge of the general area of national defense were less 
3This conclusion is based primarily upon data from 
Debate II. 
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influenced by personality structure similarity than were 
less knowledgeable subjects. In fact, data from the pre-
debate questionnaire would seem to indicate that audience 
members with the greatest defense information tended to vote 
for the speaker whose personality was least similar to their 
own. 
The small number of subjects who voted in the unpre-
dicted directions (N = 12) does not allow specific conclusions 
to be drawn, however, there is ample evidence to believe that 
the voting behavior of subjects with greater defense informa-
tion was consistently different than their less informed 
counterparts. Further research with more "sophisticated" 
pre- and post-debate instruments might serve to clarify the 
nature of this behavior, 
Responses to the item concerning pre-debate opinion 
of the R, B, 70 indicated that the "low" speaker enjoyed the 
advantage of the majority of the opinion which existed before 
the debate. The fact that three members of Quartile 1 agreed 
with the position advocated by the "low" speaker prior to the 
debate and eventually cast their votes for him may have had 
some effect upon the manner in which the votes from Quartile 1 
were distributed. Yet, even without these three subjects 
the mean dogmatism score of subjects voting for the "low" 
speaker would still have been significantly below that of 
subjects voting for the "high" speaker. Thus, it would seem 
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opinions existing before the debate may have influenced the 
outcome of the contest in terms of which speaker received the 
majority of the votes cast by the audience , but, there is 
little indication that this opinion had any important influence 
on the mean dogmatism scores of subject groups voting for 
either speaker . 
~-debate questionnaire . Three items in the post-
debate questionnaire provided information collateral to the 
evaluation of the central hypothesis . Subjects from Quartile 
4 voting for the " low" speaker were significantly less per-
suaded than were any of the other groups , ( 11 P" ranged from 
.01 to .05.) and diverged from the other Quartile Voting 
Groups in being the only one which faile d to contain some 
members who granted the same letter grade to both speakers. 
The almost constant difference be tween members of Quartile 4 
who voted for the 11 low" speaker and other groups leads to the 
conclusion that some factor operated within its membership 
to cause this phenomenon . Whether this factor was the 
result of conflict caused by their choosing to vote for a 
speaker with a dissimilar per sonal ity struc t ure , their high 
degree of defense knowledge , or some other element of the 
experimental situation cannot be determined. Research into 
the behavior of persons persuaded by speakers of dissimilar 
personality s tructure could serve to r es olve this question 
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and would, perhaps , cast light on the general social behavior 
of individua l s during conta~&t with personality "opposites ." 
The only sub jects admitting they were uncertain as to 
why they voted as they d id were fr om the low quartile . This 
~an be viewed as s upp orting Rokeach ' s belief that the low 
dogmatic more readily admits ambivalence. The fact that the 
only s ubjects who claimed to ha ve based t heir dec i sions on 
agreement or disagreement with a particul ar idea advanced by 
one or the other speaker were from Quart i le 4 seems to add 
further credence to another finding pr esented by Roke~ch; 
that high dogmatics a r e more likely to judge individuals by 
what they believe than are low dogmatics . 
11 Semantic Differentials ." The r esults of t he "Semantic 
Differentials" were reple t e with evidence that the relation-
s hip between audience member and speaker personality structures 
effected the manner in which s ubjects r eacted to the speakers. 
The following fact s all t end to indicate that ethos, as it 
operated in Debate II increased and decreased to the extent 
that speal{er and audience me mber pe rsonality structures we r e 
congruent: 
1. The highes t (mos t affirmat ive ) "Mean Semantic Dif -
ferential Scor es " were those accorded to speakers 
rece iving the votes of subjects voting in the pr e-
dicted directions. 
2. 
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Quartile Voting Groups voting in the unpredicted 
directions did not favor the speaker receiving 
their decision so much as did the predicted groups. 
3. Quartile Voting Groups voting in the unpredicted 
directions favored the speaker who failed to 
receive their votes more than the predicted groups. 
4. Almost as if they were responding to the speakers 
rather than an airplane, the same patterns reported 
in items 1, 2, and 3 were repeated in relation to 
the R. B. 70. 
Though few of the differences between "Mean Semantic 
Differential Scores" were statistically significant, every 
voting group demonstrated· some form of relative favoritism 
to the speaker whose personality structure was most similar 
to their own. Assuming the adequacy of controls, it can be 
concluded that any reported favoritism arose from ethos. The 
consistent pattern of subjects favoring speakers of like per-
sonality indicates that ethos was determined by the degree of 
speaker-listener personality structure congruity and thus, the 
results of the "Semantic Differentials" can be considered as 
further evidence supporting the central hypothesis of thl.s 
investigation. 
One additional test was conducted upon the results of 
the "Semantic Differentials," the computation of a standard 
deviation for the average of the "Mean Semantic Differential 
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Score s " f rom the voting groups from each of the extreme 
quarti1es. This process disclosed tha t the s t andard devia-
tion of the low quartile was more than twice as l a r ge as 
tha t of the opposite group (Q 1 = 1.019, Q 4 = . 41 8). These 
figures support Rokeach in hi s finding that low dogmatics 
discrimina t e more than do high dogmatics . 
Addi t ional relationships. Analys is of the relat ion-
ship be tween dogmatism scores and verba l r easoning , predicted 
speech grades , r elig ious affiliation , sex , undergr aduate 
cla sses , and academic ma jors disclosed few differe nces 
significant at the .05 l evel . Rokeach 1 s hypothesi s tha t the 
Dogmatism Scal e measure s a pe r sonality syndrome wh ich cuts 
across speci f ic a r eas of ability , interes t , and belief finds 
support in these r esult s . However , the significant dif-
f erences between s ubjects who i ndica ted a political preference 
and those who did not i s contrary to the r es ults of previ ous 
studies as is the f a ilure to find a significant difference 
betwee n the mean dogmati sm scores of male and female subj ects . 
II. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARC H 
Due to the tentative nature of th is invest igat i on a 
numbe r of areas of additiona l re search seem worthy of investi ga-
tion . Several such areas have been indicated a t various places 
i n the preceding d i scussion; the following sect i on will incl ude 
further s ugges ti ons. 
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1. The tentativeness of this study requires that 
similar investigations using differing topics and 
methods will need to be conducted before the rela-
tionship between ethos and personality structure 
can be satisfactorily explained, 
2. Studies aimed at determining how similarity or 
lack of similarity of personality structure is 
conveyed from speaker to listener should be very 
valuable. Experiments involving high dogmatics 
reading manuscripts composed by low dogmatics and 
~ yersa or comparing results of tape recorded 
and personally delivered addresses could serve to 
this end. 
3. Content analysis of high and low dogmatic communica-
tions could further aid in the discovery of the 
characteristics of each. 
4. Part of the argument concerning the effects of 
competitive debate upon the personalities of 
participants might be resolved through studies 
employing the Dogmatism Scale and similar devices. 
5. The conflict which seems to be reflected in the 
behavior of the high subjects who voted for the 
"low" speaker might serve as a cue to fruitful 
investigations employing small groups in which 
there is personality structure dissimilarity 
between the leader and other members. 
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6. Investigations of a nature similar to this study 
using g roups with varying degrees of knowledge 
of the general field fr om which the degate topic 
is drawn might cast considerable light upon the 
conditions under which ethos , pathos , or logos 
assume a dominant role in audience dec ision making . 
7. The vast a mount of data accumulated through the use 
of the "Semantic Differential" should strongly 
recommend it as a method of me asuring audience 
reactions in almost any rhetorica l investigation. 
III . SUMMARY 
In summary , the relative cong ruity between the per-
sonality structures of speakers and audience members appears 
to have had , within the limits of this s tudy, deciding effect 
upon the ethos of the speakers involved. Evidence presented 
in the preceding chapters tends to indicate that a speaker 
will enjoy increased ethos to the extent that his pe r sonality 
structure is simila r to that of the audience member perceiving 
him. 
Though the artificial nature of the debates and the 
small number of sub j ects involved in this investigation neces-
sarily limit the extent to which its conclusions may be pro-
jected into the general speech situation, there does seem to 
be ample proof to suggest that ethos and personality structure 
are closely related . 
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Perhaps even more important than specific conclusions, 
Duns 1 final comment concerning his study characterizes the 
most important feature of this investigation as it relates to 
ethos and the entire body of rhetorical theory: 
••• it has demonstrated the inseparable relationship 
between the personality of the speaker, the content of 
his speeoU, and the response to his speaking by the 
audience. 
4 
Donald Frederick Duns, "A Study of the Relationship 
Between Dogmatism and Speech Behavior" {unpublished Doctoral 
dissertaion, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 
1961)' p. 152. 
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GENERAL ATTITUDE AND OPINION STUDY 
The following is a study of what the general public 
thinks and feels about a number of important social and per-
sonal questions. The best answer to each statement below is 
your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different 
and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing 
strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as 
strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; 
whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can:,be 
sure that many people feel the same as you do, 
Mark each statement in the left margin according to 
how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every 
one, 
Mark A l. If You Agree Stro!JB:lY 
Mark A ,g_ If You Agree Moderately 
Mark A J. If You Agree Slightly 
Mark A 4 If You Disagree Slightly 
Mark A .5_ If You Disagree Moderately 
Mark A .Q. If You Disagree Stro!JB:ly 
Attached to the back of this study is a general 
information sheet, Please answer all questions as accurately 
as possible. All answers on the information sheet and other 
parts of the study will be strictly confidential. Your name 
will be used only for purposes of identification, 
Mark a l if you agree strongly with the statement. 
Mark a~ if you agree moderately with the st~tement. 
Mark a 2 if you agree slightly with the statement. 
Mark a~ if you disagree slightly with the statement. 
Mark a ~if you disagree moderately with the statement. 
Mark a Q if you disagree strongly with the statement. 
1. The United States and Russia have just about 
nothing in common. 
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2. The highest form of government is a democracy and 
the highest form of·democracy is a government run 
by those who are most intelligent. 
3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a 
worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to 
restrict the freedom of certain political groups. 
4. It is only natural that a person would have a much 
better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than 
with ideas he opposes. 
5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable 
creature. 
6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty 
lonesome place. 
7. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others. 
8. I 1d like it if I could find someone who would tell 
me how to solve my personal problems. 
9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fear-
ful of the future. 
10. There is so much to be done and so little time to 
do it in. 
11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just 
can't stop. 
_____ 12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat 
myself several times to make sure I am being under-
stood. 
_____ 13. In a heated discussion I generally become so 
absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget 
to listen to what the others are saying. 
~ 
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Mark a l if you ag;cee s:trol.'Ul:lll: with the statement. 
Mark a z. if you agree modera:telx with the statement. 
Mark 
Mark 
Mark 
Mark 
a J. if you agre~ alia:ll:tlx with the statement, 
a ~ if you !Hsag;cegJ sligh:tlx with the statement. 
a .5. if you g1sagr!:l!:l mogera:tclx with the statement, 
a .Q. if you 9.1£lag;cee s:tronglx with the statement, 
14, It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live 
coward, 
15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, 
my secret ambition is to become a great man, 
like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare, 
16, The main thing in life is for a person to want 
to do something important. 
17, If given the chance I would like to do something 
of great benefit to the world, 
18, In the history of mankind there have probably 
been just a handful of really great thinkers, 
19, There are a number of people I have come to hate 
because of the things they stand for, 
20, A man who does not believe in some great cause has 
not really lived, 
21, It is only when a person devotes himself to an 
ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful, 
22, Of all tpe different philosophies which exist in 
this world there is probably only one which is 
correct, 
23, A person who gets enthusiastic about too many 
causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" 
sort of person, 
24, To compromise with our political opponents is 
dangerous because it usually leads to the 
betrayal of our own side, 
25, When it comes to differences of opinion in religion 
we must be careful not to compromise with those 
who believe differently from the way we do, 
26, In times like these, a person must be pretty 
selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness, 
--! 
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Mark a l if you ag;c~~ strongly with the statement. 
Mark a 
"-
if you ag;c~e mogerately with the statement. 
Mark a J. if you agr!:l~ §Uglltly with the statement. 
Mark a 
.!!:. if you d1S5l:gr~e slightly with the statement. 
Mark a 
.5. if you disagree moderlil:tely with the statement. 
Mark a Q if you gislil:g:C~!:l §trongly with the statement. 
_____ 27. The worst crime a person could commit is to 
attack publicly the people who believe in the 
same thing he does. 
28, In times like these it is often necessary to be 
more on guard against ideas put out by people 
or groups in one 1 s own camp than by those in the 
opposite camp. 
29. A group which tolerates too much differences of 
opinion among its own members cannot exist for 
long, 
30, There are two kinds of people in this world: 
those who are for the truth and those who are 
against the truth. 
31. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses 
to admit he 1 s wrong. 
32. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness 
is beneath contempt. 
33. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays 
aren 1 t worth the paper they are printed on. 
34. In this complicated world of ours the only way we 
can know what 1 s going on is to rely on leaders or 
experts who can be trusted, 
35. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about 
what 1 s going on until one has had a chance to 
hear the opinions of those one respects, 
36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick 
friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs 
are the same as one 1 s own. 
37. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. 
It is only the future that counts. 
38. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it 
is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing 
at all." 
-1 
Mark a 1 if you agree strongly with the statement. 
Mark a ~ if you agree moderately with the statement. 
Mark a 1 if you agree slightly with the statement. 
Mark a~ if you disagree slightly with the statement. 
Mark a 5 if you disagree moderately with the statement. 
Mark a Q if you disagree strongly with the statement. 
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39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I 
have discussed important social and moral 
problems don 1 t really understand what 1 s going on. 
___ 40. Most people juEt don 1 t know what 1s good for them. 
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This is the final page of the survey. Before you 
complete this page, please recheck your answers to make sure 
that you have answered all of the questions on the preceding 
pages. 
Fill in the proper answers: 
1. Age __ 
2. Sex (circle) M F 
3. Classification (circle) 
Freshman Sophomore Junior Graduate Special Auditor 
4. Major 
5. Do you have a religious preference? (Circle) Yes No 
If the answer is yes, would you please indicate what it 
is? (Specify denomination, if possible.) 
6. Are you a member of a fraternity or a sorority? (circle) 
Yes No If the answer is yes, please name. 
?. Name of the course in which thiS survey was taken. 
8. Do you have a political preference? (Circle) Yes No 
If the answer is yes, would you please indicate what it 
is? 
9. What do you plan to do after you have completed your 
education? Describe 
10. Name -------------------------
11. If you have any comments to make about this questionnaire, 
please make them below. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
APPENDIX B 
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS AND 
REPORT OF SELECTED CORRELATIONS 
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Reliability Coefficients 
The "odd-even" correlations for the Dogmatism Scale 
are reported in Table XXVII. These are quite similar to 
1 those reported by Rokeach and can be assumed to be stable 
and to represent satisfactory levels. A separate correlation 
was computed for each of the nine "sections" of "Speech 59" 
involved in this study. 
TABLE XXVII 
II ODD-EVEN" RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS* 
"Section" No. of cr Subjects 
1 21 .823 
2 16 .752 
3 24 .625 
4 18 .860 
5 13 .820 
6 16 .630 
7 23 .840 
8 20 • 923 
10 16 .819 
* Odd-even correlations are corrected by the Spearman-
Brown formula. 
1 Milton Rokeach, The ~and Closed N1nd (New York: 
Basic Books, 1960), p. 90. 
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Correlations Between Dogmatism and Selected Factors 
The data reported in Table XXVIII strongly supports 
the findings of Rokeach and Duns. Rokeach discovered a nega-
tive correlation between problem solving reasoning ability, 2 
Duns found small negative correlations between dogmatism and 
s. A. T. verbal reasoning scores and dogmatism and actual 
speech grades. 3 
TABLE XXVIII 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND SELECTED FACTORS 
Between dogmatism 
and * 
verbal reasoning (N-1J3) 
* 
Between dogmatism 
and 
predloted speech grades (N-1J3) 
- 22*** 
- -. 
between verbal reasoning and predicted speech 
grades is equal to +,57 significant at ,02. 
** 
*** 
2 
.10 <. 0 5 level of significance. 
,01 level of significance, 
Rokeach, ~. ~ •• p. 90, 
3Donald F. Duns, "A Study of the Relationship Between 
Dogmatism and Speech Behavior" (unpublished Doctoral dis-
sertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1961), 
p. 179. 
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"Instruction Sheets" 
THE R. B. 70: SOME HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In mid 1950 the u. s. Air Force began to develop 
plans for a bomber to replace the then experimental B. 52. 
As fast as the 52 was, advances in air defense and the rapid 
maturation of sophisticated interceptors in the Russian Air 
Force demanded that the United States introduce a new manned 
bomber by sometime in the mid 1960s, That plane was to be 
the R. B, 70. 
The design which emerged from initial planning was a 
fantastic weapon. Capable of speeds in excess of two and 
one-half times the speed of sound, possessing a range which 
would allow it to strike to the heartland of any co~tinent on 
earth and return with an excess of fuel, with a bomb capacity 
nearly as large as that of the B, 36 (55,000 lbs,) the R, B. 
70 was to be one of the most amazing planes of all times, 
However, events of the late 50s gave some military men 
second thought a bot the advisability of going ahead with the 
project. The rapid development of ballistic missles seemed 
to outdate the 70 as a retalitory force, while equally rapid 
development of Russian anti-aircraft defense, according to 
these experts, made striking with a manned bomber something 
worse than a calculated risk, 
Defenders of the bomber held that regardless of the 
sophistication of automatic weapon systems, manned aircraft 
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were still essential for many of the duties of modern warfare 
a nd were we to allow the Russians to draw ahead of us in the 
development of supersonic bombers we would be making a pos-
sibly deadly mistake. 
T~e situation came to a head early this year when the 
House Armed Services Committee passed a specific appropriation 
for completion of the 70 ahead of the planned schedule. Defense 
Secretary McNamara had made it no secret that he felt the 
bomber was a white elephant which could just as well be allowed 
to die on the vine . 
This dispute divided the American military establishment 
right down the middle. This coming week you will have a chance 
to solve the problem . 
We are trying to give the students in Speech 59 some 
good examples of persuasive speaking and have deliberately 
selected a topic about which they will know little. This was 
done in an effort to allow them to be able to analyze the 
techniques used by the speakers without the interference of 
audience bias. 
The following is the form~t we plan to use: 
l. The audience will fill out the first half of a 
"Shift of Opinion" Ballot . 
2 . Each speaker will speak for a minimum of seven (?) 
minutes or a maximum of eight (8) minutes. (These 
are the time limits on the classroom speeches . ) 
). The audience will fill out the second half of the 
ballot. 
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Some Things to Remember: 
There will be no rebuttal period so you must do your 
persuading in the seven to eight minutes you have. 
This is an audience of college freshmen not debate 
coaches or judges, thus you can be a bit more free 
with emotion, and a bit more simple in your pi'eS'enta-
tion. 
Dress will be the same as for regular tournament 
competition. 
1.l:lll. ,;qinper .Qf. ~ debate !i1ll :tl£l. treated .tQ ,Sl steak 
dinner tl "Little Italy" compliments .Q.[ ~ Department 
.Qf. Speech. 
Use §.nY reasoning XQ!.!. would ~. .Qyj;_ ~ .QllJ.x. ~ 
information and quotations QD ~attached information 
sheets. 
"Manufactured" Evidence and Instructions to Pro-"Crash 
Program" Speakers 
YOUR BASIC CONTENTION IS AS FOLLOWS: 
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We must have a crash program to develop the R, B, 70, 
THE BASIC ARGUMENTS OF YOUR OPPOSITION WILL BE: 
1. Manned bombers are obsolete in major global conflicts, 
2, Missiles make our best strike force, 
), By the time the B, 70 is in full production it would be 
a useless offensive weapon, 
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 
"What you must realize is that rockets, no matter how 
sophisticated, do not solve all of our attack problems, There 
are some operations that can only be carried out by men who 
are actually on the scene and can make decisions or the basis 
of what they can observe. Even the best Atlas cannot strike 
twice. By this I mean that you can never be sure that a 
missile is going to detonate just because it got off the 
launch pad, Any number of a thousand things can go wrong 
as the missile is subjected to extremes of heat and cold as 
it leaves and re-enters the atmosphere, You could very well 
launch a missile at an enemy missile base and find phat the 
warhead was a dud when the enemy missiles began to fall on 
New York. This just can 1 t happen with a manned bomber like 
the R. B, 70. Equipped with air to surface missiles, such as 
the "Sky Bolt," it can stand off several hundred miles from 
the target and be ready to launch a second missile the moment 
it becomes apparent that the first attempt failed, 11 
General L. M, Scott, U,S,A.F. 
"Lets assume for a minute that our first retalitory 
blows were carried by "Polaris," "Minutemen," and "Atlas" 
missiles. The best calculations at Rand indicate that there 
would still be work to be done. It is essential that we have 
immediate follow up for that first strike. A wing of R, B. 
70s could make a complete check of every major target in the 
U.S.S,R, in a very short period. During this time they could 
access the damage done by our first strike, complete any jobs 
left undone, and return with valuable intelligence information." 
Ralph Sloan, Research Director Convair Aviation 
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"No missile likely to be invented can destroy a target 
and return to its base. And that's just what a manned bomber 
can do. Its not enough to know that you hit your target. 
Command headquarters needs much more; what military movements 
are in evidence in the enemy's heartland, what are the anti-
aircraft defenses like, what was the extent of the damage to 
the target area. In fact, we cannot see any way we can plan 
second strike strategy intelligently unless there is some way 
we can learn how our first strike worked. And it seems to me 
that the R. B. 70 is the only way we can do that." 
Gen. Harold Hapheart, Director of Special Planning 
U, S, War College 
"It has been argued that any manned bomber wouldn 1 t 
have a chance against anti-aircraft defenses, Its rather 
serious that a bombing mission wouldn't exactly be a lawn 
party, but it certainly wouldn't be any pigeon shoot. At 
this time security restrictions prevent me from revealing 
the details, but let me make it quiet clear that if we are 
ever forced to send S,A,C, on the 'real thing,' more than 70% 
would get through to the targets, 1K those planes~ B.~. 
We have every reason to believe that the percentage could be 
even higher, and that the return rate (the number of planes 
that return to home base) would be just as high. It is hard 
enough for any anti aircraft weapon to hit a target flying 
2,000 miles per hour, but its even harder with the types of 
defense mechanisms which are part of the B. 70 design. 
May I point out here that were we forced to use the B. 
52s and 47s we are flying today we could only count on about 
half the success we would be sure of with the R, B. 70, 
Gentlemen, if you pass up this opportunity to develop this 
plane fully and in a hurry, you are putting America's defense 
posture in an extremely awkward position," 
General James R. Roland, Commander First Strike Wing 
s.A.c. 
A missile is a pretty final thing. Once its gone its 
nearly at its target. Remember if there is ever a false 
alarm you can call the 70 back, you can't do that with an 
"Atlas." 
Congressman John Evans, Member of Air Force Sub-
Committee of the House Armed Services Committee 
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"As inhumane as war is, we must nevertheless con-
centrate our retalitory attack upon only strategic targets. 
At present we have no adequate means for reconnoitering a 
bombed over target area for purposes of determining whether 
or not a second strike should be launched. Of course, the 
United States could, without reconnassiance, launch a second 
missile attack automatically. However, this would obviously 
result in needless loss of life, millions of lives in fact. 
So, simply from a humanitarian point of view it would be most 
beneficial to these millions of innocent people who would 
bear the brunt of such an attack to carry our second strike 
in B. 70s. Thus we could employ these second weapons only 
where they were absolutely essential. 
"There can be no doubt that the Soviet Union is develop-
ing its own version of the B. 70, and if they are developing 
this mach three plane similar to the 70 it will completely 
nullify the combined forces of our B. 52s and 4?s. That is 
why those who oppose the rapid development of the B. 70 take 
a position which, I believe, places the defense posture of the 
United States on an extremely dubious basis. 
Harold Daves, Research Director, I.B.M. 
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"Manufactured" Eyidence rul!l Instructions Giyen Anti- 11 Crash 
Program" ~LSpeakers 
YOUR BASIC CONTENTION IS AS FOLLOWS: 
It would be foolish to embark upon a crash program 
to develop a production version of the R. B. 70. There is 
no need for such a weapons system, etc, 
THE BASIC ARGUMENTS OF YOUR OPPOSITION \liiLL BE: 
1. There are some military operations which necessitate the 
use of manned bombers. 
a. The R. B. 70 will be able to investigate damages 
caused by a missile attack and act upon the informa-
tion it discovers. 
b. No mechanical system can ever replace the value of 
human decision. 
2. The R, B. 70 will provide America with a more flexible 
defense posture. 
a, It can be used in both atomic and limited wars, 
b. It will increase the number of options the S,A,C, 
command will have in making a retalitory strike, 
c. It will make a perfect launching platform for air-
to-ground missiles, 
TESTIMONY GIVEN BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMf'IITTEE 
"Some people tell you that we need manned planes so 
they can make an immediate foll.ow-up in case a portion of a 
first missile strike fails, This just isn't the case. 
First of all, there is little chance that the missiles will 
include any failures. If all stages of any given missile 
ignite properly the chances of its hitting the seclected 
target are better than ~everal thousand to one. Should one 
of the stages fail to ignite, we receive that information 
instantaneously, destroy the faulty weapon, and send a 
second strike on its way all before the enemy even knows the 
attac]{ is coming." 
General Harold B, White, Chief of Research 
Third Air Force 
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"Gentlemen we aren 1 t being asked to appropriate this 
money for a 1943 war. So, we had better not spent it on 
1943 weapon ideas. For no ~atter how fast it is, there is 
no hope for a manned bomber to get through to say, Moscow. 
Considering the top altitudes of the Russian interceptions I 
think the Iron Curtain is just a little too high to fly over 
in anything as big as the R, B, 70. The way we 1 re beginning 
to worry about the success of the Russian anti-missile 
defense system, it seems a little bit silly to sit around 
here and discuss the possibility of a manned bomber 1s getting 
through. If you don 1 t think the Soviets can shoot the 70 
down I sug~est you ask Gary Powers. He might be able to 
give you some information. By the way, a U-2 makes a much 
smaller target than a R, B. 70, 11 
General Gerald K, Miller, Past Executive Commander 
S,A,C. 
"Our best estimates tell us the manned plane couldn't 
get to its target in less than 2 hrs. (And that is the most 
optimistic estimate.) A ballistic missile can make It in 15 
minutes. That time factor seems important to me. Assuming 
the United States has been attacked, if we are to protect 
ourselves from a second, third, and even fourth, wave of 
strikes, we must retaliate with speed and decisiveness. We 
can do this best with an entirely missile force, In fact, in 
the time it would take a wing of R. B. 70s to travel to 
Central Europe a prospective enemy could have launched as many 
as three additional waves of attacks at the United States." 
Horace Korbine, Chief of Research and Development 
General Dynamics. 
"Our best intelligence information has assured us that 
the Powers U-2 was probably downed by an infrared homing, 
ground-to-air missile. Tou must realize that an infrared 
anti-aircraft missile homes on the heat created by jet 
engines. Gentlemen, the speed at which the R, B. 70 would be 
traveling on a normal bombing run would turn the whole plane 
into a target for one of these missiles. Normally only the 
exhaust tube of a jet becomes hot enough to attract an 
infrared weapon. But, the air friction created by a ship 
traveling at 2,000 miles per hour would raise every square 
inch of the plane's surface area to a temperature of approxi-
mately 600 degrees centigrade. At this ~ate not only the 
exhaust tubes but every inch of this 119 foot flying coffin 
becomes a perfect invitation for a heat directed infrared 
anti-aircraft missile. Send 100 B. 70s over New York and my 
men would shoot down 99 of them even before they came into 
air-to-surface strike distance." 
Colonel George c. Maharas, Chief of Anti-Aircraft 
Defenses, Quadrent of New York 
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"As you gentlemen know R,A,N,D, is on record as 
opposing the future development of manned bombers, with the 
exception of small ground-support systems. Large bombers 
are obsolete today. They will be even more obsolete by 1969 
which is the earliest possible date for the full scale produc-
tion of a fully operational R, B, 70, Our projections of 
Russian arms development indicate that by that date less 
than 12% survival rate could be expected from any R, B, 70 
strike. All these figures about a 70% survival rate are 
based on the rather silly process of estimating how a 70 
could do against today's Russian defenses. In effect this 
is saying how well a plane that isn 1 t even flying could do 
against defenses which will be disgarded as useless by the 
time the plane is actually capable of flying strike missions." 
Horace J, Pharland, Air Defense Research Director 
R,A,N,D, Corp, 
"You have been told today that one of the advantages 
of the manned bomber is that if we sent it on a strike mis-
sion it could be called back if the oric;inal decision to 
strike was a mistake. This seems like a real advantage until 
you remember that what these people are saying is that you 
can call a plane back if it was a mistake, but if it wasn 1t 
a mistake the plane:probably wouldn 1t make it through to 
target anyway, At best this seems a rather dubious argument. 
It's like going to a duel with an empty piston because you 
think the whole thing might be a misunderstanding, 
Admiral K, B. Hamitlon 
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Magazine Articles Included ..1.n "Information Packets" 
Included in the "information packets" given to speak-
ers advocating the "crash program" were the following magazine 
articles: 
1.) Spatz, Carl. "America's B-70 Must Fly," Newsweek, 
55:20-21, January 25, 1960. 
2.) • "The Case for the B-70 in an Age of 
Missiles," Newsweek, 57:)4, April 17 1 1961. 
Speakers arguing for the "crash program" were also 
given "The B-70 'Valkyrie,'" a 10 page pamphlet publl.shed 
by the Public Relations Division of North American Aviation. 
Speakers opposing the "crash program" were given copies 
of the following periodical articles: 
1,) "LeMay's Last Stand," The New Republic, 146:)-l~, 
March 29, 1962. 
2.) "More Important Than Pork," Commonweal, 73:227, 
March 17, 1961. 
J.) "Science in the News: Missiles vs. Bombers, 
Congressional Committees Express Some Doubt," 
Science, 1)):1585-87, May 19, 1961. 
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DEBATE I 
First Speaker 1 11 .!1.1Jtil1 11 fulli.- 11 Crash Program 11 
We are living in the age of missiles. The defense of 
our nation is now associated with such terms as Atlas, Titan, 
Polaris, and, more recently, anti-missile missiles. My basic 
contention this morning is that it would be foolish to embark 
upon a crash program to develop the RB-70 bomber. Let 1 s con-
sider three main areas and explore the objections in these 
areas in light of possible affirmative arguments. These 
areas are practicality for secondary use, 
First, I would make three things clear, three points 
of clarification. I am only opposed to a crash program, not 
an orderly one for the purpose of research only. And secOndly, 
according to the New Republic, and this should be kept in 
mind, the plane would not be operational until 1970 or 1971, 
In this fast moving day and age, we should keep this in mind, 
And thirdly minor uses, other than that which the plane is 
intended for, can be taken care of without the crash program, 
My first area of objection: the RB-70, originally 
planned beginning in 1950, is outdated and no longer suitable 
for its original purpose, We must be flexible and adjust to 
modern warfare technology. This means less emphasis on manned 
bombers and more emphasis on missiles. The RB-70 isn 1 t 
appropriate. Quotes from testimony before the House Armed 
Services Committee: 
Gen. Gerald Miller, Executive Commander of SAC, quote, 
"Gentlemen, we aren 1 t being asked to appropriate money 
for a 1943 war; we had better not spend it on 1943 weapon 
ideas." 
Horace Korbine, Chief of Research and Development, 
General Dynamics, "Our best estimates tell us that manned 
planes couldn 1 t get to its target in less than two hours; 
a ballistic missile can make it in fifteen minutes. In 
the time it would take a wing of B-70 1 s (sic) to travel 
to Central Europe, a prospective enemy could have 
launched as many as three additional waves of attack on 
the United States," 
Colonel George Maharis, Chief of Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 
Quandrit (sic) 1 of New York, quote, "Every inch of this one 
hundred and nineteen foot flying coffin becomes a per-
fect invitation for a heat directed, infra-red anti-
aircraft missile, Send one hundred RB-70 1 s over New 
York, and my men would shoot down ninety-nine of them 
even before they came into air to surface strike distance," 
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Also the New Republic, March, 1962, said, "A Soviet bomber 
that could intercept the U-2 could certainly reach a larger 
plane like the RB-70, 11 
From this we can see that the RB (sic) is obsolete and 
unappropriate for many reasons. The ideal (sic) is outdated, 
The plane is too slow; missiles are eight times faster. It 
couldn't penetrate the enemies' defenses. In reality, it 
would probably never (sic) its target. Also, by 1970 1 this 
will be even more true. Remember the Russians are putting 
most of their resources into the area of missiles and missile 
defense. We should do the same, 
My second area of objection: the cost of the RB-70 
is too great, and other areas need the money more desperately. 
The RB-70 has already devoured over one billion dollars and 
would ultimately require a total of ten billion dollars in 
total commit, I propose to you that this money would be more 
useful if applied toward perfecting our anti-missile system 
and developing further missile striking ability, Project 
this belief into 1970, and you can easily see the desirability 
of spending the money in the age, in the area of missiles, 
This is the missile age. The Russians realize it. So should 
we. 
Commonweal Magazine in March of 1962, pointed out that 
motivation for the RB-70 may be based on financial drives. 
In referring to the RB-70 program and those defending it, 
this magazine said, "The appetite for defense contracts is 
literally insatable (sic), It is indeed a beautiful spectacle 
to see the republic cutting one another's throats in the name 
of national defense, The history of this monstrosity is that 
both the last and present administration have tried to hog-tie 
it and have succeeded momentarily, but it always gets loose 
again," The Defense Department, I agree, an orderly program 
for the development of prototypes is appropriate--perhaps a 
hundred and eighty million dollars as the Chief of Allocations 
of the Defense Department requested--but not four hundred and 
ninety-one million this year alone for proceeding toward the 
distant goal of mass production. Remember prototypes are 
useful as links toward bigger and better weapons. Mass pro-
duced creatures of obselescence are good only for mothball 
fleets. 
This plane costs too much. Much would be wasted. The 
money could be spent in more appropriate areas. 
My third objection: the RB-70 is not useful in a 
superior manner for any of its secondary uses. Let's con-
sider a few. 
-· 
For transportation, it's not needed. Others are j.ust 
as good. As a missile carrier it's not needed. We have 
developed long range ground to ground missiles and Polaris 
subs for this purpose, For conventional warfare it is not 
appropriate because conventional warheads can now be used on 
missiles. None of these areas are (sic) areas of need. We 
have taken care of them in their own appropriate ways, 
The plane is not warranted anyhow at such high cost, 
if it cannot even fulfill the primary purpose of long range 
striking ability, and again, as we pointed out, couldn't even 
get through to the enemy. 
In conclusion; we can see that first, this plane is 
outdated and would never reach the enemy. The Russians know 
this; they are concentrating on missiles. Secondly, the 
cost is too great, and the money can better be utilized in 
other areas. And thirdly, no alternative uses exist that 
warrant mass programs of production. Slow orderly production 
might be okay, mainly for the purposes of research. But the 
mass production, crash program idea that would still take 
until 1970 to put the RB-70 into operational use is not 
desirable. Some might say that some military operations 
necitate (sic) the use of manned bombers. This is true. We 
have plenty of B-52 1s and other bombers that are sufficient 
in this area. They might further say that the B-70 (sic) will 
provide America with a more flexible defense posture. This 
is not true. Missiles can be used in limited warfare or non-
atomic warfare also and are faster and cheaper. 
The idea of the RB-70 originated in 1950. It was suit-
able then, but not now. This is the missile age. Missiles 
are not obsolete for their primary purpose; manned bombers are. 
Missile development is better for the nation; bombers usurp 
funds that are needed in other areas. Missiles fulfill 
alternative uses also; bombers don't, especially in light of 
failure for primary purposes on top of this. 
My solution: a crash program of missile perfection and 
production, along with, perhaps, slow development of manned 
bombers, mainly in the area of research. Thank you, 
Second Speaker, "Low," !J::Q-"Crash ProS'ram 
' Well, I'm here to speak to you on a selected topic con-
cerning the armed services, but at this early hour of the 
morning I'm no more in favor of a long, factual discussion 
than any one of you are (sic). But my day was brightened 
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considerably when Mr. Winters came up to me this morning 
before class and said, "Listen, Mike, I 1ve got this little 
army story that I heard from Dr. Duns. Maybe you can use 
it." It seems there was this WAC corporal walking along a 
long, hot, dusty road one morning when she spied a little 
lake just surrounded by a grove of beautiful green trees. 
Well, the poor girl couldn't resist the temptation; she 
stripped off all her clothes and went in swimming. And she 
was having a wonderful time sun-bathing and swimming when all 
of a sudden she noticed an army sergeant walking down the 
road toward her. Well, the poor girl didn't know what to do, 
so she runs and made a dive for her clothes and just got the 
last button buttoned when the sergeant walked into the trees. 
But the man didn't pay any attention to her. He walked up 
to the edge of the lake, stood there and said, "Camouflage 
battalion, 1tention. Forward march!" Every tree around 
the lake walked off. But this has little to do with what I 
am to talk to you about. 
Now that we're all awake I want to recall to your 
minds an old adage that we've all heard over and over: 
Never put all your eggs into one basket. Now, I 1m pretty 
sure we can all agree on the validity of this statement; 
it's simply good, intelligent strategy for anyone. Here at 
Pacific you never see Coach Rhode take only eleven men to 
a football game. He knows he can rely on a reserve supply 
of diversified players to back him up. That way if, say, 
Wayman Hall was injured in a football game, the coach could 
always send in a substitute--maybe Tiny Campora--and we're 
ready to start again. Now this is an obvious and personal 
example of our old adage. Neither Coach Rhode nor any one of 
you puts all your eggs in one basket. 
Now, what has this to do with my subject? Well, our 
strategy has been good so far. Why shouldn't it apply to our 
armed forces as well? By this I mean, why are we to depend 
solely on unmanned missiles such as the Titan, the Polaris, 
or the Atlas, all nuclear, inter-continental ballistics 
m.issiles, for our country's defense, when it is possible for 
us to have an entirely new and potent weapons system. I'm 
speaking of the RB-70 prototype bomber, the Valkyrie. This 
airplane amounts to nothing less than a fantastic breakthrough 
in the science of aerodynamics. Such a bomber, well no, call 
it a new weapons system, such a new weapons system can fly at 
speeds of two thousand miles per hour. Now that's more than 
three times the speed of sound. It will fly at an altitude 
of 70,000 feet, and have a range covering anywhere on the 
entire earth and back home again. Equipped with either 
atomic or non-atomic missiles, the RB-70 could frustrate any 
air-defense system yet developed or likely to be devised in 
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the near future. Now for:.centi.lnies man has dreamed of a 
platform in the sky, a platform such as this, for a beginning 
for all his technological development, 
Now, remember our adage, don't put all your eggs in 
one basket. Well, this is exactly what the opposers of the 
RB-70 crash program would have us do. We would rely, or we 
would be made, be forced to rely entirely on unmanned mis-
siles for our defense. Never before in history have our 
defenses been so limited, 
Now why do they want to stop the RB-70. Well they 
give us three basic reasons. First of all they tell us that 
manned bombers are said to be obsolete, , Secondly, missiles 
make our best strike force. And third, by the time the RB-70 
is in production it will be useless as a defensive weapon, 
In answering the first objection, may I point out 
very seriously that in any major global conflict, such as 
war between the United States and Russia, even humanity 
perhaps would be obsolete. An all-out nuclear war has the 
potential of reducing our planet to a place of dead rock, and 
we all know it. Latest reports have shown that a 100-megaton 
bomb exploded over the Western United States at a 100 miles 
altitude has the capability of setting on fire, completely 
ablaze, five western states. The problems which we will 
have to contend with will be the small brush fire wars, such 
as the one currently in Vietnam, or others such as have broken 
out in Laos or Goa. Now we certainly cannot rely on a weapon 
that will wipe out the entire conflict area. That's like 
killing flies with a shot gun. What is needed is a quick 
striking, mobile force, able to move in, attack, and move 
out quickly. Now, doesn't that description sound familiar~ 
The speed and the height of the 70 enable it to go anywhere 
in the world in three hours, penetrate before any warning, 
and get away at an altitude beyond detection of normal radar 
screens. This bomber can carry a full crew, actually faster 
than the proverbial speeding bullet, twenty-nine hundred feet 
per second, 
Now, the second objection is that missiles make our 
best strike force. Well, I've already pointed out that in a 
limited war you simply cannot use nuclear missiles. But even 
if you could there are other problems. Who can be sure, or 
how can you be absolutely sure that a missile has hit its 
intended target? And if it does, who can say whether it will 
explode or not? Can you imagine this situation? We lost a 
rocket aimed at Moscow. Russia retaliates on New York. Just 
over Europe we find out our rocket is a dud. What's left? 
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A pile of tin on a Kremlin floor. A nuclear holocaust in 
New York. Any number of a thousand things can go wrong with 
a rocket from take-off to target. Why, just yesterday after-
noon we taxpayers lost another bundle on an Atlas missile on 
the launching pad at Cape Canaveral basket, 
Now, what I've been trying to emphasize all along is 
this: no missile has ever been invented that can ever 
replace the experience of a tactical commander. If and when 
that day comes, we might as well all go home and quietly die, 
I realize how much faith we Americans have in those mysterious 
little machines that seem to have all the answers. But just 
consider this. Has a machine ever been developed that can 
ask a simple critical question? Hardly. Man can never be 
replaced by a machine. This is not Orwell's ~. This is 
America, today, in a critical cold war situation. Perhaps 
our whole future could depend on a short circuit in Florida, 
We could be destroyed or sent to war by a false alarm in 
California. All of us could be obliterated, because our 
armed forces chose to put all its eggs in one basket. Don't 
put your life on the line. Don't allow America's future 
security to rest on limited defense. Don't put all your 
eggs in one basket. Thank you, 
DEBATE II 
First Speaker, "Low," fu:l.11.-"Crash Program" 
Let me begin by asking a question. Would any one of 
you go to a dual with an empty pistol simply because you 
thought there might be a possibility of some misunderstanding? 
I doubt it. But many of the supporters of the RB-70 program, 
as it was just described, feel quite honestly that one of the 
reasons for the RB-70 program is the fact that if there is a 
mistake the RB-70 can be called back. However, they fail to 
take into account that if there is no mistake, that if this 
is the real thing, that the RB-70 most probably will not even 
reach the target. So again I ask you the question, would any 
person go to a dual with an empty pistol simply because he 
thought there might be the possibility of a misunderstanding? 
I'm sure that the supporters of the RB-70 wouldn't; yet many 
of their arguments seem to take the same illogical bent. 
Quite often they're not based on empirical thought or even 
on common sense, as I think you'll see, 
There is really no need for this crash program in the 
development of a large bomber, the nature of which is the 
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RB-70. If many of the congressmen who are pushing for defense 
contracts in their respective areas would just leave off of 
(sic) a little of this pressure, if some of the air force 
officers, for example, would simply not be so concerned about 
the fact that the air force might lose some of its present 
status in the armed forces system, if there might be a little 
more recognition in responsible circles that we're moving into 
a new and different era, then I think all this needless haggling 
in Congress, all this needless waste of money, and there is a 
needless waste of it, and all this needless waste of time and 
energy in the development of an obsolete weapons system simply 
would not be necessary. Rather we should use this time, 
energy, and money for the development of what many authorities 
feel is the weapons system of the future, namely the missile 
system. 
Now, what are some of the arguments used by the sup-
porters of the RB-70, arguments which they think are con-
vincing enough that we should go into a crash program of its 
development? 
First, and as already mentioned in this little intro-
duction, they feel that human decision is so valuable that 
it is more important by far than any mechanical system. Now, 
I would agree with them wholeheartedly. But something needs 
to be recognized in terms of the RB-70 or any manned air-
craft. Human decision, once it has been made, has to be 
carried out, and, as we'll see in just a moment, the RB-70 
is not an effective enough weapon to carry out human deci-
sion. Now even if it was, the missile system, the mechanical 
system to which they refer, is not as faulty as they would 
seem to indicate that it is. General White, an air force 
general, acman who is really against the missile system, him-
self has to agree that a faulty weapons system is not an occur-
rence which often takes place. If it is a faulty weapon, or 
if there is a mistake in the launching of a particular mis-
sile, it can be destroyed instantaneously. And as far as 
the missile landing on the target area, General White, him-
self, admits that it can land with the chances of a thousand 
to one, and that it will land within a close prediction of 
where the target was intended. 
Well, another reason, and this is again quite important, 
I think, if we analyze it, is the fact that the RB-70, so the 
supporters say, also can be used for limited war. In other 
words, the time may come when atomic warfare is limited, 
when it is maybe even outlawed. But even so, the RB-70 will 
be useful because it can be used in limited warfare. Well, 
I would just ask the question, of what value is a plane whose 
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effectiveness is only in the fact that it can fly at two and 
a half times the speed of sound and at altitudes far above 
50,000, 60,000 feet, of what value is a plane like this going 
to be in a war over South Vietnam and a war over South Korea? 
I think we can see it 1 sgoing to have limited effectiveness. 
It's value is high speed and high altitude, and high speeds 
and high altitudes are going to be of no value in a limited 
war in Southeast Asia or wherever it might be. 
Another reason advanced by the supporters of the RB-70, 
and probably the most important reason, is the fact that they 
say that here we 1re going to have a more diversified aircraft, 
a more diversified striking force, a striking force with 
greater power behind it. Now, this is really the crux of 
their argument, but I think if we take a close look at it 
we'll see that this is really not the case. Now, why is the 
effectiveness of the RB-70 limited? Most important, and 
it 1 s extremely important, is the rapid development that's 
taken place in recent years, and particularly in the last 
two or three years, in the defense systems of each of the 
Soviet Union and the United States. Now, keep in mind that 
the RB-70 'c'.JOUld not be able to go into full, productive use 
until 1969; this is the earliest date, 1969. This is an 
estimate given by General LeMay of the armed forces. However, 
right now in 1962, it is estimated by the United States 
Defense Command, that if one hundred RB-70 1 s were sent over 
the Soviet Union, only five of them would get through to their 
targets--five out of a hundred. An even more discouraging 
estimate is given by Colonel Maharis, who is Defense Chief 
of the New York City area. He said if the United States, or 
anybody, sent over one hundred bombers over New York, his 
defense system would allow one out of the one hundred to 
reach the target. This is in 1962. 
Now why is this basically the case? Why has the 
defense system developed so rapidly? Because, essentially, 
of one new weapon. That is the anti-aircraft missile that 
uses the infra-red technique; in other words, it homes in on 
the hea~, the exhaust, of the jet itself. Now, the interest-
ing thing is that the RB-70 does not only have the exhaust 
upon which these infra-red missiles can strike but, by the 
fact that it 1s travelling at 2,000 miles per hour, creates 
enough friction so that every part of its entire body is hot 
enough that it can attract any missile that it wants to. 
Now, if any of yoU would doubt the effectiveness of the 
Soviet Union using these infra-red missiles as a defense 
system, then I suggest you ask Gary Powers about it. I think 
he can attest to the fact that they can use these infra-red 
missiles quite effectively. It's simply the fact remains 
that no matter how fast the plane is flying, an infra-red 
anti-aircraft missile, even as they've developed to this 
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point in 1962, can be used effectively in its defense. And 
the question must be raised, what is going to take place in 
the next seven years, the seven years in which the RB-70 is 
going to get supposedly off the drawing table into full, 
productive use. I 1m sure the Soviet Union in the mean time 
can find the means by which to develop an anti-aircraft missile 
of a greater nature that will be able to eliminate the remain-
ing five planes or the remaining one plane, whatever the air-
craft might be. 
Another factor that has to be taken into account limit-
ing the effectiveness of these ~B-70 1 s, simply in terms of 
reaching its target, is the time factor. It takes the RB-70 
at least two hours to reach its target, if the speeds can be 
created as they are on the drawing table at this time. Now, 
the missile system itself takes at a minimum time fifteen 
minutes. Now, if we just estimate the times here, this would 
allow the Soviet Union, for example, to launch at least three 
additional missile waves in the time it would take the RB-70 
to reach its target, assuming--this is a very important 
assumption--that it could even reach the target to begin with. 
And then one last factor that I'm sure we 1re all inter-
ested in--if not, we will be in a few years--is the cost 
factor. General LeMay estimates that already one million 
dollars has been spent on the RB-70, and it hasn't even gotten 
off the drawing boards. And he further goes on to say that 
by the time we could put the RB-70 into full, productive use, 
in other words by 1969, we 1 re going to have spent at least, 
the minimum, of ten billion dollars. Now he suggests, and I 
think many other authorities in the field of military 
science suggest, that we spend this money, if we have to, on 
a weapons system that belongs in the correct era, namely the 
missile system itself. There is no need to waste this money 
and the energy that goes along with it. We can put it to 
more effective use on the missile system. 
I think you can see totally, then, that the arguments 
for the RB-70 are not sufficiently strong to justify develop-
ing a crash program in this field. On the other hand, the 
effectiveness of it is extremely limited. In terms of all-
out war, its effectiveness is almost nill, The time factor 
must be considered, as well as the cost factor. Maybe the 
best policy is the one suggested by the Defense Department, 
to grant simply one hundred and eighty million dollars to 
develop and build two prototypes of the RB-70, test these, 
observe them in the next five or six years. If we find that 
we need to develop the RB-70, which I doubt very much, then 
we could go immediately into full, productive use of them. 
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There simply is no need for a crash program in the 
RB-70. As General Miller of the Strategic Air Command said, 
if we're going to appropriate money for a 1943 war, fine, but 
we're not fighting a 1943 war, so let's not have a 1943 weapons 
idea. 
Second Speaker, ".!iigh," Pro-"Crash Program" 
About a quarter of a century ago--that would make it 
about 1937--there was a hot military controversy waging in 
Washington. The times were very simi.lar to those we have 
today; we realized that we were soon in all probability going 
to be entered into a war, and a war in a new field, the field 
of air. We'd had war on the sea and in the land before, but 
for the first time we moved into the air. And this controversy 
was over the development of new methods of fighting a war in 
the air. It is fortunate for us that the proponents of the 
new methods won this time. For what they proposed was the 
B-17, one of the most deadly weapons developed in the early 
part of the second World War and one of the main reasons that 
we were not crushed by the Japanese after Pearl Harbor. 
Today we are faced with a similar choice. We have now 
moved from the war of the air, we are told, to the war of 
space. And in this war some systems have become obsolete. 
And we are told by proponents of rocketry that the airplane 
is gone, its day is over, and what we need now is to con-
centrate all of our eggs on the development of powerful new 
rockets. Well, I would contend that today perhaps we should 
do the opposite of what we did in 1937; we should listen to 
the men who back the status quo, who eontend that the best hope 
for the future in the air and in space is the development of 
mobile, highly maneuverable manned airplanes, rather than 
total concentration of rockets. The plane that I am talking 
about is the RB-70; it was the B-70, quite recently changed 
to RB-70, stands for Reconnaissance Bomber. It's not a fly-
by-night scheme; it 1 s not an idea that was developed over 
night. It 1 s an idea that has been working in the minds of 
military men since 1950. In 1950 the Korean War began. We 
realized we were already approaching a new age in the air, 
and we realized that we needed new weapons to fight global 
warfare. And what we needed was a large, fast bomber, which 
not only had two or three times the speed of a B-52 but which 
also could climb higher, faster, go farther with greater pay 
load than any plane that we had at that time. 
Let's look at the specifications that were drawn up for 
this fantastic vehicle of space, or air. Number one, it flies 
at mock three, a speed of two thousand miles per hour, three 
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times faster than the B-52, the airplane on which most argu-
ments for rockets are based, Rocketry men say, "Look how slow 
the airplane is; it 1ll never compete with the rocket. We have 
to have rockets," It has inter-continental range; it can go 
to any part of the world, deliver a pay load, and return, 
something that a rocket cannot do. It files at seventy to 
eighty thousand feet, three times as high as the average B-52, 
on a regular flight; and has a pay load equivalent to that of 
the old B-36, 25,000 pounds, many times what a B-52 can easily 
carry. Finally, it utilizes one of the biggest advantages of 
the roc\{et; it has innertial and celestial navigation equip-
ment, radar and bomb sights all lihked together, which give 
it the directional ability of a rocket. But the RB-70 has 
one advantage that no rocket can ever have; that is,the 
advantage of a man, because it is flown by man in the cock-pit, 
not by man by remote control, 
But you say, what are the advantages to this? We just 
heard an argument for rockets. Why should we have a B-70? 
Why should we plow millions of dollars into this area, rather 
than continuing_ with our development of the rocket indus try? 
General Harold Hapart, Director of Special Planning for the 
War College, has this to say, "No missile likely to be 
invented can destroy a target and return to its base, and 
that's just what a manned bomber can do. It 1 s not enough 
that you know you can hit your target, obviously rockets can 
do this; command headquarters need much more. What military 
movements are on evidence in the enemy heartland is important. 
Also, what are the anti-aircraft defenses like? What was the 
extent of the damage to the target area? (Did the rocket, 
for instance, fall on the target area, or did it fall ten 
miles off?) In fact, we cannot see anyway that we can plan 
a second strike strategy intelligently," says this general, 
"unless there is some way we can learn how the first s:brike 
worked, and it seems to me that the RB~70 is the only way that 
we can do that," 
Here is the advantage, then. In the first place, the 
RB-70, with a man at the controls, with its speed, with its 
ability to deliver rockets from the air, can determine for 
us by on-the-site observations whether we need to launch 
second, third, and fourth attacks with ICBM 1 s if we use the 
mixed system, or with more RB-70 1 s if we use this system. 
This means that we can save enemy life. It means that we 
can save valuable enemy property. It means that we can save 
our own expenses in a war. For we know what the enemy is 
planning to do. We can see his troop movements if he plans 
to follow up an ICBM attack with troops. We know what damage 
we have inflicted upon him, so that we do not need to cause 
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needless bloodshed in a war of the future. It means that we 
can be prepared for return strikes, for we know whether the 
enemy is coming back at us after our second attack, assuming 
that we were attacked first. And it means that we can recall 
our planes if there is a mistake; this is something that you 
cannot do with a rocket. A rocket is final. If we make a 
mistake when that little red telephone rings in Washington, 
then it's all over for us with the rockets. It's total war; 
not true with the B-70, 
General Carl Space, former Air Force Chief of Staff, 
says that there is another advantage to the B-70, and that's 
its ability to adapt, because with a rocket the only effective 
use for war is with a nuclear warhead. It cannot carry 
enough explosives of another nature to be practical. But 
with the BB-70 we have a very fast, effective, heavy pay load 
bomber, which can deliver conventional warheads to remote 
areas in brush fire wars, without having to resort to nuclear 
attack. Not only this, but it can also be converted to 
transport troops, something that no rocket can do. Imagine 
this. Because of the speed, if right now at 8:30a.m., Pacific 
Standard time, the Chinese Communists were to start for Formosa 
at ten knots per hour, in their little junks or whatever, and 
we were to send RB-70 1 s from the United States, the RB-70 1s 
would be there over the Formosa Straits with bombs or troops 
before the Chinese Communists had gotten half-way to the 
island of Formosa, 
And finally, then, briefly, there is another advantage 
to the BB-70. Because it gives us a versatility that the 
Russians at this time do not have, although we realize that 
they are striving for it at the present time, we can have a 
mixed arsenal. The RB-70 goes into the air, fires a Sky Bolt 
rocket, which has the same effect as an ICBM, but the RB-70 
can go in, can check the target. It can do the same thing if 
ICBM 1 s are launched first and the BB-70 1s are used merely for 
reconnaissance. Thus we can know what we are doing. We have 
eyes here where the bombs have hit, an advantage of mobility 
that we do not have at the present time. Right now we have 
committed ourselves to one method of warfare, which we admit 
is total warfare. We have not provided for brush fire wars, 
We have not provided for mistakes in the Strategic Air Com-
mand, which could put us into a war that nobody wanted. And 
we have not provided for the possibility that the Russians are 
using more versatile methods· than are we ourselves. 
The advantages of the RB-70, then: it is supplementary, 
it is adaptable, and it has the ability to think, an ability 
which can save lives, can save property, can save needless 
war~-an ability which cannot be built into the mechanism of 
any nuclear rocket, 
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TABLE XXIX 
SUMMARY OF R. B. 70 SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RESULTS, DEBATE I 
Q 1 Voting Q 4 Voting Q 4 Voting 
Item for for for 
"Low" (N-18) "Low" ( N=l8) "High"(N-4) (N-4) 
1. Ef:~ecti ve- 5.44 5.89 3.25 Ineffective 
2. Invulnerable~ 3.71 4,06 2,00 Vulnerable 
3. Timely- 4.83 5.29 2.50 Obsolete 
4. Powerful- 5.50 7 .ll 5.00 Weak 
5. Hard- 5.06 5.41 4.75 Soft 
6. Aggressive- 4.67 4.67 4.50 Defensive 
X 4.88 5.41 3.63 
.l 
TABLE XXX 
SUM!'J\RY OF 11 SPEAKER SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIALS , " DEBATE I 
First Speaker Second Speaker 
"H;i,gb" "LOJ:i" 
Item Q. 1 Q. 4 Q. 4 Q. 1 Q.4 Q.4 Voting Voting Voting Voting Voting Voting 
for for for for for for 
"LoJ:i"(N-19) "Low" (N=l8) "High_" (N=4) "Lo_1/Ln __ "Low• AHigh" 
Logical- 5.16 4.83 4.00 5.21 6.47 4.25 IJ l Qgl s::aJ 
Believable- 4.90 4.78 5.?5 5.94 6.38 4.50 U:o.beli,e:>!a:tJJ.!il 
Convincing- 3.74 3.39 5.50 6.11 6.61 3.25 Un.Qonvi;o.Qing 
Factual- 5.63 5.72 5.50 3.74 3.56 3.00 Emo-uorual 
Lucid- 5.11 4.28 5. 50 5.74 5.78 5.00 0 c e 
Aggressive- 4.32 4.18 5.50 5.90 5.11 5.25 Defensl:>!~ 
Strong- 4.05 3.88 5.50 5.84 6.28 5.50 lv a 
Open-Minded 4.05 3.61 3-75 4.11 4.72 4.00 Do rna 
Likable- 4.68 4.61 5.25 6.26 6.22 5.25 R!il:Ql.ll§iye 
Like Me- 3.26 2.61 4.25 3.95 4.83 2.75 Unlike Me 
X 4.49 4.19 5-25 5.27 5-59 4.28 
f-' 
-,J 
\.J\ 
176 
TABLE XXXI 
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN "MEAN SfEAKER 
SEMANTIC Dil~FERENTIAL SCORES" DEBATE I 
Speaker 
As Per- Q 1 
ceived v.f, 
b "L II )V ow 
Q 1 
v.f. 
"Low" 
'L; Q 4 
-' 
v.f. " 
0 i"Low" 
! Q 1 
W'~! v.f. 
'"Hi,;rh 11 
Q 4 
v.f. 
"Hi,;rh" 
Q 1 
v.f. 
"Low'' 
'H Q 4 
v.f. 
I 'Low" 
Q 1 
G v.f. 
'High" 
H' Q 4 
v.f. 
'High" 
X 
= .10 
"Low" 
Q4 Ql Q4 Ql 
v.f. v.~. v.f. v.f. 
IlL II IIH II "FI"' u IlL II ow igh :!MtL ow 
XX 
.58 .86 
.28 ' 
XX = ,05 
XXX 
.37 1.32 
X 
.21 .74 
.48 .46 
XX 
1.05 
XXX _ Ol 
- l' 
"High" 
Q 4 Q 1 
v.f. v.f. 
IlL u IIH It ow ~gl:l 
XXX 
1.12 .48 
.66 .10 
.26 .38 
X 
.75 .11 
XX 
,20 .84 
,64 
*Table should be read in the following fashion: 
Q 4 
v.r. 
II Higb." 
.01 
.59 
XX 
.87 
.38 
XXX . 
1.33 
XXX 
1.13 
--
.49 
Scores in the upper-right hand section should be read 
horizontally across the inked line. Scores in the upper-
left and lower-right hand sections should be read within the 
inked lines. 
APPENDIX F 
PRE- AND POST-DEBATE QUESTIONNAIRES 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
178 
Pur your number here --------
GENERAL INFORMATION SHEET 
The present Secretary of Defense is: 
a. Charles E. Wilson 
b. E. L. Whittle 
c. Robert McNamara 
d. Christian Herter 
The present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
is: 
a. Curtiss LeMay 
b. Lionel Lemmnitzer 
c. Charles Radford 
d. Walter Reuther 
_____ The plane which immediately preceded the B 47 and 
B 52 as the backbone of s.A.c. 
a. B 36 
b. B 29 
c. B 51 
d. B 30 
_____ A long time champion of the u.s. Air Force in the 
u.s. Senate is: 
a. Senator Eastland 
b. Senator Capeheart 
c. Senator Claighorn 
d. Senator Symington 
The next question concerns the question which you will hear 
discussed today. Please mark the answer which comes nearest 
to your opinion. 
5. _____ The best policy to follow in relation to the RB 70 
is: 
a. A crash program to ready the plane for production 
b. Continue the present development program 
c. I am familiar with the issue but have no opinion 
d. I am not familiar with the issue 
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Put the number which appeared next to your name on the roll 
sheet here: 
DEBATE BALLOT 
1. I cast my vote for: (Check one no ties allowed,) 
The first speaker 
The second speaker 
2, Give a letter grade (A,B,C,D, or F) to each speaker, 
The first speaker 
_____ The second speaker 
3. Briefly state the reason for your decision and the grade 
you gave the speakers, 
4, Check the statement nearest your attitude 
_____ Agree strongly with first speaker 
_____ Agree moderately 1"ith first speaker 
Agree mildly with first speaker 
Agree mildly with second speaker 
______ Agree moderately with second speaker 
______ Agree strongly with second speaker 
The next three questions use a device designed to allow 
you to express degrees of opinion, This method, known as the 
"Semantic Differential" works as follows: You are given a 
word such as apple, and then are presented with a series of 
paired opposites which you compare to the given word. For 
instance let us assume the word was "apple," 
APPLE 
Sweet . . . . . . . . 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Sour 
Delicious ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : Awful 
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You will notice that there are seven blanks. If we 
assume that the middle blank stands for a natural position 
then you can see that the more you move to the left, the 
more you think of apples as sweet or delicious. Conversely 
the more you move to the right the more you would think of 
apples as being sour. Thus if you thought of apples as 
being very sweet you would probably maFk your question like 
this: 
Sweet ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : Sour 
If you had only eaten very green apples you would mark 
the other end of the scale. Notice that these extreme posi-
tions are not the only ones possible, Considering the second 
item above, perhaps you don't consider apples as "awful" but 
on the other hand you really don 1 t like "an apple a day." In 
this case you might mark this item like this, 
Delicious ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : Awful 
Thus you can see that the "Semantic Differential" allows 
you to respond to a word in a number of ways. You are not 
confined to only one of two possible answers, 
Please keep two thl.ngs in mind as you answer the fol-
lowing questions, 
1. Respond to all of the items, 
2.. Mark directly over the lines, not between them, 
This, _x__: ____ :, not this, x __ __ 
THE R,B, 70 
I, Effective ____ : ____ : ________ : ____ :____ ____ Ineffective 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Invulnerable : : : : : : : Vulnerable 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Timely ____ : ____ : ____ : ________ :____ ____ Obsolete 
Powerful ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ :____ Weak 
Hard : : : : : : Soft 
---- ---- ---- ---- --- ---- ---.-
Aggressive ____ : ___ : ____ : ___ : ___ :____ ___ Defensive 
1. 
2. 
). 
4. 
5. 
6. 
8. 
9· 
Logical 
Believable 
Unconvincing 
Factual 
Lucid 
Aggressive 
Strong 
Dogmatic 
Likable 
10. Like me 
THE FIRST SPEAKER 
. . . . . . 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ 
• • 0 • • • 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
• • 0 • • • 0 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----· 
• 0 • 0 • • 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
0 • • • • • 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
0 0 • 0 0 • 
0 0 • • • • 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
• • 0 • • • 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
• • • 0 • • 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
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Illogical 
Unbelievable 
Convincing 
Emotional 
Obscure 
Defensive 
Weak 
Open-Minded 
Repulsive 
(Exclude sex) ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : Unlike me 
1. 
2. 
). 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Logical 
Believable 
Unconvincing 
Factual 
Lucid 
Aggressive 
Strong 
Dogmatic 
Likable 
10. Like me 
THE SECOND SPEAKER 
• • • 0 • • 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
• • • 0 • 0 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
. . . . . . 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
• • • 0 0 0 
• 0 • • 0 • 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
• 0 0 0 • • 
0 0 • • • 0 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
• • • 0 • • 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
• • • • • 0 
0 • • • 0 • 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
• 0 • 0 • 0 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
• 0 • 0 • • 
----·----·----·----·----·----·----
Illogical 
Unbelievable 
Convincing 
Emotional 
Obscure 
Defensive 
Weak 
Open-Minded 
Repulsive 
(Exclude sex) ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : Unlike me 
